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ART. I.—*The Priesthood in the Church, set forth in Two Discourses; delivered in Baltimore, &c.* By WILLIAM ROLLINSON WHITTINGHAM, Bishop of Maryland. Second edition, with a Preface and Additional Notes. 8vo., pp. 32. Baltimore: Knight & Colburn. 1843.

WHOEVER dispassionately reflects upon the controversies that have agitated the Church of England from the time of her political existence under the decree of King Henry the Eighth, will, we apprehend, perceive the happy application to her constitution of the prophetic answer received by Rebecca, the wife of the patriarch Isaac, as recorded in the twenty-fifth chapter of the book of Genesis; and which, with a slight alteration, we venture to apply in the way of accommodation: "*Two sects are in thy womb, and two manner of people shall be separated from thy bowels, and the one sect shall be stronger than the other sect, and the elder shall serve the younger.*"

These two sects of the Church of England we consider to be a Protestant party and a Catholic party, which, it is notorious, in that Church have ever been in collision with each other from the times of the Reformation until now; and the parallel is unfortunately preserved in the fact, equally notorious, that the Protestant party, which was the *eldest*, has long since been ruled over by the *younger*, or those that have professed Catholic principles. In using the term Catholic, we do so in that sense in which the word has been ordinarily used for some hundred years, namely, as designating the communion of the Church of Rome, and consequently when we speak of the dominant sect of the English Church as being Catholic, we mean neither more nor less than that their doctrines and opinions are much more conformable to the Romish standard, than to those technically denominated Protestant: but we stop here. It is not necessary at the present time that we

should undertake any special investigation of the history of the Church of England: what we have already observed is sufficient to recall to the reader's mind those singular anomalies of her constitution, through which her various ministers, from time to time, proclaim doctrines, and publish expositions of doctrines, as directly contradictory to each other as it is possible for words to state them. In the space of a very few years we have seen the authors of the Oxford Tracts, Mr. Perceval, and now Bishop Whittingham, ascribing peculiar features and doctrines to the Church of England, which Archbishop Whately, Dr. Arnold, Goode, and others, as positively deny, and in like manner with many other names of too little importance to be enumerated in our page.

We shall not, however, concern ourselves to compare these contradictory writers with one another; our readers in general have already heard more or less on the subject; and few, we presume, have not felt sufficient interest in the Christianity of the English Church not to be on the Protestant side of this controversy. Our present undertaking contemplates nothing further than to lay before our readers an exposition of some prominent articles of the Catholic faith of the anglo-episcopal sect in the United States, as set forth by one whom they consider a lineal successor of the apostles, who shows himself no way backward to exercise all the prerogatives that can be supposed to attach to the theory of his ministerial office.

If we had only considered the two Discourses at the head of this article according to their intrinsic merits, we should not have deemed them worthy of the trouble it would require to prepare such an analysis of their contents as would be necessary to make our readers duly appreciate them. But esteeming them as it were an *ex officio* statement of a bishop of the anglo-episcopal sect in the United States, on certain points of doctrine that he and others of his brethren in opinion are prepared to preach for the future;* we thought the subject would possess an amount of interest with our readers which might require some exposition and comment: and we hope we shall have full credit with them both for patience and labor, when we assure them we have seldom had a harder task imposed upon us. We do not mean by this to say that any difficulty lay in the matter of refutation; that was of small moment; the difficulty was, the wearisome task of reducing a confused intermingling of direct and latent assumptions, evasions of proof, and

* See the prospectus of a new periodical to be entitled, "THE TRUE CATHOLIC, REFORMED, PROTESTANT, AND FREE," to be published at Baltimore, under the auspices of Bishop Whittingham.

unwarrantable inferences, into such coherence as would bring the merits of the two Discourses fairly before our readers. After we had gone through this irksome labor, we found the points in controversy between us and the bishop reduced to so small a compass that, as the saying is, they might have been put in "a nutshell." But if we had simply stated the subject in this manner, the confutation of the bishop would not have required more than half a page, and no one would have given us any credit for the pains and trouble we had gone through before we could make the short digest that the merits of the bishop's Discourses required.

Furthermore, this short mode of proceeding would not have given our readers any adequate notion of the argument of these Discourses; for we can assure them, from our experience as a reviewer, that there is often as much instruction to be derived from seeing the process by which an author undertakes to establish or refute a fact or principle, as there would be in a conviction of the truth or falsehood of the very fact or principle itself, and such we think is especially the case with these two Discourses of Bishop Whittingham. Therefore, instead of digesting them into an exhibition of the one simple point upon which they are constructed, we think it will be more edifying to let our readers see the argumentation by which the bishop develops his own doctrines, and the very curious logic by which he arrives at his conclusions.

In the second paragraph of the first Discourse, Bishop Whittingham states his subject thus:—

"I propose to occupy your attention with a theme, the treatment of which must, more or less directly, bring up all the three topics suggested by the Church; by endeavoring to clear up a subject too generally misunderstood, often grossly misrepresented—the claim of the gospel ministry to the character of a *priesthood*."

Now one would suppose from this enunciation that the bishop would proceed "to clear up," that is, we presume, establish "the *claim* of the gospel ministry to the character of a *priesthood*" by references to those passages of Scripture that teach such a doctrine. St. Paul has said in Hebrews v, 4, "No man taketh this honor [that is, of being a priest] to himself, but he that is called of God, as was Aaron?" and how any one could make a claim for the gospel ministry to be a *priesthood*, except by referring it to the appointment of Scripture, is not easy for us to comprehend. Notwithstanding this reasonable expectation, the reader is disappointed, for Bishop Whittingham commences with an etymological disquisition concerning the English term "*priest*," which he assures us is from the old French term *prestre*, which is an

abbreviation of the term *presbyter*, which means an elder; in which acceptance, *that is*, as elder, he says it is beyond a doubt used in the ordination office of the Church of England. But then besides this sense of elder as officially used, he contends, that by the institution office of the Church of England and the Prayer Book, the term is used with express reference to a "*sacerdotal function*," and as such necessarily implying that *presbyter* includes in it the sense of the term *priest*.

Now all this may be true or not: it is not material to the *claim* of the gospel ministry to be a priesthood, what the ordination office or the Prayer Book may imply, for they are not Scripture. We want to see their *claim* of being a priesthood established from the authority of the Scripture, and that alone can establish it in the view of a Christian community. However, the bishop does not get to the Scripture authorities in this Discourse, but enters upon a controversy with certain bishops and doctors of this very Church of England, who absolutely deny the priestly character of the gospel ministry as *claimed* by Bishop Whittingham; and the balance of the first Discourse is occupied with his argumentations concerning the functions of the Jewish priesthood, by which he strives to convince his readers that the ministers of the gospel in the Church of England, and the branch in the United States, performed certain acts that he construes to be analogous to those performed by the Jewish priests; and hence Bishop Whittingham infers, that as the acts of the Jewish priesthood were *priestly*, so certain acts of the Christian ministry in having a constructive resemblance to what the Jewish priests performed, must, therefore, in virtue of that resemblance, be *priestly* also.

That our readers may be able to judge concerning the exactness of these resemblances which are so strenuously urged by Bishop Whittingham, we shall lay before them the following extracts and inferences taken from his Discourse, which, we apprehend, are sufficiently clear to dispense with any comment on our part:—

"By sprinkling the blood of the slain victim before the Lord, he [that is, the Jewish priest] prefigured the entry of the risen Son of God into the holiest not made with hands, and declared, by his visible act and deed, the dependence of sinful man upon his Saviour for the pardon of transgression. Is more or less done when, by the broken bread and wine poured out, a Christian assembly shows forth the Lord's death as its only ground of hope?

"What, then, is the 'baptism for the remission of sins,' which the Church has 'acknowledged' from the beginning? Why did Ananias bid his 'brother Saul arise, and be baptized, and wash away his sins,' unless that joint act of the administrator, in the name of God the Father,

the Son, and the Holy Ghost, and of the humbly penitent receiver, conveyed an interest in the one atonement, equivalent to that obtained by sacrifice in the older dispensation? Infinitely more, indeed, the new birth in baptism symbolized and gave: but in so far as it sealed to Saul the forgiveness of his sins, wherein was it inferior in signification or efficacy to the sin-offering of the law? Why should the administrator of water, by which sins were washed away, be less a priest than the sprinkler of blood, by which atonement was effected?

"But if sacrifice had *not* been, as it was, a joint act, the priestly interference in behalf of an offender for the forgiveness of his sins would not be without a parallel under the new covenant. 'Is any sick among you,' say the Scriptures of the New Testament; 'let him call for the elders of the church, and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the LORD: and the prayer of faith shall save the sick; and the LORD shall raise him up; *and if he have committed sins, they shall be forgiven him.*' Is less power here attributed to the elder in the church of Christ than the part of the Mosaic priest in the sin-offering implied? The mediation is more explicit and direct."

Such are the functions that Bishop Whittingham considers to be common to the Jewish priesthood and the gospel ministry, which we shall not undertake to discuss, presuming it to be universally admitted among intelligent men that no one can require others to prove the negative to what a writer may please to assert. The only point we will request our readers to remember is this, that whatever the Jewish priests did was done in virtue of an express commandment of God, directing them to perform such functions. It is, therefore, a singular circumstance that Bishop Whittingham should overlook the fact that the Scripture nowhere requires the performance of any such functions from the gospel ministers as he produces as being similar to those of the Jewish priesthood. Let him, for instance, show us where the commemoration of the Lord's supper is stated in Scripture to be the peculiar function of the Christian ministry. Let him show us where the Scripture says that gospel ministers only can baptize.* Unless he can do this, we must be permitted to say that these supposed priestly acts of the gospel ministry, as represented by him, are without authority, and, consequently, that this priesthood of the Anglican Church is, in reality, only a *volunteer* priesthood.

What is the precise import of Bishop Whittingham's reference

* These functions are, in all well-regulated churches, exercised by the ministry: the usage, however, is not grounded upon any direct Scripture warrant, but upon the fitness of things. If, indeed, the celebration of the eucharist and the administration of baptism were, by explicit Scripture warrant, confined to the ministry, this would not help the bishop, unless these functions were in the Scriptures characterized as *priestly* functions.—ED.

to the anointing with oil, &c., we do not comprehend. Does he mean to teach the doctrine of extreme unction, as the Catholics do, upon the strength of this text? If this be his meaning, which we incline to think is probably the case, then he must first settle this doctrine with his own Church, which has hitherto rejected it, and the force of his argument and comparison must lay over to receive its value, when the Episcopal Church approves the doctrine, or the bishop's inferences; for until that be done, the previous rejection of it by that Church must be considered proof that the bishop has *claimed* it at least prematurely, even according to the sentiments of his own religious communion.

We have now arrived at the twelfth page of the first Discourse; and here Bishop Whittingham for the first time states what he considers to be the true theory of the priestly office. This would have been much better placed at the beginning of the Discourse: however, as the bishop's two Discourses are not according to any order of arrangement that we are familiar with, so we must take things as he gives them to us. It is better to be late than not at all. But to return to our subject. The bishop now gives us the following theory of the priestly function:—

“And, brethren, *ministerial intervention that sins may be forgiven* is the essence of priesthood, and in the multitude of words truth has been obscured, in the discussions concerning a Christian priesthood, by stopping short of that definition.”

To make this definition sustain his notion that the gospel ministers are a priesthood, through whose intervention sins are forgiven, the bishop employs the following argumentation, which, we apprehend, will sound very strange in the ears of those who have hitherto supposed that the Church of England held Protestant doctrines:—

“But does such *ministerial intervention that sins may be forgiven*, comport with the one mediation, atonement, and intercession of the Son of God?

“Observe, in the first place, if it *ever did*, it may now. The plan of GOD for our redemption is one, and has known no change. Since sin was sin, forgiveness came through the blood of Christ alone, and belonged to him alone. If forgiveness through the Beloved, in whom we have redemption through his blood, allowed of priestly intervention before his coming, it may equally since the mystery, then hidden, has been made known.

“It *may*, but not necessarily *must*. Have we reason to think it does?

“The mode in which our LORD thought fit to heal the sick of the palsy in Capernaum may afford the clew to an answer: ‘Seeing their

faith'—the faith, no doubt, of the man himself as well as of his charitable friends—'Jesus said unto the sick of the palsy, Son, be of good cheer, thy sins be forgiven thee.' When the scribes took umbrage at the expression he had chosen to adopt for the conveyal of his mercy, his vindication assumed a most remarkable form. 'That ye may know,' said he, 'that the Son of man hath power on earth to forgive sins'—and he gave the direct command, to prove his power by miracle—'Arise, take up thy bed : '—and still more strange than the Saviour's expression and its vindication, is the comment of the inspired evangelist—'they marveled and glorified God *who had given such power unto men.*' Doubtless what the LORD JESUS claimed as 'Son of man,' he claimed, not in right of his own divine nature, but in his human nature as *given him of God*; and what he claimed as given him of God 'on earth,' he claimed as '*sent*' of God. By this miracle, therefore, he asserted his claim to *power*, as *a man sent of the Father to forgive sins.* Now, what he so claimed, we find that he afterward conveyed, in the most explicit manner, to those whom he left on earth to represent him in his church, and minister in his behalf to the end of time. 'All power'—the words of the commission run—'All power is given unto me in heaven and earth. Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them.—As my Father hath sent me, even so send I you—whose soever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them, and whose soever sins ye retain, they are retained. And lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world.'"

We shall make no comment upon the extraordinary reasoning employed in the above quotation to establish Bishop Whittingham's notion that the ministers of the gospel have power to forgive sin. We presume that every unprejudiced reader of mature age can see through such singular assumptions, and the puerile conceit by which they are sustained. But we request them again to read over the last ten lines that contain the commission of those whom the bishop says our Saviour "left on earth to represent him, &c., to the end of time."

Whenever Bishop Whittingham refers to, or quotes Scripture, he generally extends the import and meaning of the passages beyond what we deem to be correct, that he may magnify the office of that gospel ministry which he seems to have so much at heart. But in the present instance he acts otherwise. He seems to have felt something like certain other persons whom he says have been "startled at the very largeness of this grant or commission," for though the commission, as stated by him, is made up of different quotations from Matthew, John, and Matthew again, he takes no notice of certain powers which Mark as *explicitly* informs us belonged to the commission, and which we insist ought to have been quoted also: by so doing we shall see there is nothing "startling" in the commission, for we perceive by the powers

annexed to whom the commission was granted, and, furthermore, it will show the bishop to be in grievous error in supposing it the commission under which the gospel ministry now act.

Mark (xvi, 14, &c.) says, Christ appeared to the *eleven*, that is, the apostles, and said to them, "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature. He that believeth, and is baptized, shall be saved; but he that believeth not, shall be damned. *And these signs shall follow them that believe; in my name shall they cast out devils; they shall speak with new tongues. They shall take up serpents; and if they drink any deadly thing it shall not hurt them; they shall lay hands on the sick, and they shall recover.*—And they went forth and preached everywhere, the Lord working with them, and confirming the word with signs [miracles] following."

Such, then, were the powers annexed to the "commission," quoted by Bishop Whittingham, and seeing this, we clearly comprehend it has no connection whatever with the gospel ministry, but was addressed *personally* to the apostles alone. This, we apprehend, must be clear to every unprejudiced person, for no one ever accomplished the miraculous things promised by Christ, as far as we are informed, but those *who believed through the personal ministry of the apostles only*.

If the "commission" be to those who have succeeded the apostles, then *believers* converted by the gospel ministers must be able to do the wonderful things here promised. These signs, however, no one can truly assert have followed the preaching of any men after the first century, or thereabouts. But to prevent any cavil as to the exact period when miracles ceased in the church, we will only say that no miracles follow the conversions of Bishop Whittingham or any other clergyman whatever, and, consequently, in this defect we assert that the "commission" claimed by Bishop Whittingham for the gospel ministry is wholly inapplicable to them, and belonged to the apostles only in their personal ministry.

As to the phrase in the commission, "I am with you alway, unto the end of the world," Matt. xxviii, 20, this need not embarrass any one longer than may be necessary to comprehend the term used in the original Scripture; for every reader of the Greek language knows that "ending of the world" is not the literal rendering of the Scripture phrase, but what our translators honestly thought to be its significance. The words themselves, when literally translated, are, "to the ending of the age, or state," by which we presume the Jewish age or dispensation was intended, and which

was then about to terminate. The promise of Christ to be with the apostles to the ending of the world, therefore, was literally fulfilled by the supernatural evidences afforded to them in their ministrations among men, until the end of the Jewish age, which took place somewhere about forty years after the crucifixion.

That this is the most reasonable sense in which the phrase "end of the world or age" is to be understood, is distinctly sustained by the fact that the miraculous powers exercised among the first believers in Christ ceased altogether within a few years after that event: for it would seem that though an imposition of the hands of the apostles did confer miraculous powers on those who believed through their ministry, yet we have no instance on record of any value that can induce us to believe that those upon whom the apostles' hands had been laid were able to communicate a similar miraculous power to those who believed through them. The presumption, therefore, is, that when all those persons died who had received power from the hands of the apostles, then all miracles in the church ceased. This is the theory maintained by Archbishop Whately in some essays of great interest published by him a few years ago, which Bishop Whittingham himself was so much pleased with as to republish in the United States.

Unless our view on this subject be correct as above stated, there must be some other explanation to be given which is yet unknown, for never can any rational man suppose that the "commission" assumed by the bishop, pertains to the gospel ministry to the ending of the present world; for the fact that *believers* in Christ through their ministrations have no miraculous powers is self-evident and undeniable; nor is it possible, without violence, to detach miraculous powers from the "commission" quoted by Bishop Whittingham.

We have now faithfully exhibited the scope and argument of the first Discourse of Bishop Whittingham, and as yet no proof has been given from the Scriptures to justify the *claim* of the gospel ministry to be a priesthood, which the bishop proposed to establish at the commencement of the sermon. His fancied resemblances between the functions of the Jewish priests and the acts of the Christian ministers, have, in our view, about the same force as those employed by Fluellen, to prove the resemblance between Macedonia and Monmouth,—“There is a river in Macedon, and there is also, moreover, a river at Monmouth: it is called Wye at Monmouth, but it is out of my brains what is the name of the other river; but 'tis all one, 'tis so like as my fingers is to my fingers, and there is salmon in both.”

The second Discourse of Bishop Whittingham commences with great solemnity of language, founded on his peculiar views of the priestly character, that he continually assumes to characterize the ministry of the anglo-episcopal sect. But after a short exordium he makes the following remarks :—

“In the office which we have just been using, I have, by the prescription of the Church, had occasion again and again to speak of your pastor as ‘*a priest*,’ and of the duties which have now been committed to him as ‘*sacerdotal functions*’—implying that *as a priest* he is to minister among you, and therefore to offer *sacrifice*, at what we learn from the rubrics or directions incorporated in the office, to call the ‘*altar*’ of Christian worship.—It is my purpose to examine the grounds for acquiescing in the view adopted by the Church, and put forth in the frame-work of her most solemn formularies.”

Here the bishop affirms a proposition nearly similar to what he advanced on commencing the first Discourse, and repeats his intention of examining into the merits of his theory of the priestly office of the gospel ministry. And now the reader would in all reason expect to see him bring forth from the Scriptures those texts that are to establish the *claim* of the Christian ministers to be a priesthood. But instead of undertaking to establish this claim, he tells us that certain objections have been made to it. Now this was not treating his hearers or readers respectfully. He ought to have shown us how the claim is to be made, upon what texts of Scripture it is founded, and then, after having stated his strong reasons in support of it, he might inform us that certain objections had been made, &c. But instead of doing this, we are altogether left in the dark as to what are the foundations of the *claim* of the gospel ministry to be a priesthood. We must take the bishop’s word for it that they have a *claim*, though, for all that we have seen, the *claim* may be nothing but a downright assumption. However, since the bishop will not substantiate the *claim* by direct exhibition of Scripture proofs, we must even follow him, and see how he defends it, and possibly, from the mode of defense, we shall learn something further concerning the foundation and merits of this *claim* of the gospel ministry to be a priesthood.

The bishop opens his defense in the following ingenuous manner :—

“An objection that must be met at the outset, is, that we have no Scriptural sanction for such a procedure ; that the New Testament nowhere speaks of ‘*priest*,’ ‘*altar*,’ or ‘*sacrifice*,’ as pertaining to the worship of the new and better covenant.”

Now we should think that this objection is sufficient to crush to powder the whole theory of the bishop concerning the Christian priesthood: for if the terms PRIEST, ALTAR, SACRIFICE, as pertaining to the Christian dispensation, are not to be found in the New Testament, we should naturally suppose it to be incredible that either Christ or his apostles ever meditated any such system as Bishop Whittingham supposes; and we believe it would be impossible to produce any stronger objections to such an hypothesis than this utter silence of the New Testament writers. But Bishop Whittingham says this "objection is to be met at the outset"—and the manner he does meet it is to us unparalleled in all our controversial reading. To the objection, that the New Testament nowhere speaks of priest, altar, or sacrifice, as pertaining to the Christian dispensation, he replies, "*This is a matter not wholly certain!*"

"This is a matter not wholly certain, since the Epistle to the Hebrews says, 'We have an altar;' and our Saviour, in his sermon on the mount, where the gospel is set in contrast with the law, speaks of *his* followers leaving their gifts on the altar, to be first reconciled with their brethren before they offer; while the apostles repeatedly make mention of the gifts and offerings of Christians in terms implying a sacrificial character."

Now, is not this wonderful? Here is an advocate for a priesthood in the Christian ministry who admits the words priest, altar, and sacrifice, are not formally applied in the Scriptures to that ministry, and who yet attempts to delude himself and his readers into the belief that the non-application of these terms to the gospel ministers is a matter "*not wholly certain*," seeing there are two expressions in the Scripture, one relating to the then existing Jewish altar, in the view of every unprejudiced commentator, and the other a mere metaphor, which are yet, according to his notion, to set aside the whole amount of direct objection founded on the important fact that the terms priest, altar, and sacrifice are not to be found throughout the whole writings of those who promulgated the Christian religion to the world, and whom he asserts commissioned a priesthood, and appointed institutions of a sacrificial character.

We need not be surprised after this at the logic of the following argumentation of the bishop concerning the omission of the New Testament writers to introduce the terms priest, altar, sacrifice:—

"But suppose it should be granted that the application of the terms 'priest,' 'sacrifice,' and 'altar' to a ministry and worship under the gospel, does not occur in the New Testament? Just this: that the

terms, and the things they signify, will be left in the same position as the terms 'sabbath' and 'Bible,' and the things they signify. If there be no mention of a Christian *priest*, there is none, also, of a Christian *sabbath*. If our being *all* priests, a 'royal priesthood,' 'a holy priesthood to offer up spiritual sacrifices,' 'kings and priests unto God,' excludes a delegated priesthood of men separated to the work, then our time being all holy, our whole lives consecrated unto God, must exclude (as some few sects have from time to time, in opposition to the mass of the Christian community, maintained) the dedication of the seventh day as holy unto the LORD. If our having one great High Priest, for ever making intercession, by the oblation of his one sufficient sacrifice, excludes the ministration of earthly priests; so we have one heavenly sabbath, a rest remaining for the people of God, to which we are bid look forward, and for an entry into which we are taught to labor. If the absence from the New Testament of the words 'priest,' 'sacrifice,' and 'altar,' in application to the ministers and mode of Christian worship, could prove the ministry of the gospel to be no priesthood, its service no sacrifice, needing and admitting of no altar, then the absence of the words 'Bible' and 'Holy Scriptures' from the New Testament, in application to its own form and contents, would prove that the new dispensation has no sacred volume, the word of God, written by apostles and evangelists, no claim to be his revelation of his will.

"This negative mode of arguing, then, will not do. The books of the New Testament are part and parcel of the Bible, though they nowhere say so. The Lord's day is the Christian sabbath, though nowhere called so. The gospel ministry may be a priesthood, the worship of the church a sacrifice, though nowhere so described."

By such reasoning as this, which is too absurd to require any refutation, the Roman Catholics prove purgatory, auricular confession, indulgences, and whatever they may desire to establish. Mohammed could have proved equally well by the New Testament what he arrogated to himself, for having *claimed* that he was the Paraclete, or Comforter, promised by our Saviour, (John xvi, 7, 8;) every thing else would follow by as necessary inferences as any made by Bishop Whittingham to sustain the claim of the gospel ministry to be a priesthood.

Bishop Whittingham having taken the position that the "gospel ministry may be a priesthood, and the worship of the Church a sacrifice, though nowhere so described in the Scripture," now proceeds to show his strong reasons for affirming this to be the fact; and to convince us of the truth of this, he urges upon us this mighty argument, not drawn from Scripture, as our readers might naturally anticipate:—

"A presumption that they are [that is, a priesthood]—a *presumption only to be set aside by the express counter testimony of the written word*

—arises from the fact, that there never has been a time when they were not so considered by the church; for fifteen hundred years without a breath of opposition, and for the last three hundred with the exception only of a minority, so disproportionately small as hardly to merit being taken into the account.”*

We now have at last ascertained that Bishop Whittingham’s *claim* of the gospel ministry to be a priesthood rests upon no warranty or authority of the Scriptures, but on an asserted presumption of fifteen hundred years’ standing that they are so. Hard as it seems to us to be put off with a presumption when we have been looking for Scripture authority all this while, it seems still harder to digest the bishop’s doctrine on its back when he asserts that the force of this fifteen hundred year presumption can only be set aside by the “*express counter statement of the Scripture*,” whose absolute silence that there is any Christian priesthood whatever, constitutes the very objection that we have to the doctrine in question. This is a new way of arguing, and may, indeed, be called a complete turning of the tables on the bishop’s theological adversaries. They required proof from him, and he manages to

* The whole proceeding of Bishop Whittingham to evade the force of the objection that the New Testament nowhere uses the terms priest, altar, sacrifice, in reference to the gospel ministry, is so precisely like that employed by Lord Peter to justify wearing gold lace, as described in Swift’s immortal Tale of a Tub, as might lead an ill-natured person into a suspicion of plagiarism. This, however, may be explained otherwise: the resemblance between Lord Peter and the bishop may proceed from the similarity of their positions, as well as something, perhaps, similar in genius and temper. However, let our readers judge of the matter by the following extract:—

“—, a certain lord, came direct from Paris with fifty yards of gold lace upon his coat: in two days all mankind appeared closed up in bars of gold lace. What should our three knights do in this momentous affair? They had sufficiently strained a point already in the affair of shoulder knots: upon recourse to the WILL, nothing appeared there (concerning gold lace) but *altum silentium*. But about this time it fell out that the learned brother aforesaid (Lord Peter) had read *Aristotelis dialectica*, and especially that wonderful piece *de interpretatione*, &c. ‘Brothers,’ said he, ‘you are to be informed that of wills *duo sunt genera*, viz., *Nuncupatory*, and *Scriptory*; that in the *Scriptory will* here before us, there is no precept or mention made about gold lace, *conceditur*: but *si idem affirmetur de nuncupatoria*; *regatur*. For, brothers, if you remember, we heard a fellow say, when we were boys, that he heard my father’s man say, that he would advise his sons to get gold lace on their coats as soon as ever they could procure money to buy it.’ ‘By George, that is very true,’ cries the other. ‘I remember it perfectly well,’ said the third. And so without more ado they got the largest gold lace in the parish, and walked about as fine as lords.”

get round and require proof from them that he is in error. They insist upon Scripture, and the bishop gives them a presumption, and then turning on them, he challenges them to disprove his presumption from Scripture; nay, he even goes so far as to say he must have *express Scripture*, and nothing less, to disprove a presumption which has been taken up without regard to Scripture.

But if our readers be disposed to smile at this absurdity of requiring other persons to prove by Scripture the negative to an unwarrantable presumption not based on Scripture, what must they think of the ludicrous absurdity of a writer who, in the very next paragraph, cancels the whole value of his presumption by the following remarks :—

“Unquestionably, like every other truth, this, of the sacerdotal character of the Christian ministry, has been liable to misinterpretation and abuse. Errors of the most dangerous nature have grown out of it, and prevailed to a very great extent, and find their misguided advocates to this very day and at our thresholds, [that is, the Romish priesthood.] A priesthood assuming the character of mediatorship and intercessorship, sprung up in days of predominant ignorance, out of the amalgamation of half-discarded paganism with the Christian forms and doctrines. A worship offered not *with*, but *for* the people, in a tongue unknown to them, and a voice inaudible, crept into use among insufficiently instructed converts, from the barbarous hordes that changed the face of Europe in the sixth and following centuries, and, in similar circumstances, found its way among the churches of the East, depriving their time-honored forms of half their beauty and nearly all their efficacy. Crude, contradictory, and low views of the Christian sacraments, led to utterly unscriptural notions of the sacrificial nature of the blessed eucharist, and while they, almost blasphemously, elevated it into a constantly recurring, and simultaneously multiplied, propitiatory repetition of the one great mystery wrought on Calvary; degraded it into dependence for its nature, worth, and efficacy, on the intention of the frail and sinful man commissioned with its administration. Ministerial intervention for the remitting or retaining sin, by admission to the sacraments or exclusion from their privileges, assumed the form, for ten centuries unheard of in the Church, of judicial reconciliation of offenders in absolution, given on terms at the discretion of the fallible, mortal judge.”

If such, then, was the character of the priesthood of the Romish Church preceding the Reformation, according to Bishop Whittingham's own showing, and to which we assent with all our heart, is it not exquisitely absurd to ask any one to concede the smallest respect to a “presumption” that comes to us alone through such gross corrupters of Christianity? We do not understand how any one could urge more forcible objections against the value of such a “presumption” than the bishop himself has done; but he, never-

theless, is so short-sighted as to overlook the consequence, that, by so doing, he entirely destroys his own argument.

The next position of the bishop is so curious both as to its logic and ingenuity, that we consider it the most remarkable thing of the kind we have ever met with. The bishop having described the priesthood of the Catholic Church preceding the Reformation, as we have just quoted it, continues his remarks as follows :—

“ Such a priesthood the reformers found, claiming privileges which it refused to test by the written record of its commission, and exercising those privileges, even on its own showing of their extent, in abuses the most fearful and soul-destroying. Is it wonderful that some who set themselves to gainsay its usurpations, failed, in the corruption which they saw, to find the simple, Scriptural original? and under the exclusive worship, mumbled in an unknown tongue, of a mass, and pardon-monging ministry, lost sight of the Christian priesthood and its spiritual sacrifices?

“ *Some*, not all; for God be thanked, our branch of the Catholic Church of Christ, while it purged away the accumulated errors that had soiled its discipline and worship, retained alike the form of sound words in doctrine, and the golden casket of ritual observances, that it found transmitted, unbroken and unchanged, from primitive days and apostolic men. A ministry derived by pure succession, from the fount in the Lord's own commission, has never ceased to keep up its claim to the priestly character,” &c.

The preceding extract, we repeat it, is one of the most curious things we have seen in these curious Discourses, and places Bishop Whittingham as a controversial writer in a peculiarly ingenious light. He had admitted, on a previous page, that the claim of the anglo-episcopal ministry to be a priesthood rested so strongly on the presumption of fifteen hundred years, that nothing but express counter testimony of the Scripture was sufficient to set it aside. But now he turns on the Papists, through whom the fifteen hundred years' presumption only comes, censures them for “ abuses the most fearful and soul-destroying,” charges them with that outrage to common sense of refusing to test their assumed privileges by “ *the written record of their commission*,” that is, the Scriptures, and, at the same time, claims for the Church of England, without any reference whatever to Scripture on his part, the full benefit of the fifteen hundred year presumption.

King James the Second said, that no one could possibly reason with the Church of England; for that against Catholics they argued as if they were Puritans, and against Puritans as if they were Catholics: but we presume he was only acquainted with the fact that they did so in their separate discussions with either Catholics

or Puritans. It remained for Bishop Whittingham to do this at the same time, in the one breath, and his ingenuity in so doing ought to promote him to great honor with the friends of anglo-episcopacy on either side of the great Atlantic.

But now, after Bishop Whittingham's censure of the Catholic priesthood for not testing their privileges "*by the written record of its commission*," we surely are justified for our repeated notices of his omission to prove by "*that written record*" the claim he has made for the Church of England, that her ministry are priests. The objection which he himself noticed in the first part of the second Discourse,—“that the New Testament nowhere speaks of priest, altar, or sacrifice, as pertaining to the gospel ministry”—remains as yet unanswered by him, and we cannot allow him to evade that objection, and to slip abruptly into a panegyric upon the Church of England, regardless, at the same time, of Scripture on the one hand, and the Popish traditions on the other. We must be permitted to remind our readers of these inconsistencies, and since he has given us a sound form of words for the occasion, we shall use them to say, he has altogether evaded, like the Papists, to test his assumptions that the clergy of the anglo-episcopal sect are a priesthood, by any reference to the "*written record*," or Scripture.

Returning once more to the bishop's Discourses. After having exalted the Church of England, as we have shown in our last extract, and much more than we thought necessary to quote, he next proceeds to magnify the functions of the clergymen of that Church as a priesthood in the administration of the sacraments, utterly oblivious that he has never proved them to be a priesthood, or that they have any divine precept or warrant for an exclusive right to administer those ordinances. He concludes at last with an exhortation to the congregation, and to the reverend gentleman whom he had just instituted rector over them, according to the usages of the Church of England, but which it is not necessary to introduce here.

The sentiments uttered by the bishop in his two Discourses, however, do not appear to have been received by the new rector with any favor; for in the evening of that same day he preached to his congregation, and, with a becoming regard both to Scripture and common sense, had the magnanimity to tell them his views on the subject in the following words:—

“And now, let me further speak of the only way in which the Lord's table can be called an altar, the eucharist a sacrifice, and the officiating minister a priest. This can only be in the accom-

modated or figurative use of these terms, and not in their literal or Jewish acceptation, or with any idea of their being in our eucharist "a real or material sacrifice." To use these terms without such qualification very distinctly expressed leads to error, and is at variance with the word of God and the institutions and principles of our Church."

In another place he says,—

"The English word *priest* is used in consequence of the meagerness of our language, as the translation of the two Greek words *ιερευσ* and *πρεσβυτερος*,* the former of which denotes an offerer of Jewish sacrifices, and the latter a Christian minister. The latter word, according to Bishop White, 'never denotes an offerer of sacrifice' except in the figurative or accommodated sense. I am no more a priest in the sense of the word objected to, than you are, my brethren, who are laymen; nor can I in the same sense offer sacrifice any more than you can."

The consequence of this collision of opinion between Bishop Whittingham and Mr. Johns, in conjunction with the reports in circulation as to the *ultra* notions of the former, made it necessary that their several Discourses and Sermons should be printed, and so much interest was taken by the members of the Episcopal sect on the subject that second editions of them have been published. This circumstance afforded Bishop Whittingham an opportunity of explaining and strengthening his views by a preface to the second edition of his two Discourses, which, in one or two particulars, is sufficiently curiously characteristic of the writer to be taken notice of. His preface commences thus:—

"It will be perceived that in the following Discourses the stress of the argument is laid not upon *any one* act of the gospel ministry, such as the administration of the holy eucharist; but on the fact that the ministry of the Christian priesthood in the word and sacraments *is equivalent* in nature and efficiency to that of the Jewish priesthood in offering animal or other sacrifices. Of that fact proof is given. It is perfectly immaterial to the end and aim of the Discourses whether one or ten thousand persons have used the word 'priest' to express an office

* It is very strange to us that Mr. Johns should suppose there is any meagerness in the English language in this case. The Greek term *πρεσβυτερος* was never rendered by the term *priest* by any sect of Protestant Christians but those of the Church of England: excepting these last, all others translate the term by *elder*, its true, plain, legitimate signification. The complaint of the meagerness of the English language on this subject was the peculiar discovery of those who sustain transubstantiation, apostolical succession, or other kindred doctrines.

more limited in its nature than that which they [that is, the Discourses] maintain to belong to the commissioned servants and representatives of Christ in his church. *Let it be shown that the Christian ministry is not an appointed intervention for the forgiveness of sins*, and the doctrine here taught will be set aside; *but not till then.*"

Here we have our illogical bishop writing a preface which has no concinnity with the two Discourses to which it is prefixed; for in the first Discourse he proposed "to clear up the claim of the gospel ministry to the character of a priesthood;" and in the second Discourse he said, "It is my purpose to examine the grounds for acquiescing" in such a view, &c. But in the preface to the second edition of these Discourses, he says his argument is laid "on the fact that the ministry of the Christian priesthood in the word and sacraments is equivalent in nature and efficiency to that of the Jewish priesthood in offering animal or other sacrifices. Of that fact," he says, "proof is given."

Now on these points we are at issue with the bishop:—*First*, he has given no proof or argument whatever that the gospel ministry are a priesthood. He has neither "cleared up the claim," nor has he given us any "grounds to acquiesce" in the theory of their priesthood, which, in truth, is so far from being of *divine appointment*, that even he is obliged to admit the terms priest, altar, and sacrifice, are not formally applied throughout the whole Scripture to the Christian ministry. The only proof that he brought forward was the "fifteen hundred year presumption," which, after he had required all gainsayers to prove a negative, he saved them the trouble by brushing it away himself.

Secondly. We are at issue with the bishop upon what he says he has done in the preface, *namely*, given proof that "the ministry of the Christian priesthood," &c., is *equivalent* to that of the Jewish priesthood, &c. As to any thing like proof that they are *equivalent* we cannot see it in any thing advanced by him. That the functions of the Jewish priests and gospel ministers may so far resemble each other as to justify a metaphorical exchange of terms in certain instances, we shall not deny, and any thing further than will justify a tropical application we do deny, and we hope the testimony of Bishops White, Whately, and others, on this subject, is as good authority as that of Bishop Whittingham.

Passing over some other particulars that might be urged on the foregoing points at issue between us and the bishop, we direct the reader's attention to the following passage in the above extract from the preface:—"Let it be shown that the Christian ministry is *not an appointed intervention for the forgiveness of*

sins, and the doctrine here taught will be set aside; but not till then."

In this curious passage we have again a specimen of Bishop Whittingham's ingenuity as a controversialist, which is in happy keeping with that part of the Discourses which required all dissentients to prove the negative to "the fifteen hundred year presumption." He now, after again affirming the Christian ministry to be a priesthood, sets all gainsayers at defiance by requiring *THEM* to show that the Christian ministry is *NOT an appointed intervention for the forgiveness of sins*; and not until *the negative* to his assertion is proved will he agree to abandon his doctrine. Surely the merest tyro in logic is supposed to know that this would be deemed an absurd requirement. He that advances a proposition is bound to prove or establish it himself. To require others to disprove assertions, gratuitously assumed, is unreasonable enough, but to assert he will not lay them aside until the negative is proved, seems, in our view, to indicate a state of utter intellectual confusion, if it be not rather something worse; for this very singular writer, at the same time that he takes such remarkable privileges to himself in making assertions, will not admit other persons to make assertions, or to quote human authorities against him; for he expressly objects to "*reiterated assertion, and appeals to names bright and venerable, but never lent by those who bore them to crush inquiry into the meaning of the word of God under the weight of human authority.*"

The absurdity and inconsistencies involved in Bishop Whittingham's writings are often so complicated that it is wearisome in the extreme to unravel and expose them as it ought to be done, but the intricacy of the inconsistencies of this last extract are almost too great for our patience. That Bishop Whittingham could ever imagine that his Discourses were any inquiry into the meaning of the word of God is wonderful; but that he could suppose others proposed to crush him by the weight of human authority is really past all bearing: however, the drift of his observations on this subject is evidently to set aside those natural inferences that men have made concerning the palpable contradictions in doctrine between him and the late Bishop White, whom, though a member of the same Church, Bishop Whittingham represents to have been "warped by prejudice." This, indeed, is an easy way of getting rid of the authority of Bishop White's opinions; but those who are capable of judging between the two will not be at much loss to determine which of them it were the wiser to follow.

It would be uninteresting to examine Bishop Whittingham's preface any further as respects either his doctrines or his arguments. We have sufficiently laid them before our readers. It may not, however, be amiss to show his indomitable resolution to maintain the opinions promulgated by him in his Discourses, and of what small account he regards the opposition either of Papists or Protestants. "Hear him :"—

"In the meanwhile, if the Romanist chooses to value his schismatic ministrations because they profess to offer a sacrifice of a kind utterly different from any known to holy writ or the Church in its purest ages, let him. If he can persuade the people to narrow down a good old English word [that is, the word 'priest'] to suit his exclusive notions, be it so. It is the thing, not the name, about which the true Catholic is anxious. To have a ministry bearing the Master's warrant in a visible succession from Him, commissioned to preach forgiveness of sins in his name, and seal it in the sacraments, and to know it as so commissioned, and take corresponding comfort in its ministrations of the spiritual washing and heavenly food, is our need and glory.

"Nevertheless, against both the Romanist and such Churchmen as may be disposed toward the view of Zuingli, it is safe and right to insist that while we have the thing, we shall not tamely surrender its true name. The Church has a priesthood 'called of God,' 'separated unto him,' 'to minister unto him,' 'to offer gifts and sacrifices.' It is low, unworthy truckling to the usurping arrogance of Rome, and the Kora-ite gainsaying of those who deny all segregated ministry in the name of CHRIST, to relinquish what the one appropriates to its perverted notions, and the other scouts as obsolete and futile, because the extremes of error meet in opposition to our just claim. Romish and Anabaptist pulpits have resounded with denunciations of the doctrine of these Discourses. So much the better. Sooner shall the stricken anvil burst than the heritage of God's elect be despoiled by the onslaughts of heresy or schism."

As we do not apprehend that any Protestant sect among us will care a straw concerning this splenetic brag of Bishop Whittingham, we shall say nothing in reply. The Papists may defend themselves against him as they may see fit, and truly we think they ought to bestir themselves, for the Church of England, both over the sea and in this country, seem determined not only to appropriate their peculiar doctrines to themselves, but even to deprive them of their inconsistent appellation of Catholic by the still more inconsistent application of it to the smaller communion of the anglo-episcopal sect.

As it is not improbable that some of our readers may sooner or later find themselves engaged in controversy with those members of the anglo-episcopal sect in our country who entertain

notions similar to those of Bishop Whittingham, we do not think it unadvisable at the present time to lay before them a brief view of what the New Testament really communicates to us concerning the office and functions of those persons we denominate ministers of the gospel.

From the time that our first parents transgressed in the garden of Eden, the economy of human redemption has been ever manifested to us through the instrumentality of a priest offering sacrifices for sin, thus continually proclaiming to us the doctrine, that "without the shedding of blood there is no remission of sin." In patriarchal times it would seem that every head of a family or tribe offered up such sacrifices. But in the dispensation committed to Moses, the law of God restricted the function of sacrificing to the family of Aaron alone, and expressly forbade any other person to exercise that office. It would be needless to inquire what may have been the notions of the Jews concerning the priesthood, or the efficacy of the sacrifices offered by them. All believers in Christianity confess that both priest and sacrifice under the Jewish economy were mere types and references to Christ. This doctrine is so fully set before us in the Epistle to the Hebrews that it would be useless to more than refer to it; the sum of the whole epistle is, that Christ having made propitiation for the sins of mankind by the sacrifice of himself, then ascended into heaven, where he is set down on the right hand of God as our high priest, mediator, and intercessor for ever. "But this man, because he continueth ever, hath an unchangeable priesthood: wherefore he is able also to save them to the uttermost that come unto God by him, seeing he ever liveth to make intercession for them," Heb. vii, 24, 25.

Christ, then, as our high priest, having ascended into heaven, where he ever lives to exercise for us the functions of priest and mediator, every devout worshiper draws near to God through him without the intervention of any other person whatever, and if any doctrine is clearly taught in the Scripture we should presume it to be this.

But though Christ has thus ascended on high as our high priest and intercessor, he still regards all Christian believers as a community under the general term of the Church; and either by himself or by his apostles has recognized certain principles of order and edification by which they are comprehended together as a body of devout believers in him, and by which they might be confirmed and established in the common faith. Thus in Ephesians iv, 8, &c., "When he ascended up on high he led captivity captive,

and gave gifts unto men. And he gave some, apostles ; and some, prophets ; and some, evangelists ; and some, pastors and teachers ; for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ," &c.

That Christ has, therefore, set certain persons in the church, (that is, the whole communion of Christian believers,) is then abundantly clear ; but we must observe, that the terms, as above used, are all general, merely implying appointments to certain ends and purposes, but in nothing technical, as expressing permanent officers under such appellations. The names of those officers of the church that are mentioned in the New Testament as concerned in the religious exercises of Christianity are those of bishop or presbyter, and deacon.

But though the writers of the New Testament have spoken of bishops or presbyters, and deacons, yet there is nothing stated by them to give us a precise or exact comprehension of their office, ordination, or function, unless as preachers of the gospel of Christ ; and the consequence has been that men have entertained the most opposite theories on these subjects. Nevertheless, it seems to us that a proper acquaintance with the Jewish institutions of that day will remove every difficulty on the subject, and place the whole matter in the very clearest point of view, without any confusion or distraction whatever.

The terms bishop or presbyter, and deacon, were not names of officers invented by the apostles, but were familiar and well-known titles of persons performing certain functions in the Jewish synagogues ; who had been distinguished by these very names for some three hundred years or more before the advent of our Saviour.*

Now, then, since Christ or his apostles have familiarly spoken of the officers of the Christian community by the same titles as

* It may perhaps be proper that we should here correct a common, but very erroneous notion, that the first appointment of deacons in the Christian church was made by the apostles on the occasion mentioned in Acts vi. As we have abundant testimony from the rabbinical writers that deacons had been always a part of the synagogue officers from whatever time the synagogue service had existed, it is, therefore, evident that the appointment of those persons recorded in Acts vi was either *special*, or else an addition to a number then actually existing. The circumstances of the case explain the whole transaction. The Greek-Jewish Christians complained that their widows had been neglected by those officers whose particular business it was to discharge a certain duty ; and the apostles, to remedy the injustice complained of, recommend them to choose seven persons out of their own number, that is, Greek-Jewish Christians, to attend to this matter in future, in conjunction, we presume,

those by which the Jewish synagogue officers were universally distinguished at that time, and since there is not a single passage in the whole New Testament that gives any definition or makes any statement implying any particular difference to exist between the offices of bishop, presbyter, and deacon, as exercised in the churches of the Christians, from those of bishop, presbyter, and deacon, as exercised in the Jewish synagogues, it seems to us absurd to suppose there was any specific difference between them at that time, or that it was ever intended the ministers of the gospel should stand upon any other platform than that of the synagogue.

It seems impossible how any rational man can come to any other conclusion; for if Christ or his apostles did not intend that Christian believers should follow the institutions and scheme of the synagogue, why have they not only alone employed synagogue titles and terms, but have, moreover, entirely forbore to express any opinion whatever that might imply they did not approve of such a construction? How, then, can the mind of Christ and of his apostles be more clearly expressed as to the exact resemblance, in their view, of the ministers of the gospel to those of the synagogue?

However satisfactory it might be to our readers for us now to proceed with an exposition of the theory of the synagogue, it would require far more space than we could rightly claim in this review. The reader who has not been instructed on this subject must be satisfied when we tell him, on the universal consent of all writers on this subject, Jewish or Christian, that the synagogue and all its institutions of officers, &c., were framed upon no commandment

with the other officers already appointed. This advice they accepted, and chose seven persons, whose evidently Greek names show from what party in the church they had been selected.

By what authority these seven persons chosen on this occasion have been styled deacons, we know not. For all that we can see, *their appointment* was one peculiar alone to the church at Jerusalem, where the disciples lived on a common fund or stock; for we have no intimation given us that the primitive Christians lived in common anywhere else than at Jerusalem. The true deacons of the synagogue had existed in their peculiar functions already some three hundred years, as is evident from Jewish antiquities, and deacons such as these of the synagogue undoubtedly belonged to every Christian church from the beginning of Christianity. The *seven*, therefore, whose election is stated in Acts vi, can only be called deacons in a general sense, as a term applied to any subordinate officers of the church. The relation of Acts vi has, therefore, nothing to do with the appointment of deacons, properly so called, but refers to a special office, which, in all probability, was peculiar to the Christian community at Jerusalem alone.

of God, but arose from the piety and good sense of religious men among the Jews shortly after their return from the Babylonian captivity, then very desirous of instructing one another in the truths revealed to them by Moses and the prophets. They met together, therefore, in meetings or synagogues, where prayer to God was offered, the law and the prophets were read and expounded, and where exhortations were made to them to continue faithful and obedient to what God had commanded them. These services of prayer, reading, expounding, or exhorting, were performed by individuals from among their own body, who were called on in virtue of their gifts, learning, or piety, to render such services to their less enlightened brethren. Nor was there any ordination or appointment to these functions that can be said to differ in any material point from what ordinarily takes place in a well-regulated prayer meeting. In these last, as in the Jewish synagogues, any person able to pray, exhort, or teach, may be called on to edify the rest, nor would any one hesitate to obey the call if he felt himself competent. Thus every one is aware our Saviour continually officiated in the Jewish synagogue. He had never been ordained, as far as we know, either as presbyter or deacon. But he was known to them as a devout or religious Jew, and in virtue of that character he was invited to read and expound the law to the congregation; and he stood up and taught them. Luke iv, 15, &c. And so in like manner with the apostles. See Acts xiii, 14, 15; xvii, 1, 2.

But where the members of a Jewish synagogue were the common sojourners of a town or village, those persons who had spiritual gifts, being continually exercised in such services, gradually became a separate number of persons in the congregation, and were ultimately distinguished by the names of elders, bishops, or presbyters. One of these, as being the head, eldest, or moderator, was known by the name of chief, or ruler, of the synagogue, angel of the church, overseer, or bishop, and those who attended to the smaller and temporal concerns of the assembly, or of building, &c., were termed deacons, or ministers.

Such, then, in brief, was the constitution of the Jewish synagogue for some three hundred years' continuance before our Saviour's advent, and seeing that the apostles have alone used synagogue titles for the ministry under the gospel dispensation, it is passing strange how any reader of Scripture, acquainted with Jewish antiquities, can be at any loss in comprehending the true theory of the constitution of the Christian church, and ordination of the ministers of the gospel. Let us, however, urge the subject

more clearly, perhaps, through the medium of a familiar illustration.

When the United States of America severed the bond of allegiance that united them to the British crown, a greater or less number of modifications ensued in the fact, that we established a republic in the place of a monarchical government. But as there was no intention to depart from the principles or theory of British jurisprudence beyond what was necessary to suit the change of the form of government, so the office or functions of judges, sheriffs, magistrates, jurors, &c., were recognized in the mere use of those names in our new constitutions, and have remained ever since to be construed by those acts of parliaments, and decisions of English courts, that regulated the functions of judges, sheriffs, magistrates, jurors, &c., in Great Britain previous to the times of our revolution; and he would be thought insane who should attempt to construe the office of such persons by any other principles or laws than those of Great Britain, from whom alone we have received both the title and theory of the office.

Just so it was with the first congregations of the primitive Christians. They had been Jews, familiar with every peculiarity of the institutions of their country. They were instructed, by men inspired of God, that the temple service, and all its appointments of priesthood, altars, and sacrifices, were but types and symbols of the priesthood and sacrifice of Christ, which, having been fulfilled by his coming, were henceforth to cease; and, consequently, we find not a single passage in the New Testament that applies any portion of the temple service, such as priest, altar, or sacrifice, to the religious institutions under the gospel dispensation. But, at the same time, we find they did retain and use, in their religious assemblies and practices, various synagogue terms, titles, and usages, of which the titles, bishops or presbyters, and deacons, were pre-eminently so. In short, the whole constitution of the primitive churches, as far as we can see from the New Testament writers, denotes nothing else than the ordinary usages of the synagogue.

Such, then, being undeniably the case, and since the New Testament writers have not, in a single instance, by any new promulgation of discipline, stated that the functions of the gospel ministers as bishops or presbyters, and deacons, differed from their well-known employments in the synagogue, it is as unreasonable and absurd to construe the office or functions of the gospel ministry by any other theory than that of the synagogue, as it would be for us to construe the office or functions of our judges,

sheriffs, jurors, or magistrates, by any other theory of law than that of Great Britain.

Presuming our argument and illustration on this subject to be distinctly clear and forcible, we shall say nothing further on the subject, but will proceed to show that any attempts to seek for the constitution of the primitive church and the functions of its ministers by any references to the writings of the fathers, is not only illusory, but is directly contrary to the theory of the Scriptures and the teaching of our Saviour.

We say it is illusory to refer to the primitive fathers in this instance, from the fact that there are none of them for above three centuries after Christ who give any decisive testimony on the subject, as must be confessed by any impartial reader of the different controversies that have agitated the Christian world on these points.

But, in the second place, we deem a submission to the writings and traditions of the primitive fathers to be wholly contradictory to the theory and purpose of all those inspired persons concerned in the promulgation of Christianity. We have the most direct denunciations of our Saviour himself against the theory of tradition, and doctrinal teaching of men, as exhibited by those who lived under the Jewish economy; so that it would be most inconsistent indeed to suppose that Christ or his apostles could justify, in the new economy established by them, a similar mode of teaching, so distinctly censured by him, as having corrupted and made naught the one previously existing.

And, again, further than this, the apostles have distinctly announced to us, in the New Testament, that great corruptions, perversions, and a downright falling away from Christian truth, should take place at some time or other after they should be removed by death. Now, as neither Christ nor his apostles have left us any test by which we could ascertain who would corrupt, or who would preserve his truth in the world, unless we judge of it by their conformity or nonconformity to what is recorded in the Scriptures, so it must be evident that we can only determine what is truth by an honest, unprejudiced reference to the Scriptures alone, and to the principles recognized by them; for how can any one rationally undertake to say that such persons have erred from the truth, or that such others have maintained it, upon the strength of traditions and doctrinal teachings of the early fathers? seeing that we know not but that the very traditions or doctrines themselves may be the very error, corruption, or delusion that the apostles foretold would take place in the Christian world. Were

the ministers of the gospel to be inspired of God to preserve the truth sacred and incorruptible? Nay, St. Paul expressly tells the bishops or presbyters of Ephesus, (Acts xx, 30,) "*Also of your own selves shall men arise, speaking perverse things, to draw away disciples after them.*"

Again St. Paul tells us, (2 Thess. ii, 7,) that the mystery of iniquity was already at work in his time, that would ultimately terminate in that consummation of Christian corruption which should be revealed in the full development of the MAN OF SIN. With what sort of confidence, then, can any reader of Scripture rely upon traditions and teachings of men who lived posterior to the times of the apostles, who, unrestrained by their authority, published whatever notions they deemed plausible in consistency with their prejudices as Jews, heathen converts, or speculating philosophers?

There is, then, no alternative but to rest on the Scriptures alone in all their simplicity of statement, as based on principles recognized by the inspired writers. What is there recognized by them must be our rule as far as is consistent with their theory of things, and no further; for to eke out the Scriptures by some conceit of our own suggestion, or to extend the signification of titles, words, and terms used in the Scripture by some tradition of men, may lead us into some delusion or other on the subject, which, if we are resolutely bent on maintaining, may lead us, by other perversions, as it did the Jews, into a system of will worship wholly at variance with the simple text of the Scripture as interpreted by itself.

In short, according to any view which is justified by the Scripture, we can come to no other conclusion than that the constitution of the primitive church, in the immediate view of Christ and his apostles, was no way different in its theory from the Jewish synagogue, and that the ministers of the church, as bishops or presbyters, and deacons, were appointed or ordained to those functions simply on the ground that they were fitted by their gifts and integrity to exercise them to the edification of the congregation, and that their ordination, setting aside the prayers that might be offered to God to assist them by the influences of his Spirit, amounted to nothing more than a recognition of their ability to pray, teach, or exhort, as was done in like cases in the Jewish synagogues.

The principle of this ordination was distinctly what we see done continually in licensing a physician to practice medicine. Such a person having been examined by experienced physicians, and having been found competent, is therefore certified, under their

hands, by a diploma or license, to be sufficiently well-instructed in the principles of the healing art, as to be capable of affording relief to such as may require his medical services.

But, unlike a physician, a minister of the gospel, in his religious ministrations, had a right, like every other Christian, to expect continued spiritual assistance, according to the promise of Christ, as long as he faithfully persevered in the discharge of his duty to the congregation. But further than this there is no promise; there is not a single passage in the Scripture to justify the notion that the ministers of the gospel were constituted a corporate body, in virtue of which they were made privileged functionaries in the dispensation of the means of grace; and we apprehend that all those who have adopted a different theory on this subject, have alone derived it from the hand of that mystical harlot who has intoxicated "the inhabitants of the earth with the wine of her fornication."

ART. II.—*Philosophy of Rhetoric.*

THE term rhetoric was formerly applied exclusively to public speaking, and, hence, its principal theme was eloquence. But, by an easy transition, it subsequently came to be applied to the various classes of composition designed either to be read or spoken. This use of the term received the sanction of Aristotle, and has since become general. Rhetoric, then, is the guide of the orator in every thing essential to *instruct the judgment, please the imagination, rouse the passions, and improve the heart*. We shall, therefore, be at liberty in this discussion to develop those principles in style, whether written or extemporaneous, which are decisive of effect upon a popular or deliberative assembly.

There is philosophy in rhetoric—philosophy that relates both to the minds to be affected by thought, and to the language through which thought is communicated. With this philosophy he who aims at excellence in oratory should be thoroughly acquainted. Mind has its fixed laws; its distinguishing traits to be accommodated; its regular avenues through which, if at all, it must be reached. Ignorance of these may greatly diminish, if not entirely destroy, the effect of a well-meant public effort.

But we must avail ourselves of the essayist's license. A full discussion of this intricate subject would require a volume. Within the limits properly assigned to this article, we can only exhibit a

few prominent points, and we shall prefer those which are more immediately practical. If it be deemed presumption in us to attempt a development of a theme confessedly so abstruse and philosophical for the benefit of readers so intelligent as those of the Quarterly Review, we answer, "The youthful Achilles acquired skill in hurling the javelin under the instruction of Chiron, though the master could not compete with the pupil in vigor of arm."

To give order to our thoughts, we proceed to remark that *man must be addressed as possessing a reasonable soul*.

Amplification by argument enters more or less into almost every public discourse. An acquaintance with the philosophy of that department of mind which takes cognizance of arguments, must, therefore, be of decided importance to the public speaker.

It is found by a rigid analysis of mental phenomena that reason does not exist as a separate and ultimate faculty. Several distinct powers of the mind are concerned in the reasoning process, all of which must be respected in an attempt to adapt a discourse to the reason of an audience. Association, comparison, abstraction, and judgment, all perform important parts in every such effort. Whenever a proposition requiring proof is suggested to the mind, association at once collects an array of facts and arguments, relevant and irrelevant. Comparison is immediately instituted; relationship determined; kindred reasons abstracted from the mass collected by association, and the judgment determines the conclusion, sitting as final umpire upon the whole process. It is important to remark here that every intellectual power bears directly or indirectly upon the reasoning process, and hence the whole department of intellect is frequently styled reason; and an argumentative discourse is properly said to be addressed to the understanding. Aristotle seems to have had a glimpse of this truth when he asserted that "we have, as it were, two souls, the sensible soul, which we have in common with the brutes; and the reasonable soul, whereby we are distinguished from the brutes." And a view of mind similar to this, though without the mysticism of a double soul, forms the basis of the metaphysical system of the celebrated Coleridge.

It must not, however, be supposed that these various intellectual powers are all equally concerned in an effort of reason. Indeed, a narrow inspection of the mental action will show that one simple faculty performs the principal part of this important labor. With many of those powers which render occasional assistance, reason frequently dispenses; but comparison must always be operative. It must form the basis of our judgments in regard to the relationship of the arguments to the point to be proved; of the arguments

to each other; and of the whole to the conclusion. Hence, in determining upon the merit of an argument, the power of comparison is chiefly interested.

If this analysis of reason be correct, reasoning may be justly defined drawing conclusions from a comparison of related ideas. He who hopes to win over an audience, or defeat an opponent, must, therefore, bring all his remarks within the scope of this prevalent mental susceptibility. In order to this it is obvious that the relations which he would have his auditors perceive, must exist in the thoughts advanced. If they do not, all attempts to exhibit them in words must, of course, be a failure. Related words can never be a substitute for related ideas. It is of the ideas that the intelligent hearer chiefly takes cognizance, and upon the discovery of the relations which exist between them his conviction will wholly depend. And though these relations may actually exist in the opinions entertained by the author, confusion in the view of them will infallibly produce confusion in the development. How often does truth, fundamental truth, suffer in the hands of the most sincere, for no other reason than this. It is certainly unnecessary to urge here that the only remedy for this evil is increased intelligence; the cultivation of "definiteness of thought" by thorough and long-continued mental discipline.

But it should not fail to be noticed that however certain may be the connection and mutual dependence of the ideas entertained by an author, and however definite his own views of them, clearness and precision in their expression are indispensable to the accommodation of man's power of perceiving relations. It cannot be denied that accuracy and skill in the perception of philosophical relations, such as exist between ideas, do not necessarily imply a corresponding clearness in the perception of those arbitrary relations which exist between ideas and words. Hence it occurs that many who think philosophically and profoundly, fail entirely as public speakers. To point out a remedy for this evil (if indeed it be remediable) is no part of our present duty or design. But we have introduced the fact to show that a separate attention to the science of language is imperatively the duty of the public speaker. To enforce his own thoughts upon others he must be able to use those words which have been appropriated by good usage to the expression of such thoughts, and in such an order as to express them to the best advantage; and just in proportion as he is choice and select in the style of his argument will be the power of his reasoning. But a discourse addressed to the understanding should never be lumbered by words. Tautology introduces confusion in the view; pleonasm

destroys the vivacity of the reasoning; ambiguity perplexes, and equivocation misleads the hearer. Reasons for a legitimate opinion, stated in a simple, bold, and perspicuous style, cannot fail to produce conviction.

But in intruded adaptation to the power of comparison, the error of supposing that because relations are perfectly obvious to the speaker, they therefore are to all, must be carefully avoided. It must be borne in mind that this capability exists in very different degrees; hence an intimate acquaintance with human nature can alone secure the orator against the humiliating charge of having contributed more to his own edification than to that of his hearers. He must be aware of the facts upon which adaptation depends. There is an adaptation of thought, and an adaptation of language; both of which are of fundamental importance, and neither of which is practicable, without an intimate acquaintance with the intelligence and mental habits of the hearers. We insist upon this point with the more earnestness because, notwithstanding its decisive bearing upon public efforts, it is so commonly overlooked. How many sublime strains of eloquence, upon which the orator has congratulated himself as having raised him to the very pinnacle of honor, have vanished into air, without producing a single rational thought! A vacant stare and an undefined surprise at the stentorian voice or impassioned manner of the speaker are the only result; and all because the real auditors were never addressed. The man has placed himself in the ludicrous position of an orator to imaginary beings, in the presence of real ones. It is needless to say that he might as well have addressed the fairies in his study at home, as to have taxed the patience of an auditory to whom he did not condescend to speak. We have wholly mistaken the spirit of the present age, or the day of glory to such an oratory as this has entirely gone by. The only way of obtaining rank in this exalted profession in these days of sober thought, is to bring all that is said fairly within the comprehension of those who are addressed. Upon this subject we will only add, that while in only a few instances this kind of obscurity arises from too great familiarity with the principles discussed, it is generally the product of inexcusable ignorance or unpardonable vanity.

But to conclude our remarks upon this topic, the public reasoner must be acquainted with all the laws of belief; for with every one of them he will have something to do. He must be aware that whatever is intuitive with mind will be believed as soon as it is mentioned, and that the relations of many facts originally deductive are so obvious that they are universally ad-

mitted, and by common consent made the basis of reasoning; and thus save himself from the impropriety of attempting to prove what, from its nature, though true, is incapable of proof; or what every body believes, and therefore needs no proof. He must be impressed with the necessary difference between the demonstrations of immutable truths, and the power of deductive reasoning. He must know the appropriate fields and relative strength of induction, analogy, and testimony, and apply them with skill and effect. Aware of the different species of sophism, he must be prepared to reject them in his own reasonings, to detect them in an opponent, and defeat them by the legitimate use of a consistent logic. He will observe that arguments may be true, and conclusions false—conclusions true, and arguments false; and both true, and yet have no valid relation to each other, and, hence, produce no rational conviction. In fine, he ought to be a theoretical and practical logician: for in the hearer's power of perceiving relations is the certain detection of fallacy. If the ideas advanced do not bear upon each other as they are claimed to do, the assumed relation cannot be discovered, and, hence, no conviction can follow. It is in vain to urge that the great mass of hearers are incompetent to judge of abstruse reasonings, and hence he who argues fallaciously is not liable to be detected; for whatever mental decisions may follow such an effort, are not the decisions of reason, but of blind credulity, or obstinate prejudice. The recreant sophist has, therefore, never cause to triumph; for he has evaded the competent judge of his effort, and owes his victory entirely to the want of reason. But as truth is the only legitimate object of argumentation, the speaker has reason to congratulate himself only when he has fairly exhibited the evidences upon which it depends. And it should never be forgotten, that however it may be with the many, in popular assemblies, there are always some present whose accurate mental discriminations will not fail to detect the absence of legitimacy in the arguments and conclusions of the orator. And if this were not so, sound moral principle ought to be an effectual preventive to a species of dishonesty which can hardly be sufficiently reprehended.

But we proceed to remark that *man must be addressed as a creature of imagination.*

Not only is he capable of judging of relations and determining the question of truth; but he is susceptible of pleasure, and hence the philosophy of the imagination is important to the orator. It is well known that the force of conviction depends very much upon the power of attention; and attention depends greatly upon the

interest taken in the discussion. If there be no way of gratifying the fancy of the hearer, of pleasing his imagination, the clearest arguments may be wholly lost to him—the most valuable truths entirely thrown away.

The elements of pleasure to the fancy are chiefly vivacity, beauty, sublimity, and novelty.

Vivacity exists primarily in the thoughts, and it is much more easily understood than defined. It is that kind of definiteness, spirit, and energy, which gives distinctness to the view. With this distinctness, the mind is always pleased and interested. A degree of impatience, amounting to resentment, is instinctively felt when the mind, encouraged to expect a treat in the development of well-defined ideas, is perplexed with dark and ambiguous sayings—dull, trite, and stale thoughts; or dry, abstract, and impracticable theories. But if no labor is required; no conjecture necessary to unravel the mystery of confused thought or unintelligible language; if the idea, clear and well-defined, arrests the attention, rivets the soul instantaneously, leaving no room to doubt; presenting at one view the relations and dependencies of vigorous thoughts, sprightly and pertinent illustrations, and sound indubitable arguments, the mind is delighted and the hearer is a captive. This is *vivacity*. This is “truth to nature.” He who would wield this power of intellectual pleasure must be a master of language. Words, to produce this effect, must be “specific in distinction from those that are general;” epithets must be skillfully chosen, so as to “direct attention to striking and characteristic qualities of the object”—to “those qualities most obvious in the view taken of them”—to lead the mind to “trace out illustrative comparisons”—and to “afford a full description of the object.” The arrangement of words must be uncommon and impressive—“all unnecessary words must be cautiously avoided”—the sentences must be short, pithy, and periodic, and aid may be had from “climax, antithesis, exclamation, repetition, interrogation, and rhetorical dialogue.” Thus it is seen how language, as well as mind, is concerned in the philosophy of rhetoric, and how indispensable is a thorough acquaintance with its principles to the speaker who would please the imagination with the vivacity of discourse.

But man's susceptibility to emotions of beauty must be regarded in an attempt to please. This susceptibility is original with mind, and hence it is intuitive and universal. He whose wisdom produced it, has benevolently furnished the materials of its gratification, in the greatest abundance and variety. Nature is little else

than an assemblage of beauties, addressed to every organ of sense. Delightful odors perfume the air—delicious flavors gratify the taste—graceful forms, gentle resistance, soft breezes, and genial warmth play upon the feelings—sounds of sweetest melody and ravishing harmony thrill the ear—and gorgeous paintings of sunlight dazzle the eye. Nor these alone. The principles and relations perceived by the intellect; the vivid conceptions of past mental states; and the novel, bold, and brilliant creations of imagination; are all elements of the beautiful; furnishing additional materials for the gratification of fancy. These are the arrangements of nature upon which the ornaments of style depend. Here is put into the hands of the orator a most powerful engine for the control of mind. He may interest by the stately comparison; entrance and startle by the sprightly metaphor; illustrate and embellish by the well-timed allusion, and astonish by the bold personification.

But it must not be supposed that these instruments of pleasure are designed for common use. They are to be held in reserve for their appropriate occasions. The ornaments of style all require a degree of excitement, dependent upon the character of the figure; a lively, riveted attention; a mind fixed and charmed by the power of truth. Then it is susceptible of perceiving those rare, difficult, but certain relations upon which ornament depends for its effect. But if this state of mind be anticipated, by a premature introduction of the figure, or neglected by its introduction too late, the effect is lost. Nay, the feeling of irrelevancy or unfitness which must result, will inevitably prejudice the orator and disparage the effort. Hence, attempts of this kind to please the imagination should rarely, indeed never, except upon very exciting occasions, be found in introductions. They should occur seldom, as their power depends very much upon their novelty, and as the state of mind upon which their appropriateness depends is so rare and fugitive. Indeed, the young speaker of an exuberant fancy has need to be very often reminded, that a too frequent and unskillful use of the ornaments of style is far more unfortunate than an utter neglect of them. What man of taste has not been shocked by the incongruities of crude and inappropriate figures, crowded upon a state of mental indifference by the unpracticed orator, who has suddenly conceived the idea of being eloquent? However promising may be the indications of this bold and imaginative turn of mind in the young speaker, its ultimate success depends upon its being thoroughly chastened, and subjected to the control of a corrected taste. Let the student of oratory be a student of nature.

Let him form his taste upon the models of excellence around him. He who adopts this course may be said to "exist in a new creation. He lives where the sun sheds a brighter day, where the clouds are skirted by more brilliant colors, and where nature's carpet shows a richer green. Angelic forms are about him. He even stands on some chosen spot, and each new scene that presents itself gives but a varied hue to the emotion of beauty that he feels."

"Not a breeze
Flies o'er the meadow ; not a cloud imbibes
The setting sun's effulgence ; not a strain
From all the tenants of the warbling shade
Ascends ; but whence his bosom can partake
Fresh pleasure unreprieved."

And thus his own feelings are formed to a harmony with the music of nature ; the fires of his eloquence are kindled at the altar of God ; and the souls of his hearers, spell-bound, yield their homage to the power of truth.

Sublimity is another element of pleasure to the imagination. The emotion of beauty, swelled by the idea of vastness, power, or fear, becomes an emotion of sublimity. The mountain rill is beautiful—the rolling river is grand ; but the vast ocean is sublime. When the storm-cloud gathers blackness in the heavens ; when

"Along the woods, along the moorish fens
Sighs the sad genius of the coming storm ;"

and

"Men look up
With mad disquietude on the dull sky :"

when

"Thoughts rush in stormy darkness through the soul ;"

and

"Far along,
From peak to peak, the rattling crags among
Leaps the live thunder,"

the feeling of awful sublimity almost suspends the power of self-consciousness. Indeed, the scenes of sublimity in nature ; in moral principles, relations, and actions ; and in the world of towering intellect, are actually inexhaustible. But from all these scenes the orator may draw his power to astonish and delight his auditors. There may be a sublimity in his thought, a sublimity in his descriptions, illustrations, and appeals, which is actually irresistible.

But here we must not fail to urge that the occasions for the

sublime in oratory are rare and transient. He who feels himself under obligation to be sublime in every description, in every effort at public speaking, whatever is the occasion, or whatever the state of feeling in his audience, greatly mistakes the genius of oratory, overlooks the philosophy of mind, and, in the most significant manner possible, proclaims his own incompetency to the functions of the orator. As, in the case of beauty, the occasion of sublimity must be seized when it exists. It cannot be created by art for purposes of effect, nor invoked as the servant at will of the specious declaimer. The orator must rather be the servant of sublimity. He must be the victim of its feeling; the agent of its power. He must lose himself in its sweeping current—bury his language in its rolling wave; and stand out of the way till its dashing surges have passed over his audience and disappeared for ever.

The only remaining element of pleasure to the imagination which we shall consider is, novelty. The desire of novelty is a wise provision of our nature, nearly identical with curiosity. The mind is so formed as not to remain stationary, not to be satisfied with present knowledge or attainments. It is for ever on the stretch for new truths, new relations, new elements of gratification. It is to this fact that we are primarily indebted for the development of mind; for the endlessly progressive movements of our race. Hence it is that in attempts to please, the orator must know how to accommodate this universal law of our nature. But to know how to do this is comparatively easy, if he only possess the means of doing it. If the speaker has nothing new to present, then, of course, however much he may gratify other feelings of the soul, he can take no advantage of this one. But if he has *nothing* new, it may well be doubted whether he can establish his claims to consideration as a public teacher. This remark, however, must not be misinterpreted. It is by no means intended to assert that no thought is valuable, or deserves to be repeated, or is adapted to excite pleasure, unless it is new. There are a vast many truths which are intrinsically valuable, and their frequent repetition does not diminish their power to please; and yet there are various species of novelty which may be used with great success for the entertainment of an audience.

There is a novelty of principles, and of thought, which hearers feel themselves entitled to expect; and they instinctively resent a disappointment of this just expectation, as they are instinctively pleased with its gratification. The public teacher stands virtually pledged to develop new ideas for the satisfaction of his audience.

But ideas are not the product of chance. He may not expect that they will arise spontaneously in his mind, obtrude themselves upon his attention, uninvited guests, or happen to be present, just at the time they are needed. Nor yet are they the product of logic, however legitimate; for logic discovers no new truths. It compares, modifies, and combines those already known. But philosophy is the prime instrument of discovery in the world of principles; the grand revelator of truths before concealed from mental vision. Elaborate and profound philosophical research, alone, can successfully explore the fields of occult science, rich with inexhaustible treasures. And hence we arrive at the important fact that the orator must be a working man, a thorough and indefatigable student, if he would constantly accumulate the truths upon which the gratification of his hearers depends.

But there is also a novelty of relations which greatly aids the orator. Truths which are perfectly familiar may be so analyzed and combined, as to exhibit entirely new features; and these new and unexpected relations are as verily sources of pleasure as are many facts and principles never before known. The phases of truth are endlessly varied, and so often as they are presented in a new aspect they have all the charms of novelty.

And there is a novelty of description—a novelty of language which gives to the oldest truths every material advantage of new ones. And this is an advantage wholly within the power of all intelligent speakers. The richness of our language, arising from its figurative use, furnishes a vocabulary of inexhaustible variety for the expression of thought; so that however frequently the matter of a discourse may have been repeated, it will not fail to charm by its new dress in the hands of the skillful linguist. But it should be carefully observed, that the strength of this species of novelty does not depend upon direct efforts to obtain it. By a long familiarity with the numerous varieties of English style, the mind should be so thoroughly furnished with language, in its rich and varied adaptation to the expression of thought, that terms most appropriate to the design of the writer shall be instantly suggested by the sentiment; and thus the distinguishing characteristics of his style will be, "the man himself," rather than the result of mechanical effort. Indeed, an affectation of novelty of any kind is highly objectionable. It is a source of pleasure merely when it is obviously the result of intelligence previously acquired; and when it develops itself spontaneously, so that the full conviction is invariably produced that it would cost the author much more labor to express himself differently than in his own easy and novel

style. This is the excellence which Professor Newman calls "naturalness."

In concluding this effort to draw out and exhibit the philosophy of the imagination as a material branch of the philosophy of rhetoric, we must direct attention to the world of literature. Poetry, fictitious prose, historical, epistolary, and essay writing, furnish ample materials of vivacity, beauty, sublimity, and novelty. Hence it is that literature is said to be designed especially to please; and is addressed to the imagination. This suggests the importance of general and special literary reading, to those who attempt the cultivation of oratory. True it is that the inexperienced pupil should not enter this labyrinth of thought without a guide. But under the direction of a skillful pioneer, he may safely explore its secret recesses; draw forth its richest gems for the embellishment of his style; and liberally furnish his mind with costly materials for the gratification and delight of his hearers.

Again we remark, that *man must be addressed as a creature of passion.*

In the philosophy of mind, the passions is a generic appellation for the sensitive part of our nature, including, very nearly, what Professor Upham styles the benevolent and malevolent affections. These are of marked importance to the philosophic orator. Fancy gives brilliancy to our ideas, but passion animates them. Hence when persuasion is the object of amplification, we generally address the passions. If the speaker has succeeded in producing conviction of the truth of his positions, his next object is to induce action; and if reason be the guide, passion is the mover to action. The aim will, therefore, be to excite, to a proper degree, some passion actually concerned in the prospective bearings of the discussion. If, for instance, the orator would move a man to act for the defense of his honor, he must rouse his self-respect; if for his interest, he must excite his self-love; if for the public good, he must rouse his patriotism; if for the relief of the suffering, he must touch his pity; if for the increase of his intelligence, he must enlist his curiosity; and if he wish to crowd him on to deeds of noble daring, he must stir up his love of power; if to deeds of heroic virtue, he must appeal to his philanthropy; or deeds of fearful retribution, he must rouse his anger, his jealousy, or his revenge. How important, then, is the philosophy of the passions to the public speaker! Action is the great object of oratory. If we instruct, it is to make action intelligent. If we convince, it is to make action rational. If we excite, it is to make action energetic. Deliberate, but bold and decisive action is the only object worthy of eloquence. It was

not for the settlement of abstract theories that the eloquence of Demosthenes thundered in the forum ; but to rouse his slumbering countrymen to instant vigorous action against an insidious foe. It is not for the purpose of determining questions in speculative theology that the orator of the pulpit chains, humbles, excites, and entrances his hearers ; but to move them to action in the great work of their expiring probation. Then let the student of oratory give high rank to the study of the passions.

"The circumstances," says Dr. Campbell, "that are chiefly instrumental in operating on the passions are, probability, plausibility, importance, proximity of time, connection of place, relation of the actors or sufferers to the hearers or speakers, and interest of the hearers or speakers in the consequences." Fully to expand these thoughts would lengthen this article beyond the patience of the reader. We will, however, take the liberty to say that "probability relates to fact, plausibility to fiction." If in the world of truth the speaker would avail himself of the passions, he must reach the highest degree of probability of which the subject admits ; and he must establish the connection between the object proposed and the feeling to be gratified. If in the world of fiction the orator would excite, plausibility must govern the plot, the characters, and the morals. The representations must not be of persons or circumstances which never could by possibility exist, otherwise reason will revolt, and disgust will take the place of pleasure. Again, the claimed relations may be distinctly perceived, but if no feeling of importance to the individual addressed can be excited, he will receive with indifference what was designed to move him to action. Further, if the time and place of the events exhibited be remote, the interest and excitement will be less : if near, they will be greater ; and relation near and intimate to the characters of the scene moves the feeling of friendship, while interest in the consequences excites that of self-love. Hence, the study of the passions involves the whole of these modifying circumstances, as well as the strict metaphysical analysis of that class of mental phenomena ; and he who would excel in public speaking should deem no labor intolerable, essential to the acquisition of this knowledge.

But it should not fail to be observed, that to wield the passions successfully is a difficult task. The gentler feelings are to be courted with soft words, and pathetic intonations. Mild efforts can stir the passions that sit upon the surface of this sea, but vivacity, energy, and power alone, can rouse those which are deep and rare. Eloquence is the appointed agent of calming, as well

as exciting the storm of passion. But to allay the feverish, morbid excitement which breaks out like the smothered fires of the volcano, and control the fitful whirlwinds of the mind, is a work of the most delicate skill.

The practical suggestion obviously arising from the difficulty of this work is, that the effort should not be made, unless it can be skillfully conducted. That frequent and mortifying failures have resulted from a want of caution upon this point, will scarcely be doubted; while only a few master-spirits of any age have wielded with complete success this immense power over the minds of men. For it will be noticed that the difficulty is not in exciting passion. This can be done by the most ordinary mind; and either with, or without design. But to command the passions, as an engine of eloquence, is wholly a different thing. The inexperienced speaker should be put upon his guard, so that he may not be rash or premature in his attempts, while, as we have before urged, he should spare no pains to mature himself in this department of mental philosophy.

But we remark, finally, that *man must be addressed as a moral being.*

The benevolent Creator of mind has wonderfully endowed it with the power of moral distinctions; so that it instinctively asks what is right, as well as what is good: and wherever the elements of right and wrong exist, it has the capability of detecting them. It is further evident that the mind feels itself impelled to the right, and against the wrong, whenever the antecedent perception is connected with the feeling of relationship, which locates the duty to do, or not to do, upon itself. And, finally, after a right action has been performed, with a consciousness of right motives, a feeling of personal gratification, of inward satisfaction, follows, which has a direct tendency to increase the mind's love of virtue, and power to do good. If, on the other hand, the action be wrong, and the habits of the mind allow a distinct perception of that wrong, a feeling of self-degradation, of painful guilt, follows, which is obviously corrective in its character, and excites a dread of vice, which would not otherwise be possible. It is, perhaps, a sufficiently correct use of language to call them different mental susceptibilities: the discriminating, the impulsive, and the retributive power of conscience. For the evidence of their existence I need only appeal to every man's memory and self-consciousness. Either of these laws of intuitive belief is absolute in its own sphere; and who does not remember to have passed frequently through all these mental states? And what individual can fail

to be aware of their present existence, so often as their necessary conditions occur? Consciousness, the grand revelator of the mind, settles this question so completely as wholly to supersede all deductive reasoning.

We claim that no public speaker is at liberty to forget the existence of this moral nature, or neglect to provide for it. We cannot resist the conviction that secular oratory has gone widely astray from its legitimate bearings in this respect. We do not intend by this that the orator of the bar, or of the deliberative or popular assembly, is obligated to labor directly for the education of the conscience. But should he, therefore, outrage and trample upon the most sacred and authoritative attributes of the immortal mind? Should he be so regardless of moral distinctions and obligations as to wield the whole force of his eloquence, directly or indirectly, to blunt the moral feelings, degrade the moral mind in himself and his hearers, and thus help to disparage and destroy the chief conservative element of civil society? It is greatly to be feared that such men are not sufficiently aware of the immense power they are constantly wielding in this respect for the weal or wo of man. What admirable opportunities has the secular orator to extend the potent arm of popular eloquence to the relief of enfeebled virtue, and crush with the power of popular opinion the giant form of vice! The cause of truth and virtue calls loudly for reform upon this point—reform that shall rescue this heaven-appointed instrument of good from the service of sin and corruption. Let this imperative demand be seconded in the most decisive manner, by whatever of virtue there is remaining in the ranks of professional and private life, ere the smothered fires of corruption, fed by a thousand tributary flames, shall burst upon us and roll their scorching waves over all that is fair and lovely in our highly favored land.

But the direct cultivation of the moral mind is the appropriate work of the pulpit orator. Besides all the advantage which he has in the nature of his subjects, and the world from which he is allowed to draw his motives, he is Heaven's commissioned messenger for this very object. The work of guiding mind to its originally intended destination has been undertaken by God himself. And the true expression of his own wisdom is the appointment of human agencies for the accomplishment of this grand object. The eloquence of the pulpit is, therefore, characterized by a loftiness of design and purity of origin which can be claimed for no other. Its philosophy, it is true, has much that is common to oratory in general; and hence the practical principles which

have been dwelt upon at length in this paper, bear more or less directly upon the public efforts of the minister. But its distinctive character will require a separate discussion.

Dr. Blair has well said, that "every sermon should be a persuasive oration." Thorough reformation by right mental action is the great object of preaching. Every effort designed to accomplish this end must be based upon truth in regard to the persons to be reformed. They are uninformed upon the great facts of their present and future interests. Hence persuasion would be useless without instruction; and thus it appears that the minister must be thoroughly furnished with intelligence upon the great science of salvation. Suitably to enlighten the dark mind of the natural man, he will have abundant need of all the information within the reach of human effort. But especially must he be skilled in the exegesis of the sacred text; for this is the great fountain whence his richest stores must be drawn. The truths of the Bible are clothed with the sanction of God; and, most of all within the reach of the ambassador of Christ, they shed light upon the mysterious character and eternal destiny of man.

But another fact which bears strongly upon the design of the minister to persuade, is the depraved state of the moral mind. True philosophy requires that he, whose great work is the cultivation of the moral nature, should be aware of its actual condition. Did it exist now in its primeval purity, the whole aspect of Christian theology and of the ministerial work would be changed. But the Scriptures seize upon the most odious objects in nature to represent the moral state of the soul. It is not a beautiful symmetrical human figure, but a putrid mass of loathsome corruption. So completely is it degenerated, that "the imaginations of the thoughts of the heart are only evil, and that continually." This is the state of mind that is to be met by an evangelical ministry. The sovereign remedy is to be prescribed for this dreadfully fatal malady. The way to a supernatural purification of this heart of depravity must be pointed out, and the perverse temper of disobedience, which it has produced, must be overcome. Here, again, the sacred orator must have recourse to his Book of books. He will there find a divine agency, upon which his hearers must rely for moral renovation; and he will there be presented with the awful motives of eternity which must sway the decisions of the will, and triumph over the obstinacy of sin.

And the whole scheme of persuasive eloquence must regard the fact, that man is morally free. If he be moved at all, it must be as a voluntary agent. But this is no barrier to the success

of ministerial effort. Indeed, it is the only psychological arrangement which could make persuasion practicable. And here the orator of the pulpit may find a sufficient reason for all the effort which can add any thing to the probability of success. Here he may concentrate the immense moral power of his sacred profession. He may reach the will through the understanding, and sway it by the force of cogent and irresistible argument. Or he may reach it through the heart, and move it by enlisting the emotions or the passions. He may gently lead his hearer on to Christ, to God, to heaven, by the charms of love or the glory of redemption; or he may "sweep away his refuge of lies" by the collected surges of truth, gathered from heaven, earth, and hell.

But we must arrest the progress of thought, and conclude this brief attempt to develop the philosophy of eloquence, as it relates to the moral nature of man, by a few simple suggestions with regard to the orator and the fundamental elements of his success. Upon the other requisites of the pulpit orator, sufficient to answer the purposes of this article may be gathered from what has already been said. But we must not fail to urge here, that he should be pre-eminently a good man. He whose eloquence must be the ceaseless streams of purity and truth, must contain the fountain whence such streams can emanate—a heart wholly "consecrated to God by the death of his Son." Indeed, he must be, in the highest sense, evangelical. He must have a soul thoroughly impregnated with heavenly love and holy fire. It is another excellent remark of Dr. Blair, that "on no subject can any man be truly eloquent who does not utter the '*veræ voces ab imo pectore*,' who does not speak the language of his own conviction, and his own feelings." And if this exact correspondence between the heart and the language is indispensable to the success of even the secular orator, how much more must it be to that of the man whose great business is to rescue his fellows from the power of falsehood and deception, and to stamp upon their hearts the lasting image of truth!

By the same author it is urged that "the chief characteristics of the eloquence suited to the pulpit are, gravity and warmth. The serious nature of the subjects belonging to the pulpit requires gravity; their importance to mankind requires warmth. It is far from being either easy or common to unite these characters of eloquence. The grave, when it is predominant, is apt to run into a dull, uniform solemnity. The warm, when it wants gravity, borders on the theatrical and light. The union of the two must be studied by all preachers as of the utmost consequence, both in

the composition of their discourses and in their manner of delivery. Gravity and warmth united form that character of preaching which the French call *onction*; the affecting, penetrating, interesting manner, flowing from a strong sensibility of heart in the preacher to the importance of those truths which he delivers, and an earnest desire that they may make full impression on the hearts of his hearers."

In the introduction to this article it was stated that rhetoric was the guide of the orator in every thing essential to *instruct the judgment, please the imagination, rouse the passions, and improve the heart*; and that there was philosophy in rhetoric, relating both to mind and language. These truths have been our principal guide in conducting this inquiry. We have endeavored to give the psychological facts which are concerned in these objects of oratory; and, as far as the limits of our design would allow, the philosophy of affecting them by expressed thought. In doing this we may perhaps have incurred the charge of advocating a mechanical, artificial eloquence. If so, it is only necessary to reply, that the subject required the direct discussion of what may be regarded as the true objects of study and effort to the orator; while it allowed only indirect allusions to the "*nature*" of oratory.

Troy Conference Academy, March 24, 1843.

ART. III.—*The British Pulpit. An Essay on Pulpit Eloquence.*
Philadelphia: Orrin Rogers. 1841.

WE have read repeatedly, and with increasing satisfaction, this very sensible production. It appeared originally in the *Edinburgh Review*, and attracted no small attention in England; in our own country it has been copied by the religious press in weeklies, monthlies, and quarterlies, and has received most hearty commendation. The publisher of the present edition has issued it in a cheap 18mo. form; we hope he has scattered it broad-cast, for it is our sober conviction that in few communities is such a corrective to the errors of public speaking more needed, and that few rebukes to such errors have been more masterly. It presents none of those ostentatious splendors which, in occasional articles of Mackintosh, Brougham, Macauley, and others, have given celebrity to the veteran *Quarterly of Edinburgh*, and produced a sensation through the literary circles of the English language, but has

won the meed of admiration by its excellent taste, its thorough good sense, the exceeding pertinency of its suggestions, the simple energy and directness of its style, and its manifest appropriateness to the urgent wants of the times.

The author expresses his wonder that there should be so small a proportion of sermons destined to live; that of the millions preached annually there should be so few which are remembered three whole days—fewer still committed to the press—scarcely one which is not in a few years absolutely forgotten. He says,—

“If any one were for the first time informed what preaching was; if, for example, one of the ancient critics had been told that the time would come when vast multitudes of persons should assemble regularly, to be addressed, in the midst of their devotions, upon the most sacred truths of a religion sublime beyond all the speculations of philosophers, yet in all its most important points simple, and of the easiest apprehension; that with those truths were to be mingled discussions of the whole circle of human duties, according to a system of morality singularly pure and attractive; that the more dignified and the more interesting parts of national affairs were not to be excluded from the discourse; that, in short, the most elevating, the most touching, and the most interesting of all topics, were to be the subject matter of the address, directed to persons sufficiently versed in them, and assembled only from the desire they felt to hear them handled, surely the conclusion would at once have been drawn, that such occasions must train up a race of the most consummate orators, and that the effusions to which they gave birth must needs cast all other rhetorical compositions into the shade.—How, then, comes it to pass, that instances are so rare of eminent eloquence in the pulpit?”

He ascribes the inefficiency which so generally distinguishes the pulpit principally to the following causes:—

“First, that preachers do not sufficiently cultivate, as part of their professional education, a systematic acquaintance with the principles upon which all effective eloquence must be founded—with the limitations under which their topics must be chosen, and the mode in which they must be exhibited, in order to secure popular impression; and, secondly, that they do not, after they have assumed their sacred functions, give sufficient time or labor to the preparation of their discourses.”

He then proceeds to consider the “general conditions on which all religious instructions (presupposing them to be true) should be conveyed, and especially the style and the manner peculiarly appropriate to this department of public speaking.”

We have hinted at the necessity of some such corrective to the prevalent faults of our public speakers. We would not, however, have the reader class us among those whose characteristic pro-

pensity is to depreciate whatever is native in the genius of their country ; far from it, and furthest from it in respect to our capabilities for eloquence. Our history is full of its best examples. Our institutions are more congenial with it than were those of Greece or Rome in the palmiest days of the art. The physical features of our noble country are favorable to it, and the severe practical character of the national mind, especially, is adapted to it ; for imagination is more a trait of poetry than of oratory. An imaginative people, like the French or Italians, may produce poets ; but the strenuousness of the Greek, or the sternness of the Roman mind, the vigor of the British, or, better perhaps than either, the severe but rapid energy of the American intellect, fits a community to excel in genuine eloquence.

But these capabilities only render it the more desirable that the right principles of the art should be understood, and the more mortifying that spurious ones should be so prevalent. There are many reasons for the latter fact. One is, the juvenility of many of our public speakers, especially in the pulpit. With individuals, as with nations, the first development of mind is poetical, eloquence follows, and philosophy limps on crutches in the rear. Our peculiar impulses, perhaps our peculiar necessities, urge our youth into public life before the poetical period has terminated ; this, too, is precisely the period in which modes most readily become habits, and habits become unalterable. Hence rhapsody is often mistaken for eloquence, and declamation for elocution, and even when the inflammable excitability of the young mind has given place to the more manly indications of intellect, this declamatory, bastard elocution, often remains, presenting a more painful incongruity than when accompanied by an equally extravagant intellect.

Another reason, analogous to and partly arising from this, but also applicable to maturer speakers, is the superficiality of our education. While we justly boast of the superior prevalence of popular intelligence among us, we cannot deny the inferiority of our professional education, and in no respects is it more defective than in those which involve the principles of correct taste. Elocution, though included in the programme of every college in the land, is scarcely a study ; it is but incidental to the "course." Our young men pass from the college to the bar, the pulpit, and the legislature tolerably instructed, it may be, in the science appropriate to their pursuits, but scarcely acquainted with the practical art on which depends its successful application. Almost as well might one who has never learned the practical art of sculpture, presume that, because he has studied the anatomy of the human frame, and has before him the

marble material and the necessary implements, he can transform the rude stone into an Apollo.

Another cause is the influence of bad models. Men of unquestionable genius, but addicted from early habit to a false elocution, have given it importance and popularity. Their example has indeed become almost a national calamity. The public taste, which is generally correct when let alone, has become strangely deteriorated by this pernicious influence. Clamor is not unfrequently mistaken for eloquence, bombast for learning, and figures ludicrously fantastic, or hideously grotesque, for splendid imagery. We state an undeniable fact. Who has not seen in city churches vast throngs crowding pulpit stairs, altar, aisles, and portals, and hanging from the galleries and windows in vague but wondering interest at speakers whom men of severely just taste could not hear without perspiring with agony—speakers who ever and anon plunge among the clouds, or rake the stars, or, with affected tones, soft mannerisms, feminine allusions, and thoughts equally emasculate, and sometimes with genuine traits of foppery, stand up to discourse to dying men on the simplest and sternest truths in the universe? We scarcely know which should predominate, contempt or humor, in imagining such men in contrast with the noble “apostle to the Gentiles,” the Saxon reformer, or the powerful old preachers of Methodism. We do not say that such are *specimens* of our public preachers, but that they are the most popular—the “stars,” and therefore, to a great extent, the models—that the public taste has been warped to such standards. They are not only in the pulpit, but at the bar, and in the legislature, though to a much less extent.* Our author says, more truly in respect to England, we fear, than to our own country, that “the irrelevant discussions, the florid declamation, the imaginative finery, the tawdry ornament, which too often are heard in the pulpit, not only without astonishment, but with admiration, would not be tolerated a moment in the senate or at the bar.” We do not assert that the popular mind is so far perverted as to approve such instances alone, for, thanks to its instinctive good sense, it ever recognizes the power of a genuine orator; but that it is so far perverted as to approve, to applaud and even prefer them, and that their imitators are found through the land.

How potent is a wrong influence! The causes specified have produced among us a national anomaly. We are considered a

* The reference to Daniel Webster, in a late speech of Hon. T. F. Marshall, is a notable example; it was listened to with enthusiasm, but in print utterly transgresses the principles of correct taste.

rigorously practical, a matter-of-fact people. The national character of no other people shows fewer proofs of the influence of imagination. Our land has given birth to artists, but other lands have had to train and sustain them; we have scarcely produced two or three permanent examples of poetry, and yet public speaking, the most common and commanding instrument of popular influence, is chiefly characterized among us by two qualities, which are in utter defiance of the strongest tendencies of the national mind—*verbiage* and *imaginative extravagance*.

Before we dismiss this part of our subject we would record an earnest admonition to young speakers, resolutely to eschew examples toward which juvenile immaturity and buoyancy so strongly predispose them. Their usefulness, their self-respect, the approbation of all good judges, every motive, in fine, but that of a fictitious and ephemeral popularity, enforces the admonition.

What, then, is the eloquence appropriate to the pulpit? Our author says,—

“The appropriateness of any composition, whether written or spoken, is easily deduced from its object. If that object be to instruct, convince, or persuade, or all these at the same time, we may naturally expect that it should be throughout of a forcible and earnest character—indicating a mind absorbed in the avowed object, and solicitous only about what may subserve it.”

This *singleness* of purpose he demands in the topics discussed, the arguments selected to enforce them, the modes of illustration, and in even the peculiarities of style and expression. He would admit nothing for the mere design of exciting an interest, in either the language or the thought, except when directly pertinent to the object, not even for the excitement of an emotion of pleasure “*for its own sake*”—as in poetical productions—although this precise adaptation of the means to the ends cannot fail to excite itself the liveliest pleasure.

“We cannot readily pardon mere beauties or elegances, striking thoughts or graceful imagery, if they are marked by this irrelevancy; since they serve only to impede the vehement current of argument or feeling. In a word, we expect nothing but what, under the circumstances of the speaker, is prompted by *nature*; nature, not as opposed to a deliberate effort to adapt the means to the ends, and to do what is to be done as well as possible, for this, though in one sense art, is also the truest nature; but nature, as opposed to whatever is inconsistent with the idea that the man is under the dominion of genuine feeling, and bent upon taking the directest path to the accomplishment of his object. True eloquence is not like some painted window, which not only transmits the light of day variegated and tinged with a thousand

hues, but calls away the attention from its proper use to the pomp and splendor of the artist's doings. It is a perfectly transparent medium; transmitting light, without suggesting a thought about the medium itself. Adaptation to the one single object is every thing. These maxims have been universally recognized in deliberate and forensic eloquence. Those who have most severely exemplified them, have ever been regarded as the truest models; while those who have partially violated them, have failed to obtain the highest place."

Our author contends that pulpit eloquence never has been as thoroughly assimilated as it might have been to that which has had the greatest effect elsewhere, and which is demonstrated to be the right kind, both by its effects and the analysis of its qualities. The following is his definition of this kind of eloquence:—

"If we were compelled to give a brief definition of the principal characteristics of this truest style of eloquence, we should say it was 'practical reasoning, animated by strong emotion;' or if we might be indulged in what is rather a description than a definition of it, we should say that it consisted in reasoning on topics calculated to inspire a common interest, expressed in the language of ordinary life, and in that brief, rapid, familiar style which natural emotion ever assumes. The former half of this description would condemn no small portion of the compositions called 'Sermons,' and the latter half a still larger portion."

He admits the high character of the literature of the English pulpit, its erudition, originality, and argumentative strength; but contends that it is mostly foreign to the true idea of the "Sermon"—that the greater part of it deserves not the name, "if by it be meant a discourse *especially adapted* to the object of instructing, convincing, or persuading the common mind." If his definition of effective eloquence be correct, viz., that "it consists in reasoning on topics calculated to inspire a common interest in the mass of a common audience," what can be more inappropriate to the pulpit, what more hopeless in engaging the attention or interesting the feelings of a common audience, than metaphysical discussions?

"And yet abstruse speculations on the 'origin of evil,' on 'moral necessity,' on 'the self-determining power,' on the 'ultimate principles of ethics,' on the 'immortality of the soul,' as proved from its indiscerptibility, and we know not what, on 'the eternal fitness of things,' on 'the moral sense,' with other still more recondite speculations on themes which it is almost impious and perfectly useless to touch, were of common occurrence in our older pulpit literature; and they are not unfrequent, though not pursued to the same extent, even now. For our own part we believe that the discussion of such subjects is as about as profitable in a popular assembly as would be that of the well-known questions as to whether angels can pass from one point of space

to another without passing through the intermediate points, and whether they can visually discern objects in the dark. We verily believe that Thomas Aquinas would have stood aghast at the idea of dragging such questions out of the obscurity of the schools into common daylight, and making them the themes of popular declamation."

He thinks that the pulpit is fast reforming in this respect, but laments that so many young preachers, beguiled by the marvelousness or illusive profundity of such extravagances, attempt to display them in their sermons; "touching upon them, at least to a sufficient extent to exhaust and dissipate the attention of the audience," before they come to more valuable and more welcome matter, or using phraseology and allusions incomprehensible to the mass. He rebukes, also, another class who seem more intent on intellectual display than the instruction or reformation of their hearers, such as delight to discuss subjects connected with "natural theology," or "the first principles of morals," who are for ever demonstrating that there is a God to those that never doubted the fact, that the universe displays an intelligent cause to those who have ever admitted it, that death is not an eternal sleep to those who firmly believe in heaven and hell, that man is a moral agent to those who cannot think of him as otherwise, and that those elementary, ethical principles are perfectly true, which savages have never denied.

"We say not that such topics should be excluded from the pulpit, but only that they should form a very inferior element in its ordinary prelections. The Atheist and Deist, though rarely found in Christian congregations, should not be entirely neglected; and those who are neither the one nor the other should certainly be in possession of arguments which may serve to confute both, and to give an intelligent reason 'of the hope that is in them.' But it may safely be taken for granted, in ordinary cases, that the great bulk of those who attend any Christian place of worship, already believe all these things; in a word, admit the truth of that revelation, the exposition and enforcement of which are the preacher's object. What should we say of a member of parliament who should treat the House of Commons (characteristically impatient of what does not bear on practical objects) to formal disquisitions on points on which all the members are agreed, on the first principles of law and government for instance. Allusions to such matters, so far as they bear on the matter in hand, and brief references to general principles, which embrace the particular instances under discussion, are all that would be tolerated."

He pushes this rigor (and severe as it is, we contend that it is demanded by good taste) still further. Not only should the *topics* of the pulpit be thus strictly appropriate, but its phraseology also.

"There are men with whom it is not sufficient to say, that such and such a thing must be, but there is always a 'moral or physical necessity' for it. The will is too old-fashioned a thing to be mentioned, and every thing is done by volition; duty is expanded into 'moral obligation;' men not only *ought* to do this, that, or the other, it is always by 'some principle of their moral nature;' they not only *like* to do so and so, but they are 'impelled by some natural propensity;' men not only *think* and *do*, but they are never represented as thinking and doing without some parade of their 'intellectual processes and active powers.' Such discourses are full of 'moral beauty,' and 'necessary relations,' and 'philosophical demonstrations,' and 'laws of nature,' and '*à priori* and *à posteriori* arguments.' Heat straightway becomes 'caloric,' lightning, the 'electric fluid;' instead of plants and animals, we are surrounded by 'organized substances;' life is nothing half so good as the 'vital principle;' phenomena of all kinds are very plentiful; these phenomena are 'developed,' and 'combined,' and 'analyzed,' and, in short, done every thing with, except being made intelligible. Not only is such language as this obscurely understood, or not understood at all, but even if perfectly understood, must necessarily be far less effective than those simple terms of common life, which for the most part may be substituted for them."

This learned style—the language of learned vanity—is not so common this side the Atlantic as in England, but we have in its stead a species of bombast, which, if possible, is worse; unredeemed by plausible appearances of learning. It consists in the use of uncommon but not technical words—an accumulation of adjectives and adverbs—florid phrases, such as would need much chastening to suit tolerable poetry. We have heard men, who, we should suppose from their professional positions, ought to have read the classic rhetoricians and models, repeat to wondering but unprofited assemblies, discourses which, if put on paper, would be distinguishable from Young's Night Thoughts only by their inferior sense and superior extravagance. A greater rhetorical vice could scarcely exist. If St. Paul should have perpetrated such a solecism on Mars Hill, the fish-mongers of Athens, who, it is said, criticised her orators, would have driven him from Attica. The style of true eloquence is characterized, says our author, by "that *brief, familiar, and natural* manner which a mind in earnest ever assumes;" such as would be used by a man engaged in earnest conversation—intent on convincing his friend of some momentous truth, or dissuading him from some fatal measure. Greater dignity or vehemence, he admits, will often arise from the greater importance of the subject or a larger audience, &c., but there will be the same general traits still.

"The same colloquial, but never vulgar, diction will remain; the same homely illustrations; the same brevity of expression; in a word,

all those peculiarities which mark a man absorbed in his subject, and simply anxious to give the most forcible expression to his thoughts and feelings. The chief characteristics of this peculiar style are, abhorrence of the ornate and the glittering, of the pompous and the florid; jealousy of epithets, a highly idiomatic and homely diction, a love of brevity and condensation, a freedom from stateliness and formality; rapid changes of construction, frequent recurrence to the interrogative, not to mention numberless other indications of vivacity and animation, marked in speech by the most rapid and varied changes of voice and gesture. Of all its characteristics, the most striking and the most universal is the moderate use of the imagination. Now, as lively emotion always stimulates the imagination, it may at first sight appear paradoxical that this should be a characteristic at all. But a little reflection will explain this; for every one must recollect that if a speaker is in earnest, he never employs his imagination as the poet does, merely to delight us; nor indeed to delight us at all—except as appropriate imagery, though used for another object, necessarily imparts pleasure. For this reason, illustrations are selected always with a reference to their force rather than their beauty; and are very generally marked more by their homely propriety than by their grace and elegance. For the same reason, wherever it is possible, they are thrown into the brief form of metaphor; and here Aristotle, with his usual sagacity, observes that the metaphor is the only trope in which the orator may freely indulge. Every thing marks the man intent upon serious business, whose sole anxiety is to convey his meaning with as much precision and energy as possible to the minds of his auditors. But with the poet, whose very object is to delight us, or even with the prose writer, in those species of prose which have the same object, the case is widely different. He may employ two or more images, if they are but appropriate and elegant, where the orator would employ but one, and that perhaps the simplest and homeliest; he may throw in an epithet merely to suggest some picturesque circumstance, or to give greater minuteness and vivacity to description; he may sometimes indulge in a more flowing and graceful expression than the orator would venture upon; that is, whenever harmony will better answer his object than energy. What does it matter to him who is walking for walking's sake, how long he lingers amidst the beautiful, or how often he pauses to drink in at leisure the melody and fragrance of nature? But the man who is pressing on to his journey's end, cannot afford time for such luxurious loitering. The utmost he can do is to snatch here and there a homely floweret from the dusty hedgerow, and eagerly pursue his way. So delicate is the perception attained by a highly cultivated taste of the proprieties of all grave and earnest composition, that it not only feels at enmity with the meretricious or viciously ornate, but immediately perceives that the greatest beauties of certain species of prose composition would become little better than downright bombast, if transplanted into any composition the object of which was serious. We may illustrate this by referring to a passage of acknowledged beauty—the description, in the *Antiquary*, of the sunset preceding the storm, there so grandly delineated. ‘The sun was now resting his

huge disc upon the edge of the level ocean, and gilded the accumulation of towering clouds through which he had traveled the livelong day, and which now assembled on all sides, like misfortunes and disasters around a sinking empire and falling monarch. Still, however, his dying splendor gave a sombre magnificence to the massive congregation of vapors, forming out of their unsubstantial gloom the show of pyramids and towers, some touched with gold, some with purple, some with a hue of deep and dark red. The distant sea, stretched beneath this varied gorgeous canopy, lay almost portentously still, reflecting back the dazzling and level beams of the descending luminary, and the splendid coloring of the clouds amid which he was setting.' No one in reading this passage can help admiring its graphic beauty; the numerous epithets, considering the purpose for which they are employed—that of detaining the mind upon every picturesque circumstance, and giving vividness and fidelity to the whole picture—appear no more frequent than they ought to be. But suppose some naval historian, who has occasion to narrate the movements of two hostile fleets, (separated on the eve of battle by a storm,) should suddenly pause to introduce a similar description, would not the effect be so ridiculous that no one could read to the end of the passage without bursting into laughter?"

"Ridiculous?" Most assuredly, and yet we put it to the reader if he has not frequently heard from men who pass for pulpit orators, sermons which were almost entirely a series of picturesque descriptions—descriptions too which would compare in chasteness with the above about as much as would the Paphian goddess with Diana.

Having thus discussed the appropriate character of the sermon in respect to its topics and style, our author presents examples. Latimer and the English reformers generally are mentioned as specimens. Notwithstanding their rude language, quaint affectations, and frequent puerilities, their style is strongly idiomatic, and their whole tone of discourse is direct, pungent, sincere. Baxter he considers a superior model. Jeremy Taylor, though often disfigured by his exuberant imagination, presents frequently the correct manner. Robert Hall, whom our author calls "the greatest of modern English preachers," is said to have maintained in his ordinary sermons the style here so earnestly recommended. In writing his sermons for the press, he gave them the dress of his literary works. Hence our author prefers, as pulpit models, those which were imperfectly taken down in short-hand from his own lips. He ascribes much of Whitefield's effectiveness to his conformity to these principles. His printed sermons, with all their deformities, have the direct, colloquial style, frequent transitions, and brief images, for which we have contended. The two best

models yet produced by our own church are examples of this style—Summerfield and Fisk. The style of the former was remarkably simple and colloquial—his eloquence was (what all true eloquence is) that of feeling, not imagination. Montgomery, in a letter, prefixed to his biography, says that there was seldom, if ever, poetical imagery in his sermons. He was happy in the use of illustrations, but they were generally metaphors, brief, and directly to the point. The style of Fisk was not so colloquial, but was extremely simple and pertinent—uncommonly idiomatic. His images were numerous, but brief, and mostly similes. Of all English preachers our author gives the preference to South, exclusively referring to his *style*. His fancy more forcible than elegant, his vigorous intellect, shrewd common sense, condensed and direct language, fitted him for the most effective eloquence. A quotation is given, which happily at once asserts and exemplifies the principles here advocated. We cannot better conclude this part of our article than by inserting it:—

“‘*I speak the words of soberness,*’ said St. Paul, ‘and I preach the gospel not with the *enticing words of man’s wisdom.*’ This was the way to the apostle’s discoursing of things sacred. Nothing here of the *fringes of the north star*; nothing of *nature’s becoming unnatural*; nothing of the *down of angels’ wings*, or the *beautiful locks of cherubim*: no starched similitudes introduced with a ‘Thus have I seen a cloud rolling in its airy mansion,’ and the like. No—these were sublimities above the rise of the apostolic spirit. For the apostles, poor mortals, were content to take lower steps, and to tell the world, in plain terms, that he who believed should be saved, and he who believed not should be damned. And this was the dialect which pierced the conscience, and made the hearers cry out, ‘Men and brethren, what shall we do?’ It tickled not the ear, but sunk into the heart; and when men came from such sermons, they never commended the preacher for his taking voice or gesture; for the fineness of such a simile, or the quaintness of such a sentence; but they spoke like men conquered by the overpowering force and evidence of the most concerning truths; much in the words of the two disciples going to Emmaus, ‘Did not our hearts burn within us while he opened to us the Scriptures?’ In a word, the apostles’ preaching was therefore mighty and successful, because plain, natural, and familiar, and by no means above the capacity of their hearers: nothing being more preposterous, than for those who were professedly aiming at men’s hearts, to miss the mark by shooting over their heads.”

Having thus shown what should be the character of pulpit discourses in respect to topics and style, we take leave of our author and pass to some remarks, as practical as possible, on *extemporaneous* preaching in particular—a mode of which he declares that

he "cannot but think it the most effective, as it is certainly the most natural manner." It is rapidly becoming national among us, and yet it would seem that some disposition exists in our own denomination to deviate from a usage so well tested by our ministry. At a conference, which the writer attended not long since, it was intimated that notes were becoming customary in some of our pulpits. Quite a spirited but pleasant discussion ensued, which was enlivened by some good-humored anecdotes, and rendered instructive by pertinent remarks from the fathers of the conference. The presiding bishop gave a decided opinion against the innovation; and no doubt a large majority of the members deemed the verdict just. The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church has formally recommended extemporaneous preaching to its ministry; it certainly ought to be surprising that while they are adopting our own usages so zealously, *we* seem so much disposed to reciprocate the courtesy, and assume the habits which experience has taught them to abandon. We are no sticklers for peculiarities from the consideration of their age; let innovations come, if they be but improvements; but we most heartily remonstrate against the first approaches to a change in the respect referred to, not only because we think that extemporaneous speaking is the apostolic—the most successful mode of preaching—but because we believe it the only mode which fully admits the principles we have been discussing.

There are occasions on which sermons written out and read, or delivered memoriter, may be admissible; but they are few, and the speaker ought always to be commiserated for the inconvenience of a task so irksome and so incompatible with that spontaneous play of thought and emotion, which is absolutely necessary to true eloquence. Though admissible, we would not say this course is necessary, even on such occasions. The most important efforts of oratory have been extemporaneous. The classic orators spoke extempore; their preserved orations were mostly written after delivery. The greatest orators of the British senate did the same; and if we must except a few, like Burke, it will be found that they were not so much eloquent speakers as elegant writers. The energetic and Greek-like eloquence of the American revolution was also extemporaneous. Occasions the most important and the most appalling, involving the interests of states, and presenting the most formidable contrasts of parties and speakers, have been met and triumphantly controlled in extemporaneous discourse; the speakers preferring to be unembarrassed by the particularities of verbal preparation. It may be doubted, indeed, whether the

highest kind of eloquence can be otherwise attained ; it is true, at least, that all the great masters of the art, Demosthenes and Cicero, Mirabeau and Chatham, Grattan and Curran, Henry and Webster, Whitefield and Hall, have been mostly "extemporizers." There is, we admit, a species of dramatic eloquence, the eloquence of great actors on the stage, and of the French pulpit in the age of Louis XIV., which may be referred to as an exception. We would not, however, allow it to be even an exception. On the stage, it is generally but poetical recitation ; and in the French pulpit it was a similar recitation of poetical prose.

If the highest efforts of public speaking have been extemporaneous, it is certainly to be presumed that the efforts of ordinary occasions can be.

Observing men, who may have little practice in an art which requires genius, are sometimes better judges of the principles of that art than are practical proficient ; the latter are beguiled in their judgments by the facilities—the ready intuitions of genius. Genius acts instinctively, and seldom observes the process of its own operations. Hence good poets are seldom good critics ; and genuine orators have seldom defined accurately their art. Goldsmith, who knew nothing of it from practice, but much from observation, has given us perhaps one of the best definitions. He says, "A man may be called eloquent who transfers the passions or sentiments with which he is moved into the breast of another." Again, "In a word, to *feel your subject* thoroughly, and to *speak without fear*, are the only rules of eloquence properly so called." He is more explicit in another passage : "Be convinced of the truth of the object, be perfectly acquainted with the subject in view, prepossess yourself with a low opinion of your audience, and *do the rest extempore*. By this means strong expressions, new thoughts, rising passions, and the true style, will naturally ensue." Every successful "extemporizer" will give to the second passage the authority of an axiom. It may be stated as a fundamental rule in eloquence—*feel and be fearless*. The third quotation is but an expansion of the second, with one very defective clause ; it is not necessary, in order to "speak without fear," that the speaker should "prepossess himself with a low opinion of his audience ;" far otherwise. The importance of his subject, the pre-eminence of higher considerations and motives, (especially in the preacher,) and the consciousness of competent preparation, will lift him above the influence of fear much more effectually than an impression which, in most cases, must be fictitious, and in all should be ungrateful to an elevated mind.

But how command this frame of mind—"feeling and fearless?" This is the question. The advocate of notes proposes to protect himself by their instrumentality from fear and embarrassment. This he may do to some extent, but almost invariably at the expense of the other element—"feeling." The hard and minute labor of the preparation, and the mechanical mannerisms of the delivery of manuscript sermons, can scarcely fail to impair the freshness and impetus of thought. The preacher may be didactic and instructive, but he can rarely be eloquent. This method may suit the professor's chair or the lyceum desk; but it is utterly at variance with the spirit and intent of the pulpit. The people might as well read for themselves; they may find better sermons in their libraries. The pulpit ought to be didactic; but it ought to be more—it should be the fountain of *religious sympathies*, as well as religious instruction; it was designed to keep alive the spirit as well as the truth of Christianity in the world, and for this reason no proficiency of the people in Scriptural knowledge can supersede its appointed instrumentality. Preaching is not an adventitious appliance of Christianity, nor would we make it out a sacrament; yet it stands next to the eucharist and baptism—the *third great institution* of our religion, having as much authority and speciality as the sacraments; and were the Bible in every man's hand, still would it stand a high ordinance of God, a source of vivification and impulse to the church, until the end of the world. *This is the main purport of the pulpit*—if not, then the press or the religious academy can supersede it. How can we reconcile with such views that cold and lifeless retail of religious truth from a manuscript, which is misnamed preaching? To us it has the highest effect of the ludicrous, to imagine Christ on the mount, Peter on the day of Pentecost, or Paul on Mars Hill, *reading a manuscript*. How would it look, even at the bar, or in the senate?

If, then, the advocate of manuscripts can prevent by them embarrassment or "fear," (which is not unqualifiedly the case,) still he loses an advantage infinitely more important than the one he gains.

This, we believe, is the main design of manuscript preaching. It is not that the discourse may be more exact, more compact. It is doubted whether this is desirable for popular assemblies; and extemporaneous discourse, with suitable preparation, will admit of the most consecutive thought. There are other and better reliefs from embarrassment, which we shall soon consider. Meanwhile, it may be remarked, that it is no serious reason for discouragement, especially to the young speaker. Animal courage

seldom coexists with strong susceptibilities of the imagination or the heart. Few great captains have been eloquent. Few distinguished poets or orators have shown much bravery. Cicero declares that he always trembled before addressing a public assembly. Demosthenes showed himself a coward, and Whitefield confessed himself one. Of all qualities, animal courage is the least allied with other excellences; and it will be observed that of all public speakers, those bravoos who fear nothing have generally the least of that energy or pathos which frequently makes a trembling man a son of thunder or an angel of consolation. Diffidence in the early career of a public speaker is therefore a good sign. It denotes sensibility; and without sensibility there is no eloquence. In time, it may be sufficiently subdued to have all its advantages without its disadvantages. And it will always have the one advantage mentioned by a classic and accomplished lawyer, the younger Pliny,—“A confusion and concern in the countenance of a speaker casts a grace upon all that he utters; for there is a certain decent timidity, which I know not how, is infinitely more engaging than the assumed self-sufficient air of confidence.”

Our remarks thus far apply particularly to sermons entirely written. We object less, but yet strongly, to the use of briefs *in the pulpit*. We can conceive of no reason for it except indolence or imbecility. Neither of these we presume to be the cause. It is habit, at first indulged, but at last fixed. Can it be supposed that a brief sketch, seldom occupying more than a letter-page, can be noted down and then studied, revolved, expanded in the mind, and yet not be sufficiently impressed on the memory to allow the speaker to dispense with his notes? If not, we cannot conceive how such imbecility of memory can coexist with the other mental qualifications which are deemed necessary for the Christian ministry. We know men of the weakest memories for verbal details, who, nevertheless, can study out sermons requiring an hour, or an hour and a half in delivery, so as to recall with accuracy every division, subdivision, illustration, and reference. We repeat, it is habit that leads to the necessity of briefs in the pulpit. The speaker who uses them fixes not in his mind the capital ideas as centres of association for the subordinate thoughts, but, on the contrary, stores his memory with the filling up, and then refers to his manuscript for the leading propositions. This course is contrary to the very philosophy of association, and must cost more labor than the opposite method—not to speak of the interruption of thought and feeling occasioned by such references. Let the speaker go into the pulpit with his subject, in its length and

breadth, printed on his memory; let him see "through and through" it clearly; let him feel that nothing remains to be done but to deliver his distinct and glowing impressions, and will he not have more self-possession and more buoyant freedom than if he enters it with that vagueness of mind which requires the aid of a manuscript? But what if he is inexperienced, or weak of nerve, and becomes embarrassed, and "forgets his place"—what then? Why, let him stumble along, and say Amen as soon as he can. He will much sooner overcome such a liability, by so doing, than by trusting to his notes. A child learns to walk more readily by its own awkward movements than by mechanical supports.

We have mentioned that the chief design of notes is the prevention of embarrassment, and the vagueness which usually follows it, and have said that there are other and better preventives. The rule quoted from Goldsmith omits the most important one which applies to the pulpit, viz., the spiritual support which is pledged to the devoted minister. This thought is usually dispatched with little remark, as presupposed, but we would emphasize it. It is a vast consideration; it is not enough pondered by God's ministers. We have frequently been astonished at the slight moral courage of many who have read the promise a thousand times, and who ought to carry it in their hearts into the pulpit, like an impulse from "the third heaven:"—"I will be with you even unto the end." Blessed is this sentence. Every word is emphatical. "I"—who? He who is God over all, and blessed for evermore; "will be," it is positive; with whom? "*with you*;" "even," it is emphatical; "*unto the end*," it is definite. And now with such a promise, and with a special commission from heaven for his work, and with all the motives of eternity stirring his spirit, ought it to be expected that the minister of Christ should quail and cower? He may well tremble under his responsibility, but he should be the last to fear the face of man. We have already admitted that he may in his early efforts be diffident, and that it is not a bad indication for him to be so, but we contend that he can, and ought to overcome this inconvenience, without a resort to notes. It is an evil which ought to be overcome—an enemy that ought to be fought down; but let it be conquered, not by skulking under shelter, but sword in hand.

Again, one of the most important remedies of this difficulty is, competent preparation. We have been a little curious to learn the modes of preparation among various preachers, and have been astonished at their diversity. Some we have found who never put pen to paper for the pulpit. This is not right. If a man

could even study, and retain in his mind thoroughly, a subject for the time being, still he cannot preserve it for the future without a record. The indolence and negligence of such are inexcusable. We never knew any one follow this course who was profound or accurate. A second class go to the opposite extreme, and write most of their sermons entirely, and preach them *memoriter*. There are many objections to this course. It consumes too much time. Few faithful pastors can find leisure from more important duties for the composition and memorizing of two sermons per week. It will be almost invariably found that these sermon writers are poor pastors, not only neglecting their pastoral duties, but unsociable, reserved, if not morose, by their sedentary and laborious habits. Extemporaneous preachers ought to write much, not only to preserve their thoughts, but to counteract a tendency to versatility and verbosity—a tendency which will always beset them—but they had better write their sermons after than before delivery. They should be habitual writers, also, on subjects not peculiar to their profession. Some of the most eloquent speakers have been among the most vigorous writers. Cicero is an instance from the bar, and Hall from the pulpit—yet it has been in spite of their oratorical habits and by the closest discipline. Again, sermons delivered *memoriter*, lose their freshness and power. Few are the individuals who can vivify a stale and memorized discourse, and those who can, could, with suitable practice, be much more effective in extemporaneous delivery. There is no eloquence more commanding and sublime than that of the extemporaneous speaker, who, with a mastery of his subject, with the strenuous action of all his faculties, and the full play of all his feelings, stands before his audience unshackled by preconceived details of thought and language.

There are others who write out their discourses, but do not deliver them verbatim, retaining in mind the general train of thought, and using the language only so far as it can be readily recollected. This appears to us an unfavorable mode, for if the speaker is somewhat embarrassed he will be endeavoring to call up his language to his assistance, and not being able to do it, will become the more perplexed; and if he should not be embarrassed, he will be able to speak without such verbal preparation. In the one case, it is an evil; in the other, superfluous. There are other wrong modes of preparation, which need not be enumerated; but what is the right one?

By extemporaneous we need not say we have not meant unpremeditated discourse, but unwritten. *The most thorough study is requisite for success to an extemporaneous speaker.* What is the

best mode of preparation for him? This is the question. We pretend not to answer it fully, but will do so as well as we can. A direct answer should include the *selection*, *arrangement*, and *elaboration* of subjects; a more comprehensive one would take in that prior mental discipline and training in elocution which we at present presuppose.

First, the *selection* and *arrangement* of subjects. There are two modes—the textual and the topical. Both are common; but some use almost exclusively the former. In their ordinary reading of the Scriptures, they fix upon a striking or apposite text, and form their divisions upon its different clauses. There is a kind of expository preaching, and there are some individual texts in which this plan is good—sometimes admirable; but in most cases it is obviously not the best. A text includes frequently as many distinct topics as it does clauses, and all *unity* must be put at defiance, by adjusting the divisions of the sermon to those of the passage. We would not stickle too much for a vigorous use of critical rules in addressing popular assemblies; still they are to be respected, for they are not adventitious; they are founded in the constitution of the human mind, and prescribe the best mode of addressing it—and the pulpit should always use the best. It is not a little amusing to observe with what mechanical regularity some of these textualists lay down their “first,” “secondly,” and “thirdly,” (most generally the *object*, the *means*, and the *motives*,) and finally “taper off” with a well-assorted series of “conclusions.” Unity is one of the highest rhetorical excellences of a discourse. 1. The discourse is better remembered than when composed of unrelated parts. 2. One leading truth distinctly and exclusively presented, can be better appreciated by the judgment of the hearer than many of questionable relation. 3. A single truth, especially if a weighty one, (and what truth of religion is not?) illustrated, placed in different lights, argued and enforced throughout a discourse, will make a profounder impression on the conscience of the hearer than a variety, discursively treated. There is sometimes much execution done by a scattering fire; still it is never so sure as that which is well-directed.

Further, this digressive preaching is not only not adapted to the minds of the hearers, but it does not admit of a thorough exhibition of religious truth. Is it not owing to this habit that we have so little doctrinal preaching, the crying want of the times? We have, indeed, a few doctrines stated and reiterated in almost every discourse, and they, fortunately, are the elementary, the vital

truths; but how seldom are they fully defined! We do not advocate controversial preaching—the usual religious controversies in the pulpit, or through the press, we consider, with few exceptions, miserable pugilism; men might as well go at it fisticuff, and decide their theology by black eyes and bloody noses as to decide it by the usual manner in which controversies on Universalism, Unitarianism, &c., are conducted. But we may preach *doctrinally*, and yet not *controversially*. We should *instruct* our people. We should fortify them in the wholesome doctrines of the truth. This we cannot do distinctly and thoroughly without expounding individual doctrines, and we can sufficiently expound them without violating the rules for which we have contended. The discursive preacher is like the specimen seeker, who, with the precious vein beneath his feet, gathers fragments of all surrounding minerals, each, perchance, glittering with particles of the richer element; while the more sagacious discoverer stops not to shape and polish inferior specimens, but only breaks up the surrounding mass that he may dig deeper into the golden depth. The course here recommended would not be barren—it may be rich in variety, but its variety would not be in the leading thoughts,—the “propositions,”—but in the filling up. There is a *multum in uno* which displays at once discipline and fertility of mind.

A further objection is, that the stated preacher especially requires a more economical distribution of his resources, or he will soon find himself exhausted, and under the necessity of repeating in substance his old outlines.

There is a paraphractical mode of preaching, to which these objections do not apply. It consists of a running commentary on a number of passages—it is quite distinct from the above, being expository; not sermonic. It would be in many respects advantageous for our preachers to adopt a more *expository* mode of preaching during a part of each sabbath. How rich in instruction are the narratives and parables of the Gospels, and how ineffectually must they be imbodyed in the discussion of an isolated text! The modern or textual mode of preaching was unknown to the first preachers of Christianity. Their method was to read a portion of Scripture and comment or exhort upon it. Again, such discourses might be confined to the lesson of the day for the Bible class or Sunday school; they might tend to illustrate and enforce it, and at the same time be alike interesting to a promiscuous congregation. It is to be feared that in our own churches, especially, preaching is too uniformly hortative. Such preaching is essential—perhaps the most important kind of pulpit discourse—but it

should not be exclusive ; a perpetual reiteration of the more spiritual elements of theology may not only interfere with the varied and extensive instruction of the people, but impair, finally, the interest and influence of such a mode of address.

The topical mode of selecting and arranging subjects, is that in which a preacher fixes upon a *subject* or *topic*, and afterward selects a text suitable for it. For instance, he chooses the subject of "religious zeal," and he can take for his text, "It is good to be zealously affected in a good cause." Repentance, faith, baptism, holiness, perseverance, apostasy, &c., &c., &c., are topics for which appropriate texts may be found after the discourse is completely studied. Such a discourse may consist of divisions and subdivisions framed upon the different aspects of the topic, or of a simple series of arguments or illustrations on one of its aspects ; the latter being always preferable, as admitting more closeness and more economy of thought. Having prepared his sermon in reference only to the topic, he can apply the text to it so far as it is applicable, without digressing into collateral clauses. Most of the sermons of Chalmers are specimens, while the skeletons of Simeon are examples of the textual plan. As the advantages of this mode are the converse of the disadvantages of the other, they need not be discussed. Its simplicity, unity, energy, and economy are manifest.

We have blended the subjects of selection and arrangement for brevity. Another point remains, viz. the *elaboration* of the discourse, or that study which should follow the preparation of the skeleton—the filling up of the outline. We have several brief observations to make respecting it. First. The filling up, though general, should be so complete that the speaker can see through the *whole* perspective of the discourse. The text is the staple, the divisions are the swivel, and the subordinate thoughts are the links of the chain—the series should be unbroken if the artizan would be sure. We do not mean that the *whole* discourse should be prepared—but that *the different propositions should be connected by leading and well-related thoughts*. An extemporaneous speaker should not go into the pulpit (except in emergencies) without such a clew. These trailing thoughts may be general enough to admit of abundant extemporaneous additions—three or four in a dozen words, between each division, might suffice—but they should always be thoroughly studied and invariably noted in their place on the manuscript. We consider this a most indispensable rule. Many merely sketch the divisions, and trust to the occasion for the intermediate train of thought ; such are never safe. If embar-

rassment or temporary lassitude should overtake them, they may state their well-wrought positions only to bring into greater contrast a meagre, spiritless filling up. Next to divine aid, this rule is perhaps the best preventive of embarrassment. It gives the speaker a degree of confidence in his subject, which few embarrassing circumstances can disconcert. Whatever may be his lack of vivacity or fertility when he enters the pulpit, he feels assured that he has provided a stock of solid and instructive thought, which cannot but be received with profit and respect by his hearers; there is little danger of confusion, therefore; not so will he discourse as one who beats the air. We know of successful extemporizers who consider this the prime human security in the pulpit.

Second. Not only would we have a somewhat consecutive train of thought between the propositions *sketched down*, but it is desirable that some specially good thoughts, some apt or striking illustrations, adapted to throw a strong light on the subject, and to arrest the attention of the audience, should be noted—some illustrative quotations of Scripture or apposite passage of poetry—some of our author's "flowerets from the dusty hedge-row"—which will strike the mind as appropriate and even beautiful, provided it be not irrelevant beauty, such as we have proscribed. Let not such a course be despised as factitious or meretricious. We demand such preparation of the political or literary orator; and is the gospel of the grace of God less worthy? No speaker who wishes to make a forcible and vivid impression will neglect it. We do not recommend that such passages, when original, be prepared in their verbal dress; in this respect they should be extemporaneous—but let them be *noted*. The abbreviations given by Gregory of the concluding passages of Robert Hall's celebrated sermon on "Sentiments suitable to the Times" are fine examples. William Pitt pronounced the last five pages of that discourse more eloquent than any thing else on record. The language was extemporaneous, yet those overwhelming apostrophes were well studied.

Third. After thus preparing thoroughly the discourse, the next step is to commit it well to memory. The more it is labored, the more readily can it be memorized; in most cases the two processes are coincident. Those who depend upon manuscripts in the pulpit, cannot be aware of the facility of memorizing after such preparation.

Fourth. There is besides memorizing, a species of reviewing practiced by most, perhaps all extemporaneous speakers, which may be called ruminating. "I never have preached," said Bolton,

"a sermon to my people which I did not first preach to myself." This ruminating process is all-important in extemporaneous discourse; by it the speaker not only refreshes his memory, but excites his thoughts, and kindles his feelings. Combined with an ardent spirit of prayer and a close self-application of the subject, it becomes a most intense and hallowing exercise. There are two important rules respecting it, which are transgressed perhaps by most preachers. One is, that it should be an exercise entirely of *meditation* not of *delivery*. The speaker should review and expand his thoughts, but not try to clothe them in language. He will find himself always tending to this latter point, but should obstinately avoid it; because, 1. Appropriate language will always occur to him in the pulpit, if the thoughts are clear and vivid. 2. If he gives it a premeditated dress, he will probably not be able to recall it fully, unless he can also recall the language. 3. It is frequently embarrassing to depend upon premeditated but unwritten language. The difficulty here is like that of the memoriter preacher whose manuscript is not well committed, and whose ineffectual efforts to recall his language are more perplexing than would be the task of originating it extemporaneously.

The other rule is, that it should never be exercised much immediately before preaching—only so far as to reassure the memory. The fatigue and agitation of mind occasioned by laborious and anxious revision, just before entering the pulpit, must in most cases impair its buoyant play. Let there be, therefore, a full interval of repose between the time of revision and that of delivery. It is said of Rowland Hill, that he usually indulged in mental relaxation before entering the desk, and frequently when called from his study to attend the service, he was found exercising his mechanical taste by taking apart and recomposing the machinery of a clock or watch.

We might enlarge much on these points, but our limits require brevity. The few rules we have illustrated have been learned from a number of the best judges. Various minds require various modes; yet these few and simple principles are of universal and essential application. They are practical axioms. We believe that no one who thoroughly adopts them will find it necessary or desirable to trammel himself with manuscripts. A. S.

Boston, Mass., March, 1843.

ART. IV.—*The Episcopal Church defended—Review of the "Original Church of Christ," by Dr. Bangs.* By JAMES A. BOLLES, A. M., Rector of St. James' Church, Batavia, N. Y.

IN the remarks which may be made upon this strange production, it will be extremely difficult to meet and refute the many misstatements which the reverend author has made, without reflecting injuriously upon his character as a man of candor and a lover of truth. It is certainly no less mortifying than it is derogatory to the Christian character, to find its professed advocates descending from that high elevation on which such a holy cause places them, to dabble in the muddy waters of defamation, trying to fortify themselves by erroneous statements, by contemptuous epithets, and by sophisms as hollow as they are ruinous to the cause they are brought to defend. That the author before us has thus disgraced himself as a writer, and committed the cause he has attempted to advocate, will manifestly appear in the course of these observations.

It seems that in the course of last year a controversy arose between the Rev. Mr. Bolles and the Rev. Mr. Steele, a minister of the Methodist Episcopal Church, stationed in Batavia, involving, in its progress, the validity of our ordination, by Mr. Wesley, Dr. Coke, and Bishop Asbury, in which Mr. Bolles repeats the stale, and often refuted charges which have been made against these men of God for their official acts. With a view to clear himself of all arguments which had been adduced in favor of presbyterian ordination, and against the fiction of uninterrupted succession, he undertakes a review of the "Original Church of Christ," in which we know not which most to admire, his fecundity in inventing false charges, or his ingenuity in evading the force of all my strongest positions, and the proofs adduced to sustain them.

1. In the first place he finds fault with me for asserting that the Methodist Episcopal Church was organized before the Protestant Episcopal Church had an existence in this country. His remarks upon this subject are so exceedingly weak and evasive that they would be utterly unworthy of serious refutation, were it not that they may, by possibility, deceive the ignorant and unthinking portion of his readers.

But how does he attempt to evade the fact? Why, by asserting that "the Rev. Samuel Seabury, D. D., was consecrated in Scotland on the 14th of November, 1784—more than a month before

the organization of a Methodist Episcopal Church in Baltimore." He might well add, "But enough upon this point." Surely this is enough for any man that has nothing more to give, but it is not enough, certainly, to satisfy the cravings of an honest mind in pursuit of truth.

How stand the facts in the case? They are as follows:—Dr. Seabury was ordained in Scotland on the 14th of November, 1784. On the 2d of September, 1784, Dr. Coke was consecrated a superintendent by Mr. Wesley: here was a priority of time in favor of Dr. Coke of two months and twelve days. Do you say that the mere act and fact of consecration does not constitute a church organization? Granted. But if it prove the organization of the Protestant Episcopal Church, as Mr. Bolles seems to think it does, it surely proves as much for the Methodist Episcopal Church. But Dr. Coke arrived in this country eleven days before Dr. Seabury was ordained. Here, again, is priority. But still no church was organized. This took place on the 25th of December following; but the Protestant Episcopal Church was not organized until 1787, three years after the organization of the Methodist Episcopal Church.

Now, were these facts known to Mr. Bolles? If they were, as they must, I think, have been, what shall be said of the above assertion? We leave it to his own reflections.

But, allowing the facts, how does he dispose of them? How do you think, reader? He says, the reformers

"were glad of the opportunity not only of pointing to the time when the Church existed in England entirely free from Papal corruptions, but of proving that the Reformation was no more the birthday of the Church than it was of the creation of the world. And so we answer to all such miserable and 'ad captandum' arguments, and tell you that you might as well talk about the discovery of the American continent at the time of the revolution, as to talk about the establishment of the Church in this country *then*."

The force of this argument seems to be this:—The reformers claimed that the Reformation did not produce a new church, but only cleared away the rubbish from the old primitive church; and, hence, that the Protestant Episcopal Church is not a new one, but only a continuation of the old apostolic church. Now, pray tell us to what this all amounts? May not all the denominations claim the like distinction? Have they not all descended through the same line? In this respect, then, they are all of the same age and family, only one has changed its external appearance in one particular, and another in another, but all retaining the same identity.

What a pitiful plea is this for originality, and to prove that the Protestant Episcopal Church had an organization in *this* country prior to the existence of the Methodist Episcopal Church, though not organized, in fact, until *three years afterward*! "But enough of this."

2. The next exception which Mr. Bolles takes to my book is, the position which it assumes that the "terms bishop and presbyter, or elder, signified, in the primitive church, the same order of ministers." He does not object to the truth of this position, but only that it is such a truism that no one attempts to dispute it. Very well. Here, then, is one thing gained by controversy, for, be it remembered, that this was not always taken for granted. But why does he find fault with me for taking so much pains to prove so obvious a truth? Truly it was the tenderest sympathy. I might have spared myself so much labor! Thanking my antagonist for the tenderness of his spirit, I will take the liberty of remarking, that he seems not to be aware that in establishing that point I upset, at a stroke, all his arrogant pretensions to a *third order* in the ministry, made such by a *triple consecration*; for if bishops and elders were the same as to order, and if Titus and Timothy were, as they contend, bishops, they were also elders, and nothing more, as to order, and hence elders, or bishops, or presbyters, had the right of ordination. But

"can the doctor prove that the higher office held at first by the twelve apostles, and which all must acknowledge was entirely distinct from either or any of the other—can he prove that this office was not continued in the Christian church, and was not intended to be continued so long as the church shall exist?"

To this I answer, that whether I prove it or not, makes nothing either for or against my position; for, indeed, "that is" *not* "the question;" the question is, whether these apostles were so ordained as to make it their *exclusive* privilege to ordain others; and that these others were ordained three several times, first deacons, then elders, and, thirdly, bishops, evangelists, or apostles, or by whatever name you may please to call them, *before* they were duly qualified to ordain others; and that this practice has been kept up in the church from that day to this? This is the question. And in stating it in my book, I made this proposal, which I now repeat,—

That if they will bring any authentic proof of this during the first two hundred years of the Christian era, I would consent, if they would accept of me, to a reconsecration by one of their

bishops, and likewise persuade as many of my brethren as I could to follow my example.

Has Mr. Bolles met this challenge? He has not. And until he does, all his vaunting, caviling evasions, amount to nothing.

Here, let it be remembered, is the ground on which I stand. I proved in my book, and Mr. Bolles has not even attempted to invalidate my proof, that elders, under the general superintendence of the apostles, governed the church, and administered all its ordinances, not excepting that of ordination, in some portions of Christendom, for upward of four hundred years.

Let it be recollected that the question is not respecting jurisdiction, but of ordination. We know that the apostles, during their lifetime, and afterward the evangelists, and after them the bishops, did exercise an extensive jurisdiction over the churches; but that they were inducted into their office by a triple consecration, and thereby claimed the exclusive right of ordination, is what, I think, no one ever did, or ever can prove. And yet, until it is proved, the doctrine of uninterrupted succession of a third order, made such by a triple consecration, must be considered a fiction of man's invention, palmed upon the world, for what purpose I will not say.

This being the true state of the question, all Mr. Bolles' flippery about pointing to the "recorded facts that this office *was* continued" is lighter than the "chaff of the summer's threshing-floor." I will not dispute the question with him. It may, for all that I care for its consequences, stand as an indisputable truth, that the apostolic office was continued in the church; still it will remain a question of momentous consequence in this controversy, Did these apostles, in order that their successors in office might be duly qualified to administer the rite of ordination to others, induct them into office by three several and separate ordinations, and has that practice been kept up to the present time? Prove this, sir, and your work is done. Leave it unproved, and all you may say amounts to nothing.

As this is the point in debate, I may well dispense with an answer to all he has said about what Episcopalians believe respecting the right of ordination being confined to the apostles and their successors. All this may pass with him for sober truth, if it please him so to consider it. But, then, here another question will arise, which he will do well to settle: Who were the successors of the apostles? Were they Timothy, Titus, Barnabas? What were they called? Do you say bishops? But, according to Mr. Bolles, no one disputes but that bishops and elders signified

the same order of ministers, in the primitive church, for the first two hundred years. Bishops, then, or elders, ordained. How were they qualified to be ordainers? According to Mr. Bolles, by a triple consecration. Here I demand proof; and until it is brought, and I fully believe it never can be, I shall rest secure in the conviction that your whole theory is built upon the sand of human assumption.

As to what he says about St. Paul's consecration, it does not touch the point in debate. Allowing that my interpretation is erroneous, and I will not stop here to contend for it, though I am fully convinced of its correctness, the main question remains untouched—I mean, this fiction of a triple consecration. But if Paul was not ordained at that time, we have no account of his having been ever ordained at all by any human hands, and, moreover, let that ceremony imply whatever it may, either a formal induction into the ministry, or a mere setting apart for a missionary work, it establishes the point that the “greater is blessed of the less;” for surely those who laid hands on him, and sent him away, were less in authority in the church, so far as jurisdiction is concerned, than was the great apostle to the Gentiles. Still the question presses upon us—for I am determined that Mr. Bolles shall not lose sight of this main point of debate—Was Timothy, Titus, Barnabas, or any other of the apostolic successors, made such by a triple consecration? Were they higher in *order* than elders? If they were, tell me, sir, *who* made them so? *When* were they made so? *How* were they made so? And *when*, *how* did these immediate successors of the apostles constitute their successors into this imaginary *third* order? A satisfactory answer to these questions will do a thousand times more for your cause than ever so many pages of ranting about the apostolic office being continued in the church, during all its ages of pollution, perjury, blasphemy, and the most shameful moral degradation.

Mr. Bolles' remarks on 1 Tim. iv, 14 are certainly a literary curiosity. Says he,—

“Now if the casual reader takes it for granted, without examination, that the word ‘presbytery’ in this passage means a company of ministerial *presbyters*, then the passage will be an evidence to him that presbyters had something to do with the ordination of Timothy; but if he will take his Greek Testament and Lexicon, and study the subject, by looking at the meaning of the word, and the various places where it is used, then he will find that ‘presbytery’ may have a very different rendering; or if he will examine the best commentators upon the passage, such as Calvin, Grotius, and Macknight, among the dissenters, then he will find, that the word may mean a council of any

elderly persons, apostles as well as presbyters, or it may mean the *office* of the *presbyterate*, and does not refer in this case at all to the ordainers. But if he eschews Greek and commentators, and wishes to understand the matter by himself, and by reading the vernacular, then he may turn to 2 Tim. i. 6, where it is said, 'Wherefore I put thee in remembrance that thou stir up the gift of God, which is in thee, *by the putting on of my hands*;' and here he will find that St. Paul the apostle was the principal and *efficient* ordainer of Timothy; that he even presumes to say that this 'gift of God' was conferred '*by the laying on of his hands*;' that his language is exclusive of all others engaged with him in actually bestowing the gift, and, consequently, that if it was done *with* the laying on the hands of presbyters, then they were only present and assisting, as is frequently the case now, without any body's dreaming that they are the *ordainers*."

Upon this curious passage several remarks may be made. What the writer wished to gain by the reader's taking the "Greek Testament and Lexicon," I am at a loss to determine, unless he meant to impress upon the mind that there was something awfully mysterious couched in the simple term *πρεσβυτεριον*, which is the word used here, and which, as every body knows who pretends to know any thing about the meaning of Greek, means an *assembly of elderly persons*, and here means *Christian presbyters* or *elders* in the ecclesiastical sense of those terms—I say, what he meant to infer from this solemn request in favor of his doctrine of uninterrupted succession of a *third* order of ministers, made such by a *triple* consecration, I am totally at a loss to determine. But he says it "may mean a council of any elderly persons, apostles as well as presbyters." May it, indeed? Well, then, it may mean an assembly of elderly persons who were neither apostles nor presbyters, in a technical sense, and hence these elderly persons might have assisted the apostle in ordaining Timothy. Or if a company of *apostles* were styled *presbyters* in an ecclesiastical sense, then were the apostles no higher in office than presbyters, and were, therefore, authorized to ordain by virtue of their presbyterial office, which I believe to be the fact; and hence "the *office* of the *presbyterate*" was the same as the *office* of the *apostolate*, so far as the simple designation of order in the ministry is concerned.

But St. Paul says, that Timothy received the gift by the laying on of *his* hands singly. What, does he say that this gift was conferred upon Timothy by the laying on of his hands three several times, first to make him a *deacon*, secondly an *elder*, and thirdly a *bishop*, or an *apostle*? This would be difficult to prove. And yet, until it is proved, the fact that Timothy was ordained by the

hands of St. Paul alone, will make nothing in favor of Mr. Bolles' theory. But allow the plain facts which grow out of these passages, that Timothy was first consecrated a *deacon* by the laying on of the hands of St. Paul singly, and that he was afterward ordained an *elder*, by the laying on of the hands of the presbytery, and all difficulties vanish, and we have a consistent and harmonious account of the manner in which Timothy was inducted into office.

Let us, however, understand these passages as we may, they make nothing in favor of the exclusive right of ordination by a third order, made such by a triple consecration, termed now bishops, until it can be proved that Timothy was thus qualified for the order and work of a bishop in the church of God.

But why all this solemn pomp about the "Greek Testament and Lexicon?" If the writer understood the Greek, he has practiced a solemn farce upon his readers, as he, in that case, must have known that the Greek word was not used in that connection otherwise than in a strict ecclesiastical sense—unless, indeed, he wished to allow that any company of elderly persons in the church, not in office in the Christian ministry, assisted in the ordination of Timothy to the order and office of an elder. This supposition, however, would hardly comport with the high dignity and exclusive powers which Mr. Bolles wishes to attach to the bishopric of his Church. If he did not understand the Greek, then has he imposed upon the ignorance or credulity of his readers, by striving to make them think that there is some mysterious meaning about the Greek word, from which a skillful linguist might make it favor the doctrine of uninterrupted succession of a third order, so constituted by a triple consecration. In either case he has acted unworthy of a Christian minister.

3. What Mr. Bolles says about my collecting my testimonies from Dr. Miller's Letters is all a mistake, as I never once looked at those Letters while composing my numbers, nor have I since. I informed my readers whence I took my quotations, that is, those of them which I did not derive from the authors who wrote them, namely, from Stillingfleet and Lord King. And here I may as well reply to what my antagonist has said respecting my not quoting any of the sayings of Lord King, after promising such quotations. The fact is, I never, as he avers, promised to quote any of the sayings or arguments of that author, but only that the quotations which followed in that number from the fathers were borrowed from that book, which is true to the letter, his assertion to the contrary notwithstanding. On the contrary, I was so far

from adopting the conclusions of Lord King, that I dissented from him, and pointed out what I considered an error in his account of the primitive church. (See page 131 of my book.)

He also strives to invalidate Lord King's account of the primitive church, because it is well known that Slater had confuted his arguments. Whether he has confuted the arguments of King or not is nothing to me, for I never professed to, nor did I produce a single argument from that author in support of my position, but only borrowed from him some quotations from the early writers of the church. But did I not apprise my readers of Slater's "Original Draught" in the following words?—

"I am aware that *Slater* has attempted a refutation of Lord Chancellor King's account of the primitive church, and in a few particulars he may have succeeded; nor am I pledged for all the conclusions which his lordship draws from the data which he adduces from the early writers of the church. The quotations" (that is, the quotations from the fathers, and which I was about taking from his book, and which I had informed my readers, "the author had fully verified by inserting the originals themselves in the margin of his book") "will speak for themselves, and every one is at liberty to make his own inferences."—*Original Church of Christ*, p. 43. And in page 132 I more particularly pointed out what I considered an error in Lord King's account of the primitive church, in the following words:—

"While he very justly contends that each congregation managed its own affairs, under the direction of a single pastor, denominated interchangeably bishop or presbyter, he seems to overlook the higher and more extended jurisdiction of the apostles and itinerating evangelists, whose actual oversight of the whole church constituted a general superintendency above that of a congregational or presbyterial mode of administration. Hence this most estimable author, to whose labors we are much indebted for a correct view of many particulars relating to the early history and organization of the church, leaned much further toward the Congregational mode of church government than the Scriptural representation of this subject would seem to warrant. While we may admit, what he contends for, that each congregation managed its own internal affairs, under the supervision of their resident bishop, without any interference from a neighboring bishop and congregation, possessing only the same rights and privileges; we may, in perfect consistency with this admission, allow that over and above those bishops and congregations, the apostles, and, in their absence, the itinerating evangelists, exercised a general oversight of the

whole church, thus establishing a precedent for a proper episcopal government, more in accordance with the modern episcopal churches, than it is with either congregational or presbyterial parity."

Thus much for my fairness and honesty, and for the disingenuity of my antagonist in relation to Lord King.

4. The quotations which Mr. Bolles brings from Dr. Bowden make nothing in favor of his hypothesis, even allowing that they touch the point in controversy respecting the superiority of bishops over presbyters, made such by a third consecration, of which they, indeed, say nothing; for they all relate to the third century, when the bishops began their lordly career over the presbyters, not only by enlarging their own jurisdiction and circumscribing that of the presbyters, but also by encroaching upon their right to baptize and ordain; yet even then this right was not yielded by the presbyters without a struggle.

5. But the testimony of Eutychius is attempted to be set aside by proving that he has made some chronological mistakes in respect to the time in which St. Mark came to Alexandria, and the time in which he and St. Peter died. Allowing that Eutychius made these mistakes, perfectly innocent in themselves, provided they were inadvertent, does it follow that he has given a false testimony in so important a matter as that of the manner in which the bishops of Alexandria were constituted? A man may very easily, and very innocently too, make a blunder in regard to dates, more especially when his authorities are either sparse or obscure, while, at the same time, his authority may be unimpeachable on a matter of church usage, and more especially on such a prominent one as that in which a bishop is constituted. I consider, therefore, the testimony of Eutychius unimpeached, when he says, "that the twelve presbyters, constituted by Mark, upon the vacancy of the see, did choose out of their number one to be head over the rest, and the other eleven did lay their hands upon him, and made him patriarch."

6. This writer, however, accuses me of making a false quotation from Mosheim, or of quoting *two* when *one* only is found there. Now let the reader turn to Mosheim, vol. ii, pp. 115 and 126, Murdock's translation, and he will find the *two* quotations that I have made, only I gave them in Maclain's translation, which I have not at present by me.

7. He also says that I made but one quotation from Eusebius, whereas if he will look at number xiv, pp. 186, 187, and 210, he will find no less than *three* quotations from Eusebius, the two

former of which are somewhat long, while the latter, which is the only one noticed by Mr. Bolles, is quite a short one. In noticing this, however, and my reference to the catalogue of bishops found in Mosheim's History, he makes quite a flourish about my attributing this catalogue to Mosheim, while it was made out by his translator. He is perfectly welcome to all the advantage this inadvertence will afford him, as it certainly does not affect the weight of the argument one way or the other.

8. But he shall not escape so easily from some other gross blunders which *he* has made. Take, among others, the following remarks respecting my quotations from Stillingfleet. After having remarked that Stillingfleet retracted after he became a bishop at the age of forty-five, what he had written while a presbyter at the age of twenty-four, Mr. Bolles says,—

“Now, I ask, was it right, was it honest in Dr. Bangs, who must have known these facts, as they have been reiterated again and again, thus to attempt to sustain his arguments by the *authority* of Bishop Stillingfleet? Did he think that his Methodist brethren were so ignorant and credulous as to allow themselves to be duped and deceived by such a manifest imposition? Must they not regard it as a barefaced deception?”

Here, indeed, is a heavy charge! And, if sustained, would render me utterly unworthy of all or any confidence, not only “as a witness,” as this writer avers, in another place, that I am, but of all credit as a man of honor or honesty. But what will the reader think when I inform him that I not only knew that *Bishop* Stillingfleet had retracted what *presbyter* Stillingfleet had said in respect to the powers and orders of the Christian ministry, but that I had apprised my readers of it in the following words?—

“But, to weaken the influence of his arguments, it is said, that Stillingfleet afterward recanted his principles. I may reply to this in the language of Bishop White, that it was ‘*easier for him to recant than it is to answer his arguments.*’ These will remain as a monument of his learning and diligence, and of his impartial regard to truth, when the memory of those honors which were heaped upon him in after days by the hierarchy of England, in calling him to the episcopal chair, shall be forgotten. It is not meant, by this remark, to impeach his sincerity, but simply to show that ‘great men are not *always* the *wisest* in their elder days, even when they attempt to correct the supposed errors of their youth.’—See *Original Church of Christ*, p. 190, note.

Was not here an honest confession of the fact that Stillingfleet had altered his opinion? Where, then, let me ask, was the

ground for Mr. Bolles to charge me with "imposition," with "barefaced deception," by concealing the fact of Bishop Stillingfleet's recantation? Many an orthodox clergyman has recanted his orthodoxy, and turned Unitarian, and others Universalists, and some open infidels; and shall we too renounce our faith in what they formerly taught, and follow them in their devious course of error, down the road to destruction?

The arguments of Stillingfleet, and the quotations he has made from ancient authors, and which I have transferred to my pages, will speak for themselves, to none of which has Mr. Bolles made any reply, or attempted to prove that they are not fairly and accurately copied. Let him try his skill at this, instead of attempting to impeach my integrity by such pitiful shifts as those to which he has resorted. An author that will descend to such conduct betrays at once the weakness of his cause, and a consciousness of his inability to defend it by fair and honorable means.

But this charge of dishonesty! Had I given as many proofs of it as Mr. Bolles has done in his pretended review of my book, he might well accuse me of it in the manner he has. "Stop thief!" cries the real thief, to turn off the attention of the multitude from himself, and so to fix the theft upon an innocent person, that he may escape detection. Was this the object of my antagonist? Let the reader judge between me and him.

9. In the next place I am accused of misrepresenting the sentiments of Bishop White, by asserting that he "*proposed the electing and consecrating of a bishop by the hands of presbyters.*" Really, if this be a misrepresentation of Bishop White's proposed plan, then I confess I cannot understand his language. The following are his express words on this subject:—"All the obligations of conformity to the divine ordinances, all the arguments which prove the connection between public worship and the morals of the people, combine to the adopting some speedy measures; if such as have been above recommended should be adopted, and the episcopal succession afterward obtained, any supposed imperfections of the *intermediate ordinations* might, if it were judged proper, be supplied, *without acknowledging their nullity*, by a *conditional ordination*, resembling that of a *conditional baptism* in the Liturgy: the above was an expedient proposed by Archbishop Tillotson, Bishops Patrick, Stillingfleet, and others, at the revolution, and had been actually practiced in Ireland by Archbishop Bramhall."

Now what did Bishop White mean by these *intermediate ordinations*? He must have meant either the ordination of a bishop

by the hands of presbyters, or the ordination of presbyters by other presbyters, and hence he gave his sanction to the validity of *presbyterial* ordination, and which is as manifest an infraction of high-toned episcopal order as would be the consecration of a bishop by a company of presbyters. But that Bishop White ever intended such a departure from the line of episcopacy, is what neither I nor any of his readers ever dreamed of until Mr. Bolles put the spectre into our heads by his broad denial of my assertion, that he designed to recommend the consecration of a bishop by the hands of presbyters. And he thought so little of the line of succession, that he calls it a mere *ceremony* compared to the *substance* to be obtained by other more essential matters. His words are, "In the early ages of the church it was customary to debate and determine in a general concourse of all Christians in the same city, among whom the *bishop* was no more than *president*." And hence he remarks, that, to relinquish the "worship of God, and the instruction and reformation of the people, from a scrupulous adherence to episcopacy, is sacrificing the *substance* for the ceremony."

Do not these words plainly imply that their author was pleading either for the appointment of a presbyter to act in the capacity of a bishop for the time being, or for a *conditional ordination* of one of that order by the hands of others of the same order? Be this as it may, the quotations which I have made from Bishop White fully prove that he had but little faith in the exploded doctrine of the divine right of episcopacy, made such by a triple consecration in a regular line of succession from the apostles down to the present time; and this is the main purpose for which I appealed to him, whose authority, so far as it goes, is not in the least weakened by any thing Mr. Bolles has said. If I have misunderstood Bishop White, it must have arisen from the ambiguity of his language, which appeared, however, so plain and explicit as hardly to admit of a misconstruction; and even now, after attentively reviewing his words, I cannot see any other construction which can fairly be put upon them. Yet, if Mr. Bolles will have it so, I will yield to his own construction; and then it will most inevitably follow that Bishop White was willing to relinquish *episcopacy altogether* for the time being, and admit the validity of a *presbyterial* ordination, and allow that all the acts and doings of these conditionally ordained presbyters were, to all intents and purposes, valid, both civilly and ecclesiastically; for surely the bishop would not have expected that all the baptisms and marriages, and the consecrations and administrations of the Lord's supper, should

have been *conditionally performed* by these *conditionally ordained* presbyters, by the hands of other presbyters who possessed but hypothetical powers! This would have created a strange medley of a church—strange baptisms, marriages, and administrations! And suppose, in the mean time, any of these conditionally baptized persons, and married persons, had died before they could have been rebaptized and married by one of these canonically ordained presbyters, what would have been the consequence! See to what perfect absurdities my misunderstanding of Bishop White leads!

But this is not all, nor indeed the worst part of the consequence. Who should administer confirmation? This, according to the doctrine of Protestant Episcopalians, can be done canonically only by a bishop, created such by a triple consecration. Yet Mr. Bolles will not allow that Bishop White intended to create such a bishop by the laying on of the hands of the presbytery. Who then was to administer confirmation? A presbyter? Or a presbyter-bishop, acting as *president pro tempore*? Or was this ceremony to be performed also *conditionally*?

Alas! what confusion does this denial of Mr. Bolles introduce into the half-formed Protestant Episcopal Church! And what crudities does he attribute to presbyter White!

Now I cannot but help thinking that my interpretation of Bishop White's pamphlet was the more natural, the more true, and much the more charitable of the two. But I leave it to the reader, or to Mr. Bolles' second thoughts, to choose between the two, whichever pleases him best, without any anxiety as to the result upon my own reputation as an author who was striving to ascertain the truth.

10. Next comes the story of Pope Joan. This is pronounced a fiction by Mr. Bolles, and he refers to the translators of Mosheim, Maclain and Murdock, to Reese's Encyclopedia, the Encyclopedia Britannica, the American Encyclopedia, and to Gibbon, who all agree in pronouncing it a forgery. Well, what of that? I gave it as I found it in Mosheim, at the same time apprising my readers that I was aware its truth had been called in question, while Mosheim believed it, and declared that "during the five succeeding centuries it was generally believed, and a vast number of writers bore testimony to its truth; nor before the Reformation undertaken by Luther was it considered by any either as incredible in itself, or as ignominious to the church." This was *my* authority, and it is at least as good as any which Mr. Bolles has brought to invalidate it. He has quoted Gibbon as authority against the

credibility of this story; but he neglected to tell us that Gibbon says, that "till the Reformation the tale was repeated and believed without offense; and Joan's female statue long occupied her place among the popes in the cathedral of Sinenna." Though, therefore, he did not believe the truth of the story, he bears testimony to the veracity of Mosheim, that until the Reformation it was generally believed without offense, and repeated without suspicion; and, considering the corruption of the times, he allows that "her amours would have been natural, her delivery in the streets unlucky, but not improbable."

Now the question arises, why this narrative should have been so generally acquiesced in as true for five centuries anterior to the Reformation, never having been called in question by any writer until that mighty event? The reason is obvious. Such was the general licentiousness of the times, (and the court of Rome was by no means exempt from the general corruption of manners and morals,) that such an event was considered no disgrace, nor as at all vitiating the official character of the supreme pontiff; but when the Reformation began to pour its refulgent light upon the moral world, and the controversy waxed warm between the reformers and their antagonists, men began to open their eyes to the enormities of vice, and were thence led to a discovery of the moral degradation to which the ecclesiastics had been sunk; and to render the authority of the pope and his adherents less terrific than it had been, these intrepid reformers tore off the veil which had so long hidden their characters from the eye of true piety, charging home upon them and their predecessors the enormity of their profligacy. Among other things which went to disgrace this holy line of the priesthood, was this profligate act of Pope Joan. How could they withstand these thrusts upon their purity? Why, by denying their truth. This led them to question the truth of this story of Pope Joan, and many since have joined with them in striving to render it incredible. I believe the infidel Bayle was among the first, and perhaps the most successful, among the anti-Romanists, who undertook to invalidate the truth of this item of ecclesiastical history.

Yet, if Mr. Bolles wishes, he may class this among the legends of the darker ages, though I can perceive nothing more incredible in it than in the following, which I quote from Gibbon; an authority which I suppose he will not dispute, since he has already referred to him in support of his unbelief in the pontificate of Joan. He says,—

"The influence of two sister prostitutes, Marozia and Theo-

dora,* was founded on their wealth and beauty, their political and amorous intrigues: the most strenuous of their lovers were rewarded with the Roman mitre, and their reign may have suggested to the darker ages the fable of a female pope. The bastard son, the grand, and the great-grandson of Marozia, a rare genealogy, were seated in the chair of St. Peter, and it was at the age of nineteen years that the second of these became the head of the Latin Church. His youth and manhood were of a suitable complexion; and the nations of pilgrims could bear testimony to the charges that were argued against him in a Roman synod, and in the presence of Otho the Great. As John XII. had renounced the dress and decencies of his profession, the *soldier* may not perhaps be dishonored by the wine which he drank, the blood that he spilt, the flames which he kindled, or the licentious pursuits of gaming and hunting. His open simony might have been the consequence of distress; and his blasphemous invocation of Jupiter and Venus, if it be true, could not possibly be serious. But we read with some surprise, that the worthy grandson of Marozia lived in public adultery with the matrons of Rome, that the Lateran palace was turned into a school for prostitution, and that his rapes of virgins and widows had deterred the female pilgrims from visiting the tomb of St. Peter, lest, in the devout act, they should be violated by his successor."—See *Gibbon*, vol. v, p. 115, Harper's edition, 1822.

If, then, Mr. Bolles will not allow the stream of succession to have been polluted by the prostitutions of Joan, he must admit that Marozia and her "worthy grandson" poured into its limpid waters no small portion of impurities, and thereby rendered it equally turbid and distasteful to all who wish to slake their thirst from the pure fountain of truth, or disgusting to those who could trace their descent to an honorable parentage.

But neither this, nor any other instance of shameful defection from the laws of propriety, of moral and spiritual purity, is any hinderance to Mr. Bolles avowing his full faith in the unbroken line of apostolic succession. Hear him in the following words:—

"We reply, that even if the story of Pope Joan were true—an undoubted and indisputable fact—still it would not in the least affect the episcopal succession either in England or America, nor would it

* How very modestly does Mr. Bolles introduce his quotation from Gibbon! He says, "In his *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* he gives an account of two female sovereigns." Was he afraid to suggest the licentious character of these mothers of those apostolic bishops?

affect the succession, could the learned doctor prove that fifty of the popes of Rome were females, or any thing else which he might choose to call them. For at the time Pope Joan is said to have lived, and for centuries afterward, the bishops of England no more went to Rome for consecration than they came to America; and even if the succession of the bishops of Rome had been utterly annihilated, still it would no more have destroyed the English succession than the annihilation of the English succession would destroy ours. Besides all this, the Church was established in England long before the acknowledgment of the supremacy of the Church of Rome either in that country or anywhere else. Thus says Blackstone in his Commentaries, 'The ancient British Church, by whomsoever planted, was a stranger to the bishop of Rome and his pretended authority.' "

These remarks are an evidence that the faith of their author in the line of succession through the bishops of Rome is somewhat weakened, and that he is almost ashamed to trace his genealogy through such degraded ancestors. Hence he wishes to make his readers believe that the English Church, from which the Protestant Episcopal Church has descended, had no connection with the Romish Church, and did not therefore derive her authority from that corrupt source. I rejoice at this symptom of returning to reason and decent respect for purity of character. It is a sign that its author is awaking from the dream of apostolic succession, and that he begins to see the "blackness of that darkness" which for so long a time hovered over the Romish Church, and in a measure hid from human view the enormities which lay concealed beneath the cloak of infallibility.

But let us examine this pretence, that the English Church was not dependent upon Rome for her first bishops. Without entering into the historical details, many of which are doubtless fabulous, respecting the first introduction of Christianity into Britain, in the third, fourth, and fifth centuries, during which periods it often fluctuated between hope and despair, it is manifest that it was not until the sixth century that it was firmly established in the British island. This was accomplished through the influence of Queen Bertha, the Christian daughter of the king of France, who was married to Ethelbert, one of the kings of England, about the year 570. In 590 Gregory the Great was created pontiff, and in 596 he sent the abbot of St. Andrews, of Rome, named Augustine, accompanied by not less than forty monks, to undertake the conversion of the English nation. With these he landed on the isle of Thanet, in the county of Kent, where he was met by the king, and was graciously received, and finally succeeded in bringing all the people of Kent nominally to embrace the religion of Rome,

including the king himself. Having met with such success, by waving his banner and silver crucifix, fasting and praying, and chanting hymns, Augustine, in 597, returned to Gaul, was ordained archbishop of Canterbury, and primate of all England, and soon returned with a fresh army of monks. In 598 Pope Gregory, much pleased with the marvelous success of this true son of the Church of Rome, confirmed his jurisdiction over all England, continued to encourage him by his exhortations, advising him to purify the pagan temples with holy water, and thus convert them into churches, around which the people were allowed to erect booths, and there feast themselves as they had been wont to do in their pagan state. Through the indefatigable labors of the archbishop and his army of monks, the Popish religion spread, the pagan temples were transmuted into churches, new churches and monasteries were created, and additional bishops were consecrated, so that by the time Augustine died, which was in 607, nearly the whole kingdom was converted to the Romish faith, monks were vastly increased, and all things were put in a train for the full establishment of that system of Popery which finally obtained throughout Great Britain, and so remained until it was torn to pieces by the Reformation in the days of Henry VIII. and his successors, as the assumed heads of the Anglican Church.—Mosh., vol. i, pp. 156, 318, 380, 384, Murdock's translation.

Though the bishop of Rome had not yet attained to the height of his external splendor, by the possession of supreme power, yet it is manifest that a broad foundation was already laid for it, and that Gregory was even then violently contending with the bishop of Constantinople for the supremacy, and exemplified all the malevolent haughtiness of a lordly and independent pontiff; and from him Augustine received his commission to visit England, was ordained, either by himself or by others who had been invested with the power of ordination by him, to the archbishopric, was confirmed in his office by Pope Gregory, sustained and directed by him in all his movements, and, of course, held himself responsible to the pope for all his acts and doings. And yet Mr. Bolles tells his readers that because the English Church had an existence before the supremacy of the pope of Rome was acknowledged, therefore the bishops of England were not dependent upon Rome for their line of succession!

Whence, then, did they derive it? O, from Gaul. Augustine was a Frenchman, and he brought the succession from France to England, and hence, some have said, the English Church, and, consequently, the Protestant Episcopal Church, did not receive

the succession from Rome but from France ! Truly. But allowing that Augustine was a Frenchman, which is by no means certain, from whom did he receive his consecration ? Was it not from Pope Gregory, or from one commissioned by him to administer it ? Did not Pope Gregory also confirm Augustine in his bishopric, as primate of all England, send the pall, or mantle for the new archbishop, accompanied with numerous presents for the cathedral, including holy relics, with letters to the king and queen ? And were not all the monks who accompanied the archbishop, and who followed after him, sent by Pope Gregory, and did they not all, as well as their bishop, act under his direction and control ? Did not the Church in England, thus planted, and then watered from the see of Rome, grow up under its nourishment, imbibe its spirit, adopt all its mummeries, bend the knee before its sceptre, and, like an obedient daughter, submit to all its mandates, wash herself in its holy water, venerate its holy relics, and kiss the immaculate cross ?

And, during all this time, were any of the bishops of England considered legitimate unless they could trace their descent to the "holy mother," and claim kindred to the "holy father," the pope of Rome, though himself the offspring of a prostitute, and his holiness at the same time living in all manner of profligacy ? Moreover, have we any reason to believe that the Roman Catholic bishops of England were any more chaste or holy in their lives and conversation, during the greater part of this period of darkness and desolation, than were the popes themselves ? Let him who doubts this read the Life of Wiclif, and listen to the thundering denunciations which he uttered against the licentious clergy of his day and generation.

Yet, according to Mr. Bolles, all these were canonical bishops, true apostolic successors, and fit channels to convey the oil of consecration unvitiated by any foreign admixture of vicious indulgences ! I say, therefore, again, as I said in my book, that all the qualification which these ghostly fathers of the succession possessed was derived from the act of consecration—that such is the magical influence of this rite, that it instantly converts a monster in human shape into a canonical bishop.

Now any man who is driven to adopt a doctrine so repugnant to Christianity, so abhorrent to the feelings of piety and morality, must be sorely pressed for arguments to defend himself. Nay, he must have a low opinion of the purity, the dignity, and high moral excellence of Christianity, as well as of the holy character of the Christian ministry. To spend more time, therefore, to prove the

self-evident absurdity of such a dogma, would be as useless as it would be to undertake to prove that purity and impurity can never unite in the same being at the same time.

11. There are only a few more things of a miscellaneous character which I think worthy of notice in the pamphlet before me. I had called John Wesley a *reformer*. At this Mr. Bolles takes fire, and his holy indignation bursts out in a blaze of pious horror. He says,—

“Now, without any comments on the horrible blasphemy here uttered, as though any thing had been left by the Saviour unfinished, which was really ‘*necessary*’ for the reformation and salvation of the people,” such blasphemy as is only equaled by Mr. Wesley himself when he asked, in his ‘*Appeal*,’ what person could be less liable to objection than myself, whom the Almighty has employed.”

This is truly the master-piece of logical acuteness and theological fairness! Merely because I represented John Wesley as an instrument in the hand of God of reforming sinners from the error of their ways, I am accused of uttering “horrid blasphemy!” What shall be said in reply to this? Does not the Rev. Mr. Bolles preach for the purpose of reforming sinners from the error of their ways? If he do not, I will venture to affirm, even at the risk of being called a blasphemer again, that he does not strive to answer the end of his ministrations. And just so far as he succeeds in this work of reformation, and in building up believers on their most holy faith, so far, and no further, does he fulfill his holy calling. And in this sense every true minister of Christ is a reformer. Who was ever accused of blasphemy for calling Luther a *reformer*, and the good work he effected the *Reformation*?

“As though any thing had been left by the Saviour unfinished.” Here also I am at a loss how to answer, because the thing itself is so palpably absurd. Is there no difference between reforming the people who had become so sunk in wickedness as to have lost sight of what the Saviour had done and taught, and reforming something which had been left “unfinished by the Saviour?” I am tempted to step beyond the bounds of what I usually allow myself in controversy, merely because I think the occasion calls for it, and say that Mr. Bolles knew perfectly well, when he penned that sentence, that he was doing me an act of injustice. He certainly knew that I neither meant nor had asserted any such thing as he has attributed to me. He knew, I repeat, most assuredly, that I never said, nor intimated, that *the Saviour had left any thing unfinished* which Mr. Wesley was to

supply, and thus to make him a reformer of the Saviour's doctrine or precepts. And knowing this, he has willfully uttered a slander upon his neighbor, and which he has not at all softened by the sneering manner in which he has so frequently lugged in the phrase "learned doctor." Learning is an accomplishment to which I make but little pretension, and yet, I trust, I have enough of Christian principle and gentlemanly feeling not willfully to distort the truth, nor to treat an antagonist with sneering contempt.

12. Equally unfair are his remarks about what I had said respecting the success of Mr. Wesley and the Methodists. Remark-
ing upon this he says,—

"But let the Methodist himself test this doctrine of success. Let him go to the Turk and urge the success of Mr. Wesley as a proof of his divine mission, and exhibit before his eyes, if you please, the half million of followers to which the number has been reduced" (*reduced?* what does this mean?) "in England. What would the Mussulman say? Look at Mohammed, and see the number of *his* followers, amounting to more than a hundred and forty million. And then, if success is really a test of truth, the Methodist would be compelled to fall down and worship the false prophet of Mecca."

Now I must say the same in respect to these remarks as I did of the former. Mr. Bolles must have known, for he had the means of knowing in the book which he was reviewing, that I placed no dependence on the *number* of proselytes merely, but entirely on their being turned from darkness to light, and on their giving evidence of this change in their character and position by bringing forth the fruits of the Spirit, by the holiness and blamelessness of their lives. To prove this point I will here transcribe a paragraph from the "*Original Church of Christ*," p. 108:—

"Did the Head of the Church call Wesley to this work? I will answer this question by answering another. Was the work in which Wesley engaged so zealously and successfully the work of God or the work of man? If you say it was the work of God, then you allow that God called Wesley to its performance, and that he sustained and sanctioned him in it. If you say it was the work of man, then you affirm that a man, independently of divine grace, without the aid of the Holy Spirit, could, by his own power and influence, reform more sinners from the error of their ways, and build them up in all holy living, than all the clergymen in England beside! Take therefore your choice. If you choose the former, that is, that it was the work of God, then you grant all for which I contend. If the latter, then you allow that sinners may

be brought from darkness to light, and become changed in heart and life, by human power alone. You must either allow, therefore, that John Wesley was called, sustained, and sanctioned by the Head of the church, or turn open infidels, and confess that the power of the gospel is no longer necessary to the conversion and salvation of the world."

Mr. Bolles must now dispose of this argument as pleases him best. The reader, however, will perceive that I placed no dependence upon the mere fact that numbers were nominally proselyted to the opinions of Wesley; but that I put the evidence of his divine call upon the fact of his being made an instrument of really converting sinners from the error of their ways, of *turning many to righteousness*. If Mr. Bolles is disposed to controvert this fact, let him do so, and thereby expose himself to the censure of all those who have borne witness to its truth in the English, the Protestant Episcopal, and every dissenting church under heaven, who have ever referred to the subject.

Now did he not know, when he wrote the above paragraph, that this was my ground of argumentation? He certainly did, or he never read the book he was reviewing, and in either case he forfeits title to confidence. I therefore charge him in this instance also with a most flagrant and willful perversion of my words, which amounts to the sin of slander, or *bearing false witness against his neighbor*.

13. Another accusation this reverend author brings against me, equally false and slanderous. In his second letter to Mr. Steele, p. 16, he has the following words:—

"In one of these tracts," (tracts written by me,) "among other things, our bishops are charged with 'brutal stupidity, ignorance, and wickedness.' And again, 'Such is the magic influence of the oil of consecration, that these men are instantly metamorphosed into saints, into legitimate successors of the apostles.'"

These, I confess, are my words. But how are they misapplied! Mr. Bolles represents me as applying them to the bishops of the Protestant Episcopal Church, which was as far from my thoughts as this representation is from the truth. No! such a censorious sentence against these worthy men never dropped from my pen, as the reader will be convinced by turning to page 240 of my book, where I was speaking of the stupidity, ignorance, and wickedness of the popes and their clergy of the *ninth, tenth, and eleventh* centuries, who had no other qualification for the priesthood but the oil of consecration; and yet Mr. Bolles, with this fact before him, for he must have had my book before his eyes to

enable him to transcribe the words so accurately, makes his readers believe that I represented *his* bishops, that is, the bishops of the Protestant Episcopal Church, as being thus stupid, ignorant, and wicked.

Here again I charge him with a willful perversion of the truth, for he most assuredly knew that he was making a false impression upon the mind of his reader. And this is the man that boasts of his being in the line of apostolic succession, and excludes all other ministers but those of his own Church from having a valid ordination, and, of course, from being duly authorized to administer the sacraments of Christianity.

I know of but one way in which Mr. Bolles can possibly evade the force of this charge, and that is, by saying that by *our* bishops he did not mean the bishops of the Protestant Episcopal Church, but meant to call the bishops of the *ninth, tenth, and eleventh* centuries *his* bishops. Let him do so if he chooses. If he will recognize those popes, of whom I was principally speaking, as *his* bishops, then he must retract all he has said about his Church existing independently of Rome, place himself under the wings of this "unclean bird," and claim kindred with those polluted fathers of his Church. In this case, I charge home upon him all I said respecting the "stupidity, ignorance, and wickedness" of those bishops, and appeal to the record for its truth.

But no, he meant no such thing. He *meant*, I verily believe, to make a false impression upon the minds of his readers, with a view, no doubt, to render me odious in the estimation of his friends, and the friends of the Protestant Episcopal Church, and thus to destroy my credit as a writer. It will react, however, upon himself, as he must, most inevitably, bear the reproach of a willful perverter of the truth, and thereby of *bearing false witness against his neighbor*.

But what will not a man attempt to do who will have the hardihood to try to make the world believe that John Wesley was either such an egregious fool or wicked knave as not to intend to invest Dr. Coke with episcopal powers, nor to establish a Methodist Episcopal Church in America! A man that will attempt such an impossible task, and quote documents to prove it, almost every one of which proves directly the reverse, need excite no wonder if he attempt any thing which malignant ingenuity can invent—he may slander the living and the dead without remorse or shame.

I am well aware that by using this strong language, I run the risk of being charged with undue severity, or of violating the rules of Christian love and courtesy. But I cannot help it. I think the

occasion calls for it. I would most gladly find an apology for my accuser if I could. This, however, I cannot do. He had the book before him while he was writing, and he therefore must have known that he was doing me an act of cruel injustice. The reader, therefore, must allow me the privilege of speaking plain truth, such as the provocation calls for, in the fear of God, without evasion or disguise, leaving my antagonist to dispose of it in any way his second sober thoughts shall dictate to be right and proper under the circumstances.

A few remarks will conclude what I have to say on this perplexing subject. Mr. Bolles complains of me and some other writers for bringing heavy accusations against his Church. Alas! alas! he may well complain! Whoever will look into their publications, for more than half a century past, will find almost a continual stream of reproach, of sarcasm, ridicule, and censure, against John Wesley and the Methodists. During most of this time not a word has been uttered on our part by way of replication or in self-defense. At length we have ventured to speak, to defend ourselves against their rude assaults, when, lo and behold, we have been guilty of a mighty offense! For doing what? Why, for showing that their accusations were without foundation, and that our ministry and ordinances were susceptible of a Scriptural and rational defense.

Now we wish our opponents to know, and to understand distinctly, that we do not think it our duty to lie down, and silently let them tread us under their feet;—that we have the means and ability to defend ourselves from their slanderous representations, and that we presume to think that our ministry and ordinances have as good a claim to apostolic authority, simplicity, and purity, as theirs, or any other church in Christendom; and that John Wesley was neither a knave nor a fool, but that he acted the part of a wise, honest, and upright minister of the sanctuary in all he did, and that such are the purity and strength of his character as to be unimpeachable by the tongue of slander or the pen of malevolence. We advise them, therefore, to let him alone. He is an overmatch for their strength.

The unfairness of Mr. Bolles in his professed review of my book must appear most glaring to every one who has attentively read the two publications. Instead of meeting my main positions, and assailing my arguments in their support, he has passed them over in solemn silence, and dwelt upon a few comparatively unimportant particulars, distorting my sentiments, falsifying my words, and denying what is most evidently true, and finally accusing me

of imposture and deceit, unworthy of credit as a quoter of ancient documents. It is most assuredly irksome to dwell upon these infirmities of our fellow-men, and truly mortifying to see these exhibitions of human frailties, not to say moral obliquities. We may, indeed *ought* to apologize for an inadvertent blunder of the pen, for accidental mistakes arising from haste or carelessness of thought; but what apology *can* be made for *willful* perversion, for misrepresentations which could not, in the very nature of things, arise from inattention, from negligence, or want of means of knowing better? These things are not said in anger. If I know my own heart, I have felt not a particle of ill-will for my antagonist during this discussion, although I have been constrained, from a high sense of duty, to speak strongly and plainly, in what I consider just terms of rebuke, which I hope may not be lost on my reverend accuser.

I have no personal acquaintance with Mr. Bolles. I only know him from his book; and I honestly confess, had I not been informed that he has a fair standing in his Church, and that his publication would be likely to gain credit among his readers, I should not have thought it worthy of a serious notice. All his arguments have been answered over and over again, and until something new can be brought, it will hardly be worth while for us to pay any attention to any thing he may say or do.

I will conclude by repeating what I have often said before, namely,—

That if our antagonists will bring a single proof, either from the sacred Scriptures, or the writings of the primitive fathers for the first two hundred years of the Christian era, that the officer in the church, called APOSTLE, EVANGELIST, or BISHOP, was ordained THREE several times, first a DEACON, secondly an ELDER, and thirdly a BISHOP, EVANGELIST, or APOSTLE, then I will yield the point to them, and acknowledge that our ground is untenable.

This is the real question in debate. And if Mr. Bolles will meet it fairly, and sustain it by unimpeachable testimony, he will render his cause a thousand times more service than all his silly trifling with his readers by publishing the letters of John Wesley, Charles Wesley, and Dr. Coke, and the opinions of Dr. Whitehead to prove that Methodist episcopacy is spurious—all of which, except the remarks of Dr. Whitehead, were duly considered in my book, not to a word of which, so far as these letters are concerned, has he deigned to give any answer worthy of the least attention.

ART. V.—*Memoir of the Rev. Charles Nisbet, D. D., late President of Dickinson College, Carlisle.* By SAMUEL MILLER, D. D., Professor in the Theological Seminary, Princeton, New-Jersey. New-York: Robert Carter. 1840.

THIRTY years elapsed between the death of Dr. Nisbet and the appearance of this biography. This delay, however it may have been caused, has been productive of some disadvantages. Most of the doctor's associates have followed him to the grave; many traits of his character have lost their sharpness of outline in the recollection of those that remain; much information that might have been obtained at an earlier period is lost for ever; and the community have now only the general interest in the subject which must always attach to the biography of a remarkable man.

But the delay has not been without its good results. The prejudices, both of love and hatred, have passed away. The crowd of little men, who, to use the language of Carlyle, "rush toward a great man's character as soon as he departs, and blink up to it with such view as they have, scanning it from afar, hovering round it this way and that, and each cunningly endeavoring to catch some little reflex of it in the little mirror of himself" have vanished into empty space. Neither the glare of adulation nor the vapors of detraction are likely now to prevent clear vision of the object. We do not know but that the author is right in saying that "the most candid and impartial, if not the most feeling and racy biographies are those which have been formed many years after their subjects have passed from the stage of action." Certainly, in this case, the work has fallen into good hands. Dr. Miller is perhaps as well acquainted with the life and character of the deceased as any living man; and, from his established reputation for good sense, piety, and candor, we have reason to expect that the virtues and faults of the man whose name he commemorates will be fully appreciated and honestly stated. At the outset we may say that the hopes thus excited have been generally met; and if, in some instances, we shall find reason to differ from the author, or even to blame him, we shall endeavor to do so with becoming reverence for his age, his usefulness, and his learning.

CHARLES NISBET was born at Haddington, in Scotland, on the 21st of January, 1736. After studying, under the direction of his father, the Greek and Latin languages, and other branches of elementary knowledge, he entered the University of Edinburgh in 1752. From that time, receiving no pecuniary aid from his

father, he sustained himself honorably by his own exertions. Immediately after his graduation, he entered upon the study of theology in Divinity Hall, where he remained, according to "the excellent habit of his country, for six years." At the end of this time he was licensed to preach. All that we find in the biography in regard to his religious experience up to this period is contained in the following words:—

"On the 10th of March, 1756, he recorded an act of solemn dedication to God, drawn in a spirit of enlightened and ardent devotion. And on the 18th of April, 1759, he drew up another paper, in a different form, but of similar import: both very strikingly evincing that while he was diligently engaged in studying theology as a science, he was by no means forgetful of its practical and experimental influence on his own heart as a Christian."

After preaching about two years in Glasgow, he accepted a call, in 1763, to the church in Montrose, where he remained, first as assistant to the aged pastor, Rev. John Cooper, and then as his successor, until he left Scotland for America in 1785.

In 1766 he married a lady to whom he had been engaged for twelve years, and who contributed greatly to his happiness and comfort to the end of his days. Even at this early period he had acquired an extensive reputation for learning and talent. In 1767 Dr. Witherspoon applied to him to permit his name to be presented among the candidates for the presidency of Princeton College. Indeed,

"the truth is, Mr. Nisbet was now regarded as among the most learned men in Scotland, and was proverbially called the walking library. Nor was this wonderful. His thirst for knowledge was insatiable. His habits of study were singularly diligent. His memory was not only excellent, but bordered on the prodigious. The libraries within his reach were large and rich. And his access to the society of literary men, both in and out of the church, was such as seldom falls to the lot of one so youthful, and who could boast so little of what is called worldly patronage."—P. 28.

The account of Dr. Nisbet's ministry in Scotland, given in our author's second chapter, is the most unsatisfactory portion of the book. Not that it is devoid of interest, for it abounds in exhibitions of his wit and talents. But in an account of a Christian minister's pastoral life we look for more. We should be glad to learn something of his mode of preaching, of the fidelity with which he performed his pastoral duties, of the success which attended his labors, of the character and amount of his personal piety; in short, to learn what were his qualifications of mind and

heart for the great work of *preaching the gospel*, and how he exercised them in that noblest of human employments. Except a few vague and general statements by the author, and the testimonial given to him, at his departure, by the presbytery of Brechin—in which it is stated that he “discharged the several duties of the pastoral office with great faithfulness, diligence, and assiduity: and that his conduct, both in private and public life, has been in every respect unexceptionable, and highly ornamental to his character and profession as a Christian, and a minister of the gospel”—we can learn little on these points from the biography. We draw no unfavorable inference from this, but simply wish to mark the deficiency, and to express our regret that it exists.

But if we have little proof in these chapters of his personal piety and of his zeal in preaching the gospel, we have abundant evidence of his orthodoxy, his learning, and his wit. The Church of Scotland was divided, when he entered upon his ministry, into two great parties, the orthodox and the moderate, of which the former was distinguished for the evangelical preaching of its members and for their opposition to the abuses of patronage. To this party Mr. Nisbet allied himself, and, in its defense, he often displayed, before the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, that pungent satire, profound erudition, and abundant wit, which afterward won for him so wide and enviable a reputation. Two specimens of his speeches are given by our author, either of which is sufficient to give plausibility to the strong traditionary statements that remain in regard to his remarkable talents as a debater in the General Assembly. Clear, pointed, and precise, these speeches are models of excellence in regard to style. Abounding in happy quotations, apt allusions, and strokes of wit, they yet contain strong and well-arranged arguments upon the questions in debate. If well delivered, they must have had tremendous effect. Indeed, says our author,

“he seldom failed to electrify the body which he addressed. It appeared as if no argument, no quotation, no *bon-mot* could ever take him by surprise. If any one ever attempted to play the wit at his expense, quick as lightning, flash after flash of superior wit would break from his lips, accompanied with a peculiar expression of his countenance, which, when he chose to indulge it, might be said to blaze with wit, which generally proved irresistible, and seldom failed completely to turn the laugh on his prostrate adversary.”—P. 70.

It is clear, also, that Dr. Nisbet was a consistent and zealous friend of civil liberty. In the great contest for American independence, he sided with the colonies, and expressed his opinions

with his usual fearlessness. Having to preach on a fast-day appointed by government, during the war, he took his text from Dan. v, 25, (the handwriting on the wall,) and commenced his discourse with the following words :—

“We are this day called upon by our superiors to fast, and afflict our souls; and they have not called us to this duty till they had given us abundant reason to do so.—To discharge our duty with as little offense as possible, we have chosen the words of this text for the subject of our discourse on this occasion. They served to awaken a mighty monarch, who does not seem to have ever thought before.”
—P. 75.

On another occasion of the same sort, the town council of Montrose left the church in a body, perceiving, from the beginning of his sermon, that its doctrines were not likely to suit their taste. Mr. Nisbet stretched forth his hand toward the seat they had just left, and said, as they withdrew, “The wicked flee when no man pursueth.”

These instances are characteristic. Through life Dr. Nisbet delighted in such extemporaneous sarcasm as that which he leveled at the Montrose town council; and, as the propriety of its exercise in that case may well be questioned, so, on other occasions, his wit frequently got the better of his judgment.

The third chapter contains some fragments of correspondence with the Earl of Buchan, Lady Huntingdon, and the Countess of Leven. It appears strange to us that Dr. Miller makes so much of this correspondence. He seems wonderfully taken with the titles of these good people. The *noblesse*, as he singularly enough calls them, appear to be the most noticeable persons with whom Dr. Nisbet had to do, and are not to be mentioned but with reverence. The letters of the Earl of Buchan are characteristic enough. Those of Lady Leven are just such as any well-bred woman of tolerable understanding and moderate acquirements might be expected to write; and they occupy entirely too large a space in this biography.

The fourth chapter contains an account of Dr. Nisbet's invitation and removal to the United States. Soon after the close of the American war, several gentlemen of high character determined to establish a new literary institution west of the Susquehannah River. Among these were the Hon. John Dickinson, then governor of Pennsylvania, Dr. Benjamin Rush, William Bingham, Esq., and others noted for their public spirit and benevolence. A charter having been obtained from the state, the first meeting of the board of trustees was held on the 15th of September,

1783. The attention of the board was probably directed to Dr. Nisbet, as a suitable person to lay the foundation of the new college, by Dr. Rush, who is believed to have made his acquaintance during his residence in Scotland. Dr. Nisbet was accordingly elected president of Dickinson College, on the 8th of April, 1784. The prospects of the future college were gloomy enough, except in the glowing imaginations of its projectors. A report was made to the board, at the very time of Dr. Nisbet's election, which stated the total amount of the funds of the college, including money, stocks, and lands, to be £2839, 12s., 6d., Pennsylvania currency, the productive portion of which yielded only £130 per annum. The trustees relied, for an increase of their funds, upon the liberality of the public and of the state legislature. And yet they offered Dr. Nisbet a salary of £250 sterling, a house rent-free, and the payment of all his expenses from Scotland to Carlisle. Dr. Rush wrote to him repeatedly, in pressing terms, making the most unqualified promises, indulging in the most sanguine prophecies of success, and pledging the honor and estates of the trustees for the payment of their obligations. To these repeated and urgent solicitations, coming from men whose elevated position in society entitled their word to the utmost confidence, Dr. Nisbet, though dissuaded by many of his friends, finally yielded. On the 23d of April, 1785, he sailed from Greenock with his family, and landed at Philadelphia on the 9th of June following. He reached Carlisle on the 4th of July, and was received with the highest marks of respect. On the next day he took the oath of office as president of Dickinson College, and commenced his duties at once. He was almost immediately taken sick, and, after some months' confinement, resigned his office; but in the ensuing spring, his health having been restored, he was re-elected, and resumed his duties as president, in which office he remained until his death.

The history of his connection with the college occupies the two succeeding chapters. It is a history, if the biographer is correct, of unwearied labors, constant anxieties, and mortifying disappointments on his part; of ignorance, incapacity, and neglect on the part of the trustees. Their splendid promises were forgotten; their fair-built castles vanished; their high-flown assurances of assistance and success came to nothing. This is strong language, but it is deserved. For the mere failure of their enterprise no one could blame the trustees. It was not their fault that the country languished for years after the close of a protracted and exhausting war. It was not their fault, that, from the derangements of com-

merce and the currency, money was so scarce, that men who were disposed to be liberal to the college could not be; and that many parents, who desired it, were unable to give their children a complete education. They did not destroy credit or unnerve enterprise. They were not to blame because the mass of the people thought more about making money than improving their minds or educating their children. But it *was* their fault that they did not foresee these things, at least to some extent; that they permitted their judgment to be blinded by their wishes; that they made promises which they could never fulfill, and excited expectations which could never be realized; and that, after the novelty of the enterprise wore off, and the edge of their interest was blunted, they permitted a stranger—who had been seduced from a comfortable home, and an elevated position in society in an old country, to a sphere of action for which he was unfitted by his habits, his education, and his age, in a new—to toil on, struggling with insurmountable difficulties, in the position where they themselves had placed him, uncheered by their encouragement, and almost unaided by their assistance.

Dr. Nisbet, then, was disappointed in coming to America. But he had more to contend with than the failure of the trustees to fulfill the promises which they had made him. He might have borne all this, perhaps, if he had been allowed to pursue his own course in the instruction and government of the college, and to carry out the elevated views of education which he had imbibed in Scotland. But he found this impracticable. The men with whom he had to deal, with some honorable exceptions, seem to have been meddling, pragmatical, and captious. When, even in 1785, he presented a few hints to them, designed to elevate their notions of education and colleges, not the smallest attention was paid to them, though, as he says, they were approved by many of the trustees in their hearts. "Every thing," to quote his own phrase, "was ordered according to the old *mumpsimus*." He thus writes to the Earl of Buchan:—

"Parents would have their children become learned, but the way in which they are to attain it must be dictated by those who know nothing about the matter. The power of the trustees is absolute, and without appeal. They receive the tuition-money paid by the parents, and allow the teachers what salaries they please; they turn them off when they think proper, and they confer degrees *pleno jure*, the teachers serving only as clerks for drawing up and signing the diplomas, the trustees receiving the money that is paid for them. Nor is the case altered though some of the trustees should be persons of virtue and learning. They will oblige their friends, and take such measures as

may render their college agreeable to the people, and draw students from a distance. What they consider as the ultimate end of learning, is that students may be able to speak readily in public; so that the preparing and delivering their speeches make the greatest part of their employment."—P. 141.

And again, his biographer, with reference to a later period, remarks,—

"Instead of enlarging and improving the system of public instruction, they were rather disposed to make it more narrow and superficial. Accordingly, the trustees, several years before the doctor's death, directed the course of study in the college to be shortened, and required as much to be done in one year as had formerly occupied two years. To this measure he strongly objected, as a kind of literary quackery; as adapted to deceive the public; to impose upon young men seeking a liberal education; and as pandering to popular ignorance and parsimony in a manner disgraceful to the guardians of education. His remonstrances, however, were in vain; and there is every reason to believe that the mortification and discouragement connected with this measure, and some others of a similar kind, and indicating the same spirit, preyed upon his mind, and convinced him, that the great hope which had brought him to the country, that he might be instrumental in raising the standard of knowledge and public improvement could no longer be cherished."—P. 282.

The determination of the trustees to control the course of instruction and government would be sufficient, if no other cause could be assigned, to account for the failure of Dickinson College in the earlier years of her history. It is impossible for any faculty to manage a college successfully if the board of trustees can interfere continually in the internal affairs of the institution. If they are to fix the periods of study, to say what books shall be studied, what students shall be promoted, and what punishments shall be inflicted, nothing else can be expected but continual strife between themselves and the professors. In the nature of things it must be so. If the professors of a college are to sustain its reputation, they must be devoted to its interests, and exert all their energies freely and heartily in its behalf. But they cannot do this if their line of action is marked out for them by others, whom they know to be less capable than themselves of judging in the premises. What justice can there be in holding a man responsible for the character of an institution, and yet binding him hand and foot with regard to every movement that is to form that character? As well require a man to practice gymnastics in a straight jacket or to write in handcuffs.

Accordingly, the history of the college is a record of strifes between the trustees and faculty, of periods of spasmodic success followed by corresponding depressions, of changes in its officers and laws, and of entire suspensions of its activity, until its reorganization, under the auspices of the Methodist Episcopal Church, in 1834. At that period the disturbing cause above alluded to was effectually removed. The legislature, on the application of the board, made an addition to the charter, by which the discipline of the college was declared to be "essentially vested in the professors and faculty, they being held responsible for the proper exercise of the same." From that period there has been the utmost harmony of action between the trustees and faculty. While the intelligent gentlemen who compose the former body have devoted themselves, with a degree of zeal rarely found in such officers, to the regulation of the finances of the institution, and to the general promotion of its interests, they have wisely left its intellectual and moral discipline to those whose daily business it is to study and employ the best means of training the minds and hearts of youth. The very best feeling has always prevailed; and the success of the college has surpassed any expectations that could have been reasonably entertained at the time of its reorganization.

In the remarks heretofore made upon the early history of the college, we do not mean to be understood as saying that the action of the trustees was in every instance ill-advised and wrong; or that the course of Dr. Nisbet, as president of the college, was always right.

We have no doubt that he adhered somewhat too stubbornly to his own views, which, founded as they were upon the wants and circumstances of a totally different state of society, doubtless needed modification in many respects to adapt them to this country. But in his main principles, he was, in our judgment, entirely correct. In no country, new or old, can the human mind be thoroughly educated in two or three years. Nowhere is it true that the chief end of man is to make speeches. Nowhere, at least on this globe of ours, can science be learned in sport, or wisdom gained without self-denial. It was on general principles such as these that Dr. Nisbet differed from many of the men under whose authority he had to act. In the main they had their own way, and the result was—zero. On one great point the sturdy good sense of the doctor would never yield. He maintained, in the face of all opposition, that the study of languages is one of the best means of mental discipline, and ought to be a principal element of a liberal

education.* At that time the cant of *practical* studies, which has since become so fashionable, was beginning to make itself heard. As if any studies could be more *practical* than those which give the best and surest discipline to the mind ! This folly is wearing away, but its influence is yet too strong among us. It has caused the courses of study in many of our colleges to be swelled to their present impracticable extent. It has caused our seminaries to profess to give instruction *de omnibus rebus et quibusdam aliis*. Even our girls' boarding schools teach the young misses logic, and all the *ologies* and *philosophies*, besides the ornamental branches. All this is sufficiently foolish. But we trust that better days are coming ; that our colleges will aim more at mental discipline than at an extensive course of study superficially pursued ; and that our seminaries will be content to be seminaries, without having every teacher called a professor, and without undertaking to carry on the studies appropriate to the colleges within their own walls. This last is a crying evil which ought to be abated. We get catalogues of seminaries with a faculty of professors, with a long and imposing course of study, and with assurances that students can be prepared for *any* class in college. If they would confine themselves to their proper business of thoroughly drilling in the elements those students who are preparing for college, and giving a good course of training to those who are not, the colleges would be relieved of the number of half-prepared youth that embarrass their classes, and society would be rid of a set of sciolists who, with a smattering of all the sciences, and minds untrained to the severe pursuit of any, think themselves "wiser than seven men that can render a reason."

But to return to our subject. Dr. Nisbet's situation could hardly be called pleasant, at any period. Though he was in labors abundant, lecturing, teaching, preaching, on a variety of subjects, and with an amount of success which could have been rivaled, perhaps, by no man in America at the time, the college never satisfied his feelings, either in its character or condition. He gave vent to his uneasiness, with considerable freedom, in his letters to his friends in Scotland. As his family became settled in life

* "I content myself with expressing the opinion, formed after a good deal of experience and observation, that the usual academic course of linguistic and mathematical studies is fully entitled to the preference which it has so long enjoyed in our higher seminaries. I know not, indeed, what studies can be substituted for these ; I do not say with the prospect of equal, or nearly equal, utility, but without endangering the best interests of education."—Dr. Olin's Address at the opening of the Genesee Wesleyan Seminary. The manly good sense of this excellent speech has refreshed us not a little.

around him, however, his feelings were gradually softened. His reputation for wit and learning was widely diffused. Though he did not escape slander, (what good or strong man does ?) his character was irreproachable. His general health continued good, until about the beginning of January, 1804, when

“he was seized with a severe cold, accompanied with inflammation of the lungs and liver, which gradually gained ground until it terminated his life. After the disease began to assume a threatening aspect, and especially within a few days of the closing scene, he appeared to suffer exceedingly : but he endured it all with remarkable patience and fortitude. He retained the possession of his mental powers to the last. The only faculty which appeared to be strikingly impaired was his memory, which, in health, was among the master-powers of his mind. This prevented his holding much connected conversation with those around him during his last hours. The exercises of devotion appeared to occupy his heart and his lips as long as he was able to utter them. The last efforts of vocal utterance which could be distinguished, were employed in articulating, with great tenderness, the name of his wife, and in saying, with peculiar fervor, ‘Holy, holy, holy!’ With these words on his lips, he gently fell asleep, on the 18th of January, 1804, having within three days completed the sixty-eighth year of his age.”

So only good men die.

An accurate analysis of Dr. Nisbet’s character is not attempted by his biographer. From the various notices, however, which are brought together in the concluding chapter, from the incidents of his life itself, and from those parts of the book before us in which he speaks for himself, we can gather a few prominent characteristics.

The extent and variety of his learning will afford us some conception of the powers of his mind. It may be said, perhaps, without exaggeration, that he was the most learned man of his time in this country. Besides a familiar acquaintance with the Greek and Latin classics, he possessed a knowledge also of Hebrew literature ; and in modern languages he was master of French, German, Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese. He seems to have been acquainted, not superficially, but profoundly, with “the fathers of the Christian church ; with the earlier as well as the later historians ; with the principal theological writers of all countries and systems ; with the history of knowledge ; with the leading writers on the philosophy of the mind, moral philosophy, political economy,” &c. His thorough knowledge of the progress of German theology is especially noticeable. Few men, on this side of the Atlantic, and very few in England, had

the same knowledge forty years ago. He kept himself well informed of every movement in Germany, that land where every hour has its movement, and every movement is a change. At an early period of his career in college, he delivered "four co-ordinate courses of lectures, one on logic, one on moral philosophy, a third on the philosophy of the mind, and a fourth on belles-lettres, including interesting views, historical and literary, of the principal classical writers, both Greek and Latin. These were all carried on at the same time, and with the greatest apparent ease; the lecture of each successive day being, for the most part, written, so far as it was committed to writing at all, on the preceding evening." And, at a subsequent period, he added to these a regular course on systematic theology, extending over a period of a little more than two years, and comprising, in that time, four hundred and eighteen lectures.

These were the acquisitions and labors of a giant. It is needless, then, to say that Dr. Nisbet possessed a powerful mind; and even the peculiar powers with which he was most richly endowed need hardly be mentioned. Of course, without a strong *memory*, he never could have accomplished what is here told of him. The biography abounds with illustrations of the prodigious extent to which he possessed this faculty. We select a few. He could hear the college classes recite in Greek and Latin without book. He is said to have committed Cowper's Task at two readings. He could repeat a great, if not the greater, part of Homer's Iliad. Dr. Brown relates, that when, in the course of conversation, any difficult passage of Scripture was alluded to, he would refer at once to the connection, and commonly repeat literally, and with the utmost readiness, the whole context.

"Not long after his settlement in Carlisle, when he was dining with a select literary circle, a lawyer of considerable eminence, who prided himself greatly on his acquaintance with the Greek and Latin languages, was of the company. In the course of conversation this gentleman quoted several lines in the original Greek from Homer's Iliad. When he had finished his quotation, Dr. Nisbet said to him, 'Well, mon, go on; what you've left is just as good as what you've taken.' The gentleman confessed that his memory did not serve him for repeating more. The doctor then began where he had ended, and, with the greatest ease, repeated a considerable additional portion."—P. 333.

He was an insatiable reader. Nothing, it would seem, in the shape of a book, came amiss to him. Dr. Miller says that he could read a book in one half or one-third part of the time it cost

any other person of his acquaintance, and that he seemed to forget nothing he had ever read.

Striking as is the testimony to the strength of his memory, it is equally so as to the acuteness and readiness of his *wit*. It is clear also that he, in common with almost all deep and affectionate natures, was not destitute of humor. The mere intellectual play which we call wit is often found in very bad men, and is a dangerous faculty even for the good. But humor, springing from a warm and sympathetic heart, and, in its genial manifestations, seizing upon the feelings of others with a kind attraction, is a very different and far higher endowment, in a moral point of view. Humor sees that the sportful and the sad lie side by side in our human life, and is as ready to laugh with the one as to weep with the other. The acute glance of wit detects the weak, the incongruous, the ridiculous in human nature, and, without sympathy or feeling, delights in aiming its keen sarcasms at these vulnerable points. Dr. Nisbet's wit often got him into trouble. Dr. Green says, "It was satirical, or sarcastic, too often for his own quiet; causing loss of friendship in some who could not make allowance for an overbearing propensity." But the instances recorded by our author are generally harmless; pleasant plays upon words or sportive effusions of humor. Dr. Martin writes: "I carried him one night, through intricate paths and windings, to him, at least, a labyrinth. At the end he exclaimed, 'O Martin! you will make an excellent commentator; you carry one safely and skillfully through dark passages.'" He frequently attended the meetings of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church at Philadelphia. On one of these occasions Dr. J. M. Mason said to him, "Well, doctor, I find you sometimes come to Philadelphia during the sessions of the General Assembly." "Yes," said he, "I am not a member, but I like to see my friends, and see a little of what is going on." "But do you not sometimes go into the assembly and listen to its proceedings?" "Yes, I sometimes go in for the *benefit of hearing*, and then I come out for the *benefit of not hearing*." "Well, doctor, which is the greater benefit?" "Indeed, mon, it is hard to strike the balance."

It is not an uncommon notion that a man of strong memory must necessarily have a weak judgment. But all literary history disproves it. A man cannot become great in any department of science or literature without a strong memory. To remember retentively is an almost invariable characteristic of genius. But it is not often the case that retentiveness is united with susceptibility and readiness. Dr. Nisbet, however, seemed to recollect what

was casually associated with his thoughts, almost as well as what he had philosophically studied and arranged in his mind. Nor was his clear, sound mind ever burdened by his intellectual wealth. A manly, straight-forward judgment was one of his strongest characteristics.

His moral character was of a high order. That noblest of moral endowments, a loving heart, he appears to have possessed in an eminent degree. "His whole history exhibited him as kind-hearted and sympathetic beyond what is common in those who are popularly called benevolent men." His early attachments kept strong hold on him to the last. From a casual association, he could not shut his windows at night without thinking of his friends in Scotland. He says, beautifully, "When I see the sun, moon, and stars passing over me, I am ready to envy them, and to ask them concerning my friends whom they have so lately visited, and are so soon to see again." Like all men of sanguine temperament and ready wit, he was remarkably accessible and social. But he was too ardent to be prudent. In conversation, he abhorred all disguises, and was unreserved in disclosing his own sentiments. If this be a fault, it is near akin to virtue. It does one's heart good, now and then to meet a clear, candid man, that hangs out no false colors, and abominates cant of all kinds. Such a man, we think, was Dr. Nisbet. Doubtless this temper brought him into difficulties, and, perhaps, as we have before said, he carried it to excess.

Dr. Nisbet's theology was Calvinism of the old stamp. Here, as elsewhere, he did not mince matters. He had no sympathy with new schools or new measures. He had no love for Arminians, and never pretended to have any. Dr. Green says of him, that "though he was a decided Calvinist, he was not intolerant of other denominations, if they held what he regarded as the fundamentals of religion. I never heard him speak with severity of any religious sect except the Universalists." Doubtless Dr. Green had never heard him speak thus intolerably; but the following extract from a letter to Lady Leven, in 1770, smacks strongly of prejudice, if not of intolerance:—

"It would seem that Mr. Wesley, by his preaching and conferences, has been but too successful in seducing many of the ignorant and unwary into his notions. He has been long suspected of teaching doctrines inconsistent with the gospel of Christ, and tending to encourage sinners in a reliance on their own works and merit for justification. In his last conference he seems to have taken off the mask, and openly to inculcate the old Popish doctrine of the merit of good works,

wrought by sinners in a fallen state, in direct opposition to the Articles of the Church of England, which he must have subscribed, and to the doctrine which he has many times preached.—The obscurity and ambiguity with which Mr. Wesley expresses himself, give strong suspicion against his sincerity, as well as orthodoxy.—None can have the vanity to believe that Scripture, reason, and argument will have the effect to enlighten Mr. Wesley, who is a person of great learning and ingenuity, and cannot be supposed to err from ignorance.”—P. 72.

On this fine specimen of the effects of a narrow creed, in pouring bitterness into a kind heart, Dr. Miller remarks, apologetically, as follows :—

“If the subject of this Memoir had undertaken to speak of Mr. Wesley and his opinions, twenty or thirty years afterward, when the character of both was more fully developed, he would hardly have called in question the ‘sincerity’ of that eminent man. His *consistency* and *orthodoxy* he would, no doubt, still have assailed with undiminished confidence; but he would probably have awarded to him the praise of honest zeal, and of no small usefulness, however mistaken and erratic some parts of his system.”—P. 73.

This was kindly meant of our author, and we thank him for it. He leaves but little to quarrel with in Mr. Wesley. As for “consistency” in error, it certainly never characterized the founder of Methodism. As for orthodoxy, too, it is a word of such vague meaning, that we never dread it. So long as the right of private judgment lasts, it matters little what is the standard of orthodoxy set up by any individual doctor of divinity, however learned. But we fear that Dr. Miller has not succeeded in making out his case in favor of his friend. It is very doubtful whether Dr. Nisbet’s prejudices abated at all with the lapse of years. In 1786, Lady Leven writes to him that she fears he is prejudiced against the Methodists of both classes, and tries to persuade him that John Wesley is a faithful servant of God. Later still, in 1789, she tells him that “it hurts her to find him speaking lightly of the Methodists in general.” Nay, even so late as 1800, Dr. Nisbet, in the course of a most learned and instructive letter to our author, which contains as much information as we have ever known to be condensed into the same space, gives an account of the declining state of piety in the eighteenth century, and expresses his joy at the more decisive revival of true religion which had, within a few years

“taken place in England, both among some portions of the dissenters, and still more remarkably in the established Church, under the

ministry, and from the writings of such men as Romaine, John Newton, Simeon, Cecil, Scott, and others, distinguished for the general soundness of their opinions and the fervor of their piety. When Romaine and Hervey arose, in the early part of the century, to plead for evangelical religion, they stood almost alone among the clergy of the Establishment."—P. 279.

Here is an account of the religious revival of the eighteenth century, with no mention of the labors of John Wesley! As well write a history of science, and leave out the name of Newton. As well describe the Reformation without alluding to Luther. "In elevating the moral and religious character of the people of England," says the Edinburgh reviewer,* "the first place is due to the illustrious founder of Methodism." We may certainly, in this case, retort Dr. Nisbet's language upon himself with propriety, and say, that "he was a person of great learning and ingenuity, and could hardly be supposed to err from ignorance." The man, who, in 1801, could trace German theology through all its devious mazes, must have known something of the progress of Christianity in Great Britain. The leader of the host, under God, was John Wesley. This *could* not have been entirely hidden from eyes so keen as Dr. Nisbet's, and yet he could not find it in his heart to mention it. To the very last, then, as far as we can see, his Calvinistic prejudices against Methodism remained as unmitigated as did his gloomy creed.

Dr. Miller has a note upon this subject which demands a moment's notice. We quote part of it:—

"Dr. Nisbet was indeed warmly opposed to the Arminianism of Mr. Wesley and of his disciples; and he also greatly disapproved of the *shouting, falling down, groaning, &c.*, so common in their public worship forty or fifty years ago, and no less of their decrying *learning* in the gospel ministry, as they habitually did at that time. The great change which has taken place in the Methodist body in regard to outcries and disorders in worship, and also in respect to the increasing provision made for the literary training of their candidates for the ministry, is known to every one. But in regard to *doctrine*, had the venerable subject of this Memoir lived to this hour, he would have had undiminished reason to express strong dissent from that body. Were he now alive, and to go into a Methodist Episcopal church, in many parts of our country, he would still hear Calvinism denounced by name in the most reproachful and violent language, as a 'hateful, abominable system,' as a 'doctrine of devils,' &c., and our Confession of Faith quoted in a garbled manner, and loaded with the coarsest abuse, as the doctrine of Presbyterians."—P. 354.

* No. cxxxv.

Here again, perhaps, we ought to be grateful to our author. He admits that Methodism has improved, in some respects, within half a century. But yet, this fling at shouting, falling down, &c., was, it seems to us, hardly necessary, as no mention was made of these irregularities in the letter referred to, and as it is clear that Dr. Nisbet's prejudices were more strongly directed against Mr. Wesley's *doctrines* than against any other peculiarities of Methodism. Besides, Dr. Miller is sufficiently acquainted with the history of the (Calvinistic) churches of Scotland and New-England to know that "such things" occurred in the very temples of "orthodoxy" long before they were seen in the humble meetings of the Methodists. This may pass, however, for what it is worth. But our author's assertion, that in many parts of the country, at the present time, "the Confession of Faith is quoted in a garbled manner, and loaded with the coarsest abuse," in Methodist churches, is, to say the least of it, a little extraordinary. We do not charge him with intentional misrepresentation, but we do mean to state, that in all our knowledge of Methodism—and we have had the opportunity of knowing it personally in "many parts of the country"—we have *never* heard the Confession of Faith either garbled or loaded with the coarsest abuse by Methodist preachers. If Dr. Miller *knows* these things to have been done, we ought to have something more definite, in regard to the place and time, than his vague assertion that such things are to be met with in many parts of our country. And even if he has heard of such imprudences in a few cases, we put it to him as an honest question, in all Christian feeling, whether it be right, in a formal book of biography, designed to go out into the world and to live—to make such a representation as would imply, to ordinary readers at least, that such things are common in the pulpits of the Methodist Episcopal Church?

A brief comparison of the career of Dr. Nisbet with that of a distinguished contemporary will close this article.

We have seen that Dr. Nisbet was born in 1736. Enjoying rare opportunities, and endowed with rare capacities for improving them, he acquired vast stores of knowledge at an early period of his life. His mind was polished and sharpened by intercourse with the learned. In the schools of theology he became mighty in the Scriptures; and in the books of philosophy he learned the wisdom of men. The languages and literature of the ancients were at his command; the treasures of every tongue in modern Europe were laid open before him. With a lively wit and a ready tongue he could make the best use of all these acquisitions. Even

in his youth he was a giant. But it was not until years had added experience to his strength, that, in the very prime of his bodily and mental vigor, he was invited to America. A wide field seemed to be opened there for the exercise of his zeal and abilities. The country was just starting in the race of nations, with all the vigor of youthful liberty. The minds of the people were oppressed by no tyranny; no time-honored institutions hindered their development; their habits, their modes of thought, their whole character, were yet to be formed. It was thought that men, unshackled by authority, would listen to reason; and that the public mind, plastic and flexible, might be formed in the mold of truth and virtue. It was thought, too, that Dr. Nisbet was admirably fitted for this task. His personal qualifications were undoubted; and the denomination of Christians to which he belonged was strongly established in the country. A college was offered to him; a liberal salary secured; a church was waiting to attend his ministry. He obeyed the call. In 1785 he left his native land for the purpose of *promoting religion and learning* in the United States of America. His reputation had gone before him, and the great ones of the land welcomed him. He entered upon his duties with high anticipations. His family were around him. A powerful church sustained him. The benefactions of the state were bestowed upon his college. In the discharge of his duties, he studied, taught, and preached, with extraordinary industry. For eighteen years did he continue these labors almost without intermission. Yet he was unsuccessful. He found that liberty did not make men reasonable; and that human nature was as intractable in America as in Europe. His college did not flourish; his salary was irregularly paid; his services were not duly appreciated. He died with the consciousness that he had failed in his undertaking. He did great good, doubtless, in forming the minds of some scores of young men who afterward entered the ministry; but, besides this, all that now remains to tell that he came to America, is the college over which he presided. How would it astonish him to find that even in this, his darling enterprise, he had been laboring to establish an institution of learning whose patronage was mainly to be derived from those very Methodists whom he so despised!

Francis Asbury was born in 1745. His education was obtained in the village school and in the workshop of his master, a maker of buckles. He sat at the feet of no Gamaliel. He never crossed the threshold of a school of theology. In his youth he could not read the books of the ancients; and of modern tongues he acquired none but the vernacular. But in the word of God he was learned,

like Timothy, from a child. At fourteen years of age he was converted, and at twenty-one he began to preach. At twenty-six, in answer to a call from Mr. Wesley, he offered his services to go to America *to preach the gospel*. A great field was there, to be sure, white to the harvest; but the reapers had to fight their way. The society to which he belonged was known there only to be despised. No church was ready for him; no honors awaited him; even his name was utterly unknown. In 1771 he landed in America. The country was on the eve of war. The minds of men were agitated by stormy passions. The years that followed "tried men's souls," yet in patience possessed he his, and amid the strife and din of arms he continued his work of peace. Through dangers and perils he held on his way. The war closed, but his labors were only begun. In 1784 the Methodist Episcopal Church was organized, and he was elected its bishop. For thirty-two years he performed the duties of that office with apostolic simplicity and diligence. His life was more like that of one of the early missionaries of Christianity than of a church dignitary in the eighteenth century. He came to America *to preach the gospel*, and he accomplished his object. He had no certain dwelling place, it is true, but he desired none; his salary barely supported life, but *none* had been promised him; and when money was offered him, he refused it, lest he should seem to preach for hire. Men appreciated his services far beyond his own estimate of their value. Unentangled by the duties, and uncheered by the joys, of domestic life, he was free to devote all his time to his work: and his celibacy, however it may have originated, was kept up to the end of his life on conscientious grounds. His diocese was greater than St. Paul's. Within the compass of every year, the borderers of Canada and the planters of Mississippi looked for the coming of this primitive bishop, and were not disappointed. His travels averaged six thousand miles a year; and this, not in a splendid carriage over smooth roads; not with the ease and speed of the rail-way; but often through pathless forests and untraveled wildernesses; among the swamps of the south and the prairies of the west; amid the heats of the Carolinas and the snows of New-England. There grew up under his hand an entire church, with fearless preachers and untrained members; but he governed the multitude as he had done the handful, with a gentle charity and an unflinching firmness. In diligent activity, no apostle, no missionary, no warrior ever surpassed him. He rivaled Melancthon in love and Luther in boldness. He combined the enthusiasm of Xavier with the far-reaching foresight

and keen discrimination of Wesley. Comparatively destitute of learning, he was wise to a proverb. With a mind untrained in the schools, he yet seemed to seize upon truth by intuition; and though men might vanquish him in logic, they could not deny his conclusions.

Such was Francis Asbury, who came to America fourteen years before Charles Nisbet, and lived twelve years after him. We have seen the result of the labors of the learned, witty, and orthodox divine. What is the monument of the itinerant Wesleyan? He himself, during his lifetime, saw the followers of Wesley in America increase from four preachers and three hundred and sixteen members to nearly seven hundred preachers and over two hundred thousand members. Twenty-seven years have passed since his death, and the church which he founded numbers three thousand nine hundred and eighty-eight traveling preachers, and more than a million of communicants!

This comparison is made with no invidious purpose. While it does not disparage Dr. Nisbet, it illustrates the great principle and practice of Wesley and of Methodism, that *the means must be adapted to the ends*.

Dickinson College, 1843.

ART. VI.—*The School and the Schoolmaster.—A Manual for the Use of Teachers, &c., in Common Schools.* In two Parts: Part I—By ALONZO POTTER, D. D., of New-York. Part II—By GEORGE B. EMERSON, A. M., of Massachusetts. 12mo., pp. 552. New-York: Harper & Brothers.

THIS work realizes what has long been a favorite conception of ours; and we confidently anticipate that its publication will constitute the commencement of a new era in the history of common-school education in this country. In a country like Prussia, having a despotic government, vast improvements may be made in systems of education if only the monarch and a few of his leading ministers be enlightened and benevolent, because *there* whatever has been conceived and decreed in the cabinet may be enforced, thoroughly carried into execution in all its details, by the strong arm of absolute power. But in this country the people are the sovereigns; and whatever may be the power of the few to control the many for *certain purposes*, yet no great object needing co-operation in every

district and family can ever be accomplished among us otherwise than upon the voluntary principle, that is, not otherwise than by first creating among the people such an amount of information and interest as will induce them to unite in demanding and enforcing the necessary reform. So long as the people remain in ignorance and in apathy respecting their common schools, and respecting their true interests in education, or so long as their conceptions of the improvements to be desired, of the excellence capable of being attained, are only vague and narrow, too feeble to arouse them from their habitual indifference, or to prevail over their love of money, and consequent love of cheap instruction, so long will it be found impossible to move their representatives to undertake any wise and thorough legislation on the subject. Should these representatives, more enlightened than their constituents, or acted upon by a special influence, be induced to legislate in a higher spirit, to call for better instruction, for more worthy qualifications and efforts in teachers and inspectors, for a nobler zeal and liberality in employers, their enactments, being unsupported by popular sympathy, or even by popular consent, would remain buried in the statute book, a dead letter. No laws can accomplish any thing in this country, no laws can be executed, unless they are sustained by the general convictions of the people; and especially is this true of laws such as those which relate to the improvement of common schools; because they demand that sort of pains-taking, that minute attention to details from year to year, that liberality which nothing but a warm and enlightened zeal can produce.

Now, though there has long been prevalent throughout our country a vague impression that our common-school system requires amendment, yet we fear there has been no distinct idea as to *what* is needed in the way of improvement, or of the *amount* of the present deficiency, as compared with what has been done elsewhere, and may be easily effected by us. It has, therefore, long seemed to us that we greatly needed two things: *First*, something like a *beau ideal*—a standard of attainable excellence—something which should be definite, distinct, and feasible to aim at: and, *second*, we want to know what has been done by others; this knowledge would abate our self-complacency, put an end to our passive acquiescence in the present state of things, and animate our parents, teachers, and rulers to well-directed exertion. Accordingly, we suggested to a friend, several years ago, the importance of circulating thoroughly in every school district *two tracts*; the first to contain a succinct, popular statement of what had been done abroad in the way of improving common schools, so far at

least as similar features might be adopted in this country ; and the second to exhibit a brief exposition of the right method of instruction and management in relation to different branches of study and to the operations of the school generally. These two tracts being in the hands of every man in the state, all descriptions of persons would have a better understanding of their duties ; the teacher would know what he ought to be and to do ; the parent would know what he had a right to expect ; inspectors and superintendents would know what qualifications, arrangements, and methods of instruction they ought to demand ; and the legislature would be qualified to act wisely and efficiently. Having opened a perfect communication between our people and foreign countries as to intelligence, as to information about what is passing in their systems of common-school education, it can scarcely be doubted, that our standard of excellence would quickly rise to at least an equal level with theirs. The idea of publishing these tracts passed away like a thousand other projects, good and bad, which are conceived, but never executed ; and although we have had at different times many excellent things, such as Professor Stowe's Report, and detached pieces of valuable information, published in our journals of education, which were well calculated to accomplish partially the work that the said tracts were intended to perform more thoroughly, yet until the appearance of the "*SCHOOL AND THE SCHOOLMASTER*," we have had nothing that could lay claim to much completeness either in design or execution, and certainly nothing that could be expected to produce that effect on the public mind which we have been in the habit of deeming essential to any great and general improvement of the common schools of this country.

The work of Professor Potter and Mr. Emerson is, of course, far more elaborate and complete than any thing that could have been attempted in the projected publications we have referred to : the writers are well known not only as gentlemen of education and distinguished ability, but also as practical teachers of long experience, and they have combined with great skill the results of their own observation and reflection, with the suggestions derived from the schools and the works on education of foreign countries. A mere glance at the table of contents is sufficient to show that, in their excursion through the great field of education, they have examined almost every subject that ought most to interest the parent, teacher, school inspector, and legislator, as well as those general readers, who, though belonging to neither of these classes, must have a powerful influence, direct and indirect, over them all,

and who cannot but feel a lively concern in efforts affecting so vitally the intelligence and welfare of the country.

The first part, entitled the *SCHOOL*, which is the work of Dr. Potter, treats in the first chapter of the *nature and uses of education*, viewed in all its different aspects, under the following heads:—

I. What is education?

II. Prevailing errors in regard to the nature and end of education, embracing three sections.

III. What is the education most needed by the American people?

IV. The importance of education: 1. To the individual; 2. To society.

In the second chapter Dr. Potter discusses the subject of *common schools*, their present state, the best means of improving them, their relation to other means of education, including a vast variety of most valuable strictures and suggestions respecting school-houses, manners, morals, intellectual instruction, female teachers, monitorial and other systems, class books, education of teachers, high schools, &c.

The second part, entitled the *SCHOOLMASTER*, and written by Mr. Emerson, treats with great minuteness of the *qualities* requisite to constitute a good teacher, of the *studies* which he ought to pursue as a means of rendering his instructions and the general influence of his mind more thorough, comprehensive, and elevating; and of the *duties* which, as a teacher, he owes to himself, to his pupils, to his fellow-teachers, to parents, and to the community.

In addition to these topics, Mr. Emerson devotes one whole book to the *school*, its organization, government, and methods of instruction in the several branches of study; and another book to the *school-house*, its situation, size, position, and arrangement, including also some excellent remarks on the too much neglected subjects of *light*, *warming*, and *ventilation*.

These topics are treated with the union of philosophical depth and practical judgment, as to details, which might be expected from writers whose lives have been devoted with so much success to the cultivation of letters and to the every-day business of instruction. Of course, in a book which touches almost every question that can be raised respecting the nature and influence of education, and the different methods of promoting its interests, it must be presumed that there are views presented concerning which there will be different shades of opinion. And this is doubtless the case with the work now under consideration. Nevertheless, we feel

quite confident that, on the whole, it will meet with the decided approbation of all who bring to its perusal a tithe of the reflection and experience which dictated its pages; and we are equally confident, that were it generally read with serious attention by the parents and teachers of the land, the effects would be speedily seen in a growing disposition in families to sacrifice luxury to education, to call for more adequate provision for the intellectual and moral culture of their children, and in a juster appreciation, on the part of teachers and inspectors, of the high and momentous nature of the duties to be discharged in the common school.

To present even a condensed summary of the facts and arguments contained in this work, together with such reflections of our own as are naturally excited by the perusal of its several parts, would be to write, not an article merely, but a book, and a large one too; but as we aim at nothing more than to commend the very important matter contained in this volume to the earnest attention of our readers, we shall content ourselves with a mere specimen, calculated to exhibit the spirit that pervades the work, together with a few hasty remarks of our own on some of the topics discussed.

One of the most interesting and valuable features of the "*School and the Schoolmaster*" is, the careful and judicious reference constantly made in all its suggestions to the peculiar circumstances, social, political, and religious, of this country. It would not have been very surprising had writers so capable of general speculation, and so familiar with the systems of education adopted in foreign countries, been tempted to build up splendid but somewhat impracticable theories, or to propose remedial measures, sanctioned by foreign usage, but unsuited to the genius of our government and people. Nothing, however, of this sort is to be met with in any of their discussions, which are severely practical and thoroughly adapted to the wants and capabilities of the country. While they are very far from making the least concessions to popular error; while they keep ever in view the largest conceptions of the true aim and end of education, yet in pointing out what is practicable in our circumstances, and what is most important to be attempted, they evince a judgment at once comprehensive and discriminating, such a judgment as could result only from a thorough insight into the philosophy of education in general, and an intimate practical acquaintance with the business of instruction as modified necessarily by our institutions.

Professor Potter having answered the question, "What is edu-

cation?" and having exposed certain "prevailing errors in regard to the nature and end of education," proceeds to inquire, "What is the education most needed by the American people?"

That his general statements respecting the kind of education needed in this country are both true and highly important will scarcely be denied; and followed up, as they are in subsequent parts of the work, with minute and definite explanations of the particulars, in which consists the culture that befits an American citizen, they cannot fail, if attended to, of producing a salutary effect upon the country. In continuing the subject, Dr. Potter urges the importance "*of more thorough instruction in the first principles of politics.*" This is certainly desirable; for, as things are managed at present, the majority of the people gain their first acquaintance with politics through the distorted representations of party newspapers, or from the petty conflicts of rival village cliques. This is surely wrong. It must be esteemed a great misfortune to any country when its politicians, or any large portion of them, receive no education in general principles before they become involved in details. They will infallibly be conceited and headstrong, prompt to propose rash measures, and ever ready to fall in with new and plausible theories, and to unsettle the best-established maxims of government. Let, then, the young be taught the elements of political science; let them inform and discipline their own minds; let them read the lessons of history; let them try to settle great general principles, moral and political, and to study their bearing and application to the circumstances around them, before they enter the field to guide or influence others.

Dr. Potter maintains, also, that "the state of our country, and the character of the age, call loudly for *a more elegant and humanizing culture*" than has been common among us. A taste for the fine arts, for the beauties of nature, and especially for music, he thinks would do much to moderate the passion of our people for high excitements, and for gross sensual indulgences, would soften their feelings, and elevate their sentiments, and add a new charm to social and domestic life. And certainly he who can doubt this must be ignorant alike of the nature of man and of the state of the country. Can we wonder at the tendency to intemperance, to commercial and religious excitement, when we consider how few resources for simple, cheerful enjoyment, there are in most American homes?—how little music; how little poetry or imagination; how few of those pleasant fire-side or neighborhood festivals, which, in other countries, do so much to render people cheerful and contented with none but simple and innocent

gratifications—gratifications that humanize while they refresh, causing to grow up in every bosom the unalterable feeling, that the pleasantest place in the world is home? In Germany, so universal is the taste for music, that every family of three or four inmates can get up its little concert, or, by calling in a few neighbors, provide a musical feast, which, with us, would be the theme of admiration for a month. Why do our young people learn so early to think of cheerful gratifications as something which they must seek elsewhere than at home? Why do they live so much away from the paternal presence? Why do they so frequently fall into wild, frivolous, extravagant, and vicious courses? Why is life so often turned into a stupid, blank, or morose existence, fatal alike to the intellect, the moral feelings, and the social affections? Alas! Is not the answer to be found in the absence of homebred delights? in the absence of those gentle, but healthful and unfailing excitements, which come from music and minstrelsy; from a taste for the beautiful in nature and art; from pleasant domestic customs and associations; from social habits formed upon the principle that genuine piety and virtue are best promoted, not by austerity and gloom, but by a cordial hilarity, tempered with gentleness and affection? We recommend this part of the work before us to the special attention of our countrymen, trusting that the day is not far distant, when, in the rural districts of our land, and indeed in families everywhere, those tastes and employments which contribute to embellish life, to relieve its monotony and gloom, to render youth and manhood contented with simple and innocent pleasures, to glorify home as the scene of all that is heart-cheering in the intercourse of young and old, of master and servant, blended into one beautiful picture of duty and enjoyment, will no longer be deemed superfluous or unbecoming.

The remarks of Dr. Potter on the influence of education in promoting "*usefulness and success in life*," and in contributing to the *happiness* of the individual, are striking and just. In connection with this subject he observes,—

"In estimating the happiness to be derived from education, let us not overlook the vast addition which may thus be made to *domestic and social enjoyments*. Without the facts and ideas which are supplied by reading, how meagre and spiritless would conversation prove! In rearing children, and in the difficult task of making home pleasant and attractive, books form an unfailing resource, and many who now waste life and talent in a round of harassing dissipations, or in low vice, might have been both happy and useful if they had early imbibed a taste for good books."

Dr. Potter discusses, at considerable length, the question which has been so often agitated, how far education tends to diminish crime and to promote virtue. Taking education in the sense in which he advocates it, viz., as including intellectual and moral instruction and training, and considering, moreover, that the moral culture is the fruit of a sound religious influence, there can, of course, be no doubt that it is the only effectual means of making good citizens and good men. But whether mere secular knowledge, whether the education of the intellect merely, without a right moral culture, will contribute to such a result is not quite so certain. In practice, indeed, the problem which we have to solve is a complex one. It is scarcely possible that intellectual education should be carried far without involving, incidentally and unavoidably, much moral culture. Few teachers can be so perverse or so stupid as not to appeal sometimes to the conscience and moral feelings of their pupils. Again, the books which are put into the hands of the child to teach him to read, as well as a majority of those which will afterward engage the attention of the youth and the man, especially in such a country as ours, will be sure to contain many excellent moral and religious precepts, more, much more, we may safely presume, of good than of evil. Besides, considering the present character, moral and religious, of the educated classes in this country, it seems highly probable, that, by educating a child, even though the education be confined for the most part to his intellect, we introduce him to the society of persons whose moral influence will be more salutary than would be the influence of the classes among whom he must fall if entirely uneducated. To all this it must be added, that education, even of the intellect alone, seems to impart to the subject of it some powers of reflection, of foresight, and of self-restraint.

If we consider the case of a person who has been left in gross ignorance, we generally perceive that his mind is dark, narrow, and inactive. His passions and sensual appetites are predominant. He lives in the midst of the lowest and grossest images. When his brutal propensities are aroused, when evil is placed just before him, he acts impulsively, from a sort of blind instinct. He *sees nothing at a distance*. He cannot restrain himself while his eye glances forward to the fatal consequences of the sin, to the distant rewards of virtue, or while he can listen to the monitor within. Such habits of forecast are entirely foreign to his dark, sensual existence. He sees nothing, thinks of nothing but the object of passion or the lure to sin in his immediate presence, and rushes to

crime and ruin as a wild beast in pursuit of his victim would rush down a fatal precipice.

Dr. Potter adduces various facts to show that "the average amount of crime is almost exactly in the inverse ratio of the average amount of instruction." The testimony of the directors of the Ohio penitentiary, quoted by him, and applicable, we imagine, to all similar establishments, conveys a sad lesson. They say,—

"It is an erroneous impression that the convicts are intelligent, shrewd men, [we know not where such an impression has existed, certainly never in our minds,] whose minds have been perverted by vice, rather than blunderers into low and vicious habits, and ultimately into the commission of crime, from idleness, ignorance, and opacity of mental vision. It will be seen that nearly the whole number of convicts are below mediocrity in point of information; and, indeed, our inquiries and observations have long since satisfied us that, not only in our own prison, but in others which we have visited and inquired after, depraved appetites and corrupt habits, which have led to the commission of crime, are usually found with the ignorant, uninformed, and duller part of mankind. Of the two hundred and seventy-six, nearly all are below mediocrity; one hundred and seventy-five are grossly ignorant, and in point of education scarcely capable of transacting the ordinary business of life."

Upon this Professor Potter propounds a query which ought to sink deep into the hearts of our rulers, legislators, and people generally. "Is it not," says he, "a question for grave reflection, how far society, after thus suffering individuals to grow up in ignorance and incapacity, retains, in respect to them, the right of inflicting punishment?" For ourselves, we have long been persuaded that it is one of the most solemn and momentous questions that can be presented to the consideration of any people. This view of the subject long ago made us a thorough convert to the wisdom and soundness in principle of the Prussian law, which first provides amply for the efficient education of every child in the nation, and then enforces their attendance upon the schools for a certain term of years. A government, or, if you please, a society, has the same interests and the same duties to impel it to *secure* the education of its children, that a parent has to make him insist upon his offspring receiving instruction. What sort of a parent would *he* be who should say to his children, "Yonder is the school! You must consult your own pleasure about attending it! I advise you to get an education; it will benefit you in such and such ways; but I shall use no constraint; you must judge and act for yourselves; and prepare to abide all the consequences of your choice!" Are children competent to judge and act for themselves

in such matters? Are all parents fit to be intrusted with the power of educating their children or not as they please, and as little as they please? Consider their ignorance; their avarice; their thoughtlessness. If we would regard that man as unworthy of the name of parent, as deeply criminal, who should leave his children in utter neglect, without education, and then, when, through ignorance, they stumbled into vice, should turn round upon them, inflicting the severest punishment, and casting them for ever away from him, what are we to think of the state, which, using no paternal constraint to secure the attendance of its children at school for a competent term, making no provision for the case of those who not only need gratuitous instruction, but other assistance to enable them to avail themselves of such instruction, doing nothing of all this, but leaving them to grow up, if they and their parents please, in ignorance and stupidity, with undisciplined passions, till they become "blunderers into low and vicious habits, and ultimately into crime, from idleness, ignorance, and opacity of mental vision," then hastens with a sort of vindictive zeal to drag them to prison or to the scaffold? Wherein is such policy more virtuous or praiseworthy in a state than in a parent? We shall be told that the Prussian law is unsuited to the genius of our free institutions, and that the people of this state would never submit to be coerced in regard to the education of their children. If this be so, (and we have no doubt the latter part of the objection is well founded,) all we have to say is, *So much the worse for the country!* As to the idea that the law in question is incompatible with any liberty which the subject ought to possess, which would be useful to him or to the state, we consider it sheer nonsense. But we are not going to argue the point.

On the subject of the influence of education in diminishing crime and promoting virtue, we have two remarks to make before we dismiss the question. In the first place, we believe that just in proportion as the education imparted is confined to the intellect, the prospect of benefit to the moral character of the individual is diminished and involved in doubt. To educate the intellect without educating, at the same time, the conscience and the moral feelings, is to create a more powerful engine, without doing any thing to determine the direction in which it shall move. The intellect, in itself considered, has no moral character. It is neither good nor evil. When developed it will be guided by that moral power which is predominant, whether it be conscience or vicious inclination. But the conscience will not be educated and rendered controlling by mere intellectual culture. Such culture, if ex-

clusive, will leave the moral powers depressed and enfeebled, while the passions are becoming turbulent and strong; while excitements are stirring up vicious inclination; and while the individual is carried by his intellectual energies into the midst of conflicts and temptations, which require for his preservation a power of moral control as well matured and developed as have been the powers of the intellect. It is sometimes supposed that the development of the intellect supersedes the necessity of any special culture for the moral faculty. But the reverse is the truth. The more thoroughly the intellect is developed the more necessary it becomes to take particular care to invigorate the moral powers. A thoroughly enlightened and controlling conscience is even more needful for the man of cultivated intellect than for others—just for the same reason that more powerful means of direction and control must be provided for the ship that is to encounter the stormy winds and waves of the broad ocean, than are required to secure the safety of the cockboat that only moves back and forth within the sheltered harbor. The man of intellectual power has a wider and more exciting, and, therefore, more perilous sphere of action than ordinary persons, so that the moral influence that would suffice to keep inferior mortals steady would be totally inadequate to preserve him from being ruined by passion and temptation. Great intellectual power and cultivation, then, demand a corresponding degree of efficiency in the education of the moral nature.

We observed, a few pages back, that education, though merely intellectual, would generally introduce the individual to an acquaintance with books and to the society of cultivated persons, whose *moral* influence would be salutary. But this would not always be the case, at least not always in the same degree. Suppose a young man to have come forward with a cultivated mind, but without moral or religious training, just previous to the French revolution! Such cases were not uncommon. Would the writings of the living men most likely to be encountered by such a person at such a period be certainly or even probably of a character to promote his virtue? What more probable than that his exclusively intellectual education, having puffed him up with a pride of freethinking, and armed him with no settled aversion to impiety and immorality, would result in his becoming a devoted reader of Voltaire and Rousseau, and the associate of their disciples? Is it not manifest that intellectual culture at such a period might increase the danger to which the virtue of a young man would be exposed, and that the only way to impart such culture with the least safety would be to throw over it the

sanctifying and controlling influence of an early moral and religious discipline?

Our second remark is, that, with few exceptions, the system of education most in vogue in this country, both in families and in schools, is chiefly remarkable for the supreme importance which it attaches to secular knowledge, and for the very inadequate attention paid to thorough moral and religious training. In the first place, there is little or no systematic moral and religious instruction of an elementary character. Children are treated to a few vague and desultory exhortations, or to extravagant appeals to their feelings, when they ought to be learning the ten commandments, and gaining a clear insight into their duties, and giving themselves up in a simple, reverential way, to the love and obedience of God. All that is lacking in this early discipline, it is supposed, will be supplied by some great and sudden transformation at a subsequent period. And what is the consequence? We do not undertake to set limits to the goodness and power of God. We gladly acknowledge that his grace has often transformed persons who had known little of early moral and religious culture into consistent and beautiful Christians. But is this the ordinary course of his providence? As a consequence of the too prevalent neglect in schools and families of careful instruction in early childhood in duty, in the holy law of God, in the blessings of the Christian covenant, as a consequence of the early neglect of that moral and religious discipline which would make the conscience discriminating and authoritative, and the passions submissive, do we not see a great deal of high religious profession in union with very loose moral notions and habits? Is not the proportion of erring consciences among us, of unlovely and unstable Christian characters, a large one? Do we not see men making mistakes on moral questions, which look very much as if they had not learned their catechism when they were young, or else had studied one that was quite defective? Has there not been within the last ten years a wide-spread defection from honest dealing between man and man, a betraying of sacred trusts by persons of lofty pretensions, a lack of moral firmness and sagacity to perceive and resist the encroachments of an evil spirit of gain and extravagance, which should make us jealous, lest there be some fatal error in regard to that early moral training which constitutes the groundwork of the national education and of the national character? Of course, considering the infirmity and corruption of human nature, we are not quite so unreasonable as to suppose that the best system of early moral culture would ever cure all the evils to which we

have referred: but we do believe it would have great effect in diminishing them; and we are strong in the assurance, that at this moment, the great remedy for the loose morality, for the capricious, excitable, unstable character so prevalent among us, is to be found less in those imposing agencies which act so potently, but so impulsively, upon the adult population of the land, than in a general return to a more thorough system of moral and religious education for the young.

We are free to confess that we look with some distrust, or at least with a satisfaction that is not without its alloy, upon those reports respecting the character of state-prison convicts, which are used to show the beneficial effects of the education generally given in the country upon the moral character of its subjects. It is said that the proportion of convicts in our prisons, who have received even a tolerable education, is exceedingly small. This is doubtless true; but it is not very conclusive. We are not so churlish as to deny that the elementary education common among us has in it more of moral good than of evil. But the real question for us to consider is, Has it enough of good, is the good so abundant and effectual as to satisfy our reasonable expectation? Is the moral good of such a nature that, in looking forward to future improvements, we may concern ourselves chiefly with devising better methods of promoting intellectual development without seeking for any *radical change* in the character of the moral culture? For ourselves, we think not. It is true, a very moderate share of education, and that, too, very deficient in a moral point of view, will stand a good chance of keeping people out of state prisons. This is a benefit; and we desire to be thankful for it. Yet when we consider it more closely, we are constrained to doubt whether this benefit be quite so certain, or so unqualified, as we might be inclined at first to suppose. One is sometimes tempted to suspect that society would be quite as well off if a few of the simpletons within our prisons could give place to some more cunning and skillful rogues who are without. It is quite evident, from the general character of the convicts, that in a majority of instances their stupidity, their lack of foresight, and cunning, and caution, and dexterity, had quite as much to do with their conviction and confinement as their want of moral principle. Their want of foresight and self-control, their dark, impulsive, sensual nature led them to stumble into crimes which were of such a nature and committed under such circumstances as to render their conviction nearly certain. Had their intellectual faculties been a little sharpened by an education which left their moral principles and

feelings no better than they were at the time they committed their several crimes, it is probable they would have avoided those crimes; would have passed for pretty respectable people; and would have diffused around the influence of their depraved but plausible characters from the centre of commercial or political life. Whether just such characters as they would have made with a little exclusively intellectual training are not to be found in goodly numbers among our scheming and plotting politicians and office seekers, among our commercial gamblers and our libertines, and among our pseudo-saints who make a gain of godliness, is for those to judge who are most conversant with such circles. Now it seems to us that we need an education for the young, which will not merely render them too sharp-witted to be caught in state-prison offenses, which will not only remove them, in a good degree, from the temptation to commit such crimes, but which will go further, and render them just, and true, and self-denying, and high principled, whatever may be the sphere in which they move, or the temptations to which they are exposed.

Let it ever be remembered, that when there has been proper instruction in childhood, there is great reason to hope that, though there be many wanderings, a time will come when the heart will be softened; when the mind will be disposed to serious reflection; and when the *characters that were written on the infant memory* will rise up before the soul, and teach it the way to peace and holiness, and life everlasting. But when no such instruction has been given, the sinner may be stricken down by disease, may be driven into the secret chamber to spend days and nights in silence and solitude, may hear from books and from friends words of admonition; but they awaken no holy recollections, they appeal to no familiar ideas; they can only appear mysterious and repulsive; the wretched spirit has no simple truth to which it can turn; there are no long-forgotten habits of prayer to be revived; and the season that might have been one of grace and salvation is too often passed in vague and fruitless horrors, only to be succeeded by a hopeless death, or by another equally hopeless course of sinning.

It will naturally be presumed that such a work as "the School and the Schoolmaster" must contain a great deal of discussion relating to the character, duties, and influence of the teacher. Nor will such expectation be disappointed. We might, did our limits permit, quote from either of the experienced and intelligent authors many admirable passages, which would speak with power to the hearts and consciences of both teachers and parents: but

we must content ourselves with referring the reader to the work itself.

If the parents of our country had adequately conceived how much depends upon the character of the teacher to whom they intrust their children, upon his manners, his real goodness of heart, his love of children, his general intelligence, his ability to preserve order and respect by his mere presence, his power of applying himself wisely to the intellectual and moral faculties of his pupils, they would spare no trouble in searching for such a teacher, and no expense or attention in making him, when found, comfortable and contented. We do not hesitate to express the opinion that the influence of the teacher's character in school is vastly more important than any amount of positive information which he can impart from books. Especially is this the case in secluded parts of the country, where children have few opportunities of seeing any thing that is beautiful and noble in human character. In such neighborhoods how blessed is the influence of an intelligent, refined, self-denying, benevolent man, who is interested in his work, and content to labor and pray for the temporal and eternal welfare of rising generations! How many rude and reckless children will gain from such a character their first conceptions of exalted goodness, of true moral dignity and refinement, their first glimpse of

"Thoughts that breathe and words that burn!"

How many will gain from such an example their first notions of what it is to think intelligently, nobly, beautifully; what it is to speak the English language as it deserves to be spoken! In such a presence how many will first become conscious of feelings of deep reverence, and learn to practice, habitually, an unreserved and willing obedience! What *virtue* goes out from such a character to cure evil dispositions and to awaken lofty aspirations! Let such a teacher remain for years in the same neighborhood, holding himself aloof from party dissensions, shedding around him a soothing and conciliating influence, showing himself unselfish, the patient, gentle, cheerful, dignified friend of all, going from house to house in trouble and in joy, imparting counsel and encouragement in reference to the plans of the young, and what a revolution would he accomplish all around him in one short life! What a life for himself and for them! Should any neighborhood find itself capable of estimating such advantages, and earnestly desirous to enjoy them, let it consider that they are worth more than can ever be paid for them. Let it remember that no human

virtue can maintain its ground, and work with the faith and love which are necessary to success, in the midst of neglect, and injustice, and contemptuous treatment, and unchanging hardships, and baffling ignorance and parsimony. Let it erect a school-house which, by the convenience and propriety of its arrangements, and the beauty of its groves and prospects, will teach children and employers to think of education as a beautiful and noble work. Let them do an unheard-of thing. Let them erect a neat and commodious cottage, and adorn it with garden and shrubbery, and endow it with ample privileges, and send to it, as occasion shall serve, a little of the sweetest of their butter, and of the finest of their flour, and let them say to the worthy man whom they have taken pains to find, and to induce by liberal promises (promises destined to be ever punctually fulfilled) to come among them: "Here, my dear sir, is your home; look upon us as your friends; aye, more, as your kinsmen; you are to be intrusted with the education of our children, an arduous and responsible duty, upon the successful performance of which depends more of happiness or misery, more of good or of evil, to us, and to those who shall come after us, than heart can conceive or tongue express. We pledge to you our prayers, our sympathies, and our cordial support. We charge ourselves with the care of your temporal interests and comforts. Every effort which you make to promote the intellectual and moral well-being of our children shall be acknowledged as a service which we can never adequately repay. At our firesides and our boards you will ever find a cordial welcome and an honored place; you shall share in whatever of good Providence may bestow upon us; and when age shall cause your labors to become irksome, should you continue your faithful duties so long, it shall be our care, and the care of our children, to render the evening of your days as serene as their meridian will have been useful and honorable." Let any neighborhood pursue such a course, (alas! when will one be found with the wisdom and the liberality to think of it?) and we hazard nothing in pledging ourselves, that, at the end of ten years, they will find themselves repaid a hundred-fold for all that they have done.

Having confined our attention to a few of the general topics brought forward in the work before us, we are sensible that we have conveyed to our readers no idea, and that we can convey none, within the narrow limits of an article, of the great amount of practical instruction which it contains in relation to the details of the business of education. We shall not now make the attempt. Mr. Emerson's "Schoolmaster" is crowded with minute sugges-

tions, the number and value of which, separately considered, defy efforts at condensation. We acquiesce the more willingly, because we trust the whole work will be generally circulated, and consulted as a manual, by both parents and teachers, not only in this state, but in every part of the country.

Before concluding this article, however, we desire to call the attention of our readers to one feature of the work which we consider to be of great practical importance; we mean the views which are repeatedly enforced by both writers, of the duty of aiming in all systems of education at a vigorous and healthy development of the imagination. We are constrained to say, that on this subject we think there is throughout the country a great deal of error and a great deal of neglect. Because flimsy fictions are very silly and very injurious things; because a morbid, ill-educated, and ill-regulated imagination is a great foe to common sense and to enjoyment; because the aid to be derived from this faculty in making money, and building rail-roads, and in getting up in the world is not quite obvious, therefore it is very sagely concluded, not only that the imagination is unworthy of systematic culture, but that its growth is a thing to be especially dreaded and guarded against. And what is the consequence? The spirit that pervades the land, and breathes upon all our firesides, is cold, dry, unpoetical. We have some good poets; but popular minstrelsy we have none. Ours is a matter-of-fact sort of world, in which physical improvement, money getting, and what is called solid instruction, are the great objects of interest. It is impossible to compare ourselves in this particular with such a country as Scotland, whose mountains, and rivers, and dells, are all alive with the spirit of poetry and romance; where even the poorest peasant has a memory and imagination teeming with the effusions of forgotten bards, a soul perpetually excited by the marvelous, the tender, the heroic, the humorous, the pathetic; and to observe how much these poetic tastes and associations do to promote the happiness of the common people, to prevent them from falling into sordid and vulgar or vacant habits of mind; how much to impart beauty and creative power to the cultivated intellect of the country, without lamenting that our circumstances, the absence of poetical influences among us, and our peculiar views of education, leave the young, especially of our rural districts, with so little to excite and nourish the finest powers of the mind, and with so little hope of ever being enabled to derive from the imagination either gratification or efficient aid.

The remedy for these defects, so far as we can remedy them,

must be sought for, in the first place, in the nursery and in the common school. It is recorded of the ancient philosopher Diogenes, that having been sold into slavery, and coming into the possession of a master, who, perceiving his powers, gave him his children to instruct, he, among other things, made selections from the finest poets, and caused them to be committed to memory. Would that our families and our schools could be persuaded to substitute such exercises, which refine the language of the child, and familiarize and fill his mind with the beautiful and the moral, for some of the weary, uninspiring, unfruitful generalities, mere husks of low information, with which they now waste the time, and deaden the mind, and break the spirit of their children. On this subject the sentiments of Dr. Potter and Mr. Emerson are enlightened and worthy of profound attention. We must now conclude our imperfect notice of the work, earnestly commending it once more to the consideration of all who feel interested in the intellectual and moral well-being of their country.

ART. VII.—1. *An Essay concerning Human Understanding ; and a Treatise on the Conduct of the Understanding. With the Author's last Additions and Corrections.* By JOHN LOCKE, Gent.

2. *Communication from the Rev. Dr. Beasley on Locke's and Cousin's Philosophy.* Methodist Quarterly Review for October, 1842.

THE speculations contained in the following pages have occupied more or less of the author's attention for several years past, while engaged as an instructor of mental science. But they would not probably have been presented to the public so soon had they not been called out by the "Communication" we have placed at the head of this article. We know not, indeed, but that we shall incur the censure of spreading them prematurely before the public. Be that as it may, for ourselves we have but little concern. We claim only that we are sincere inquirers after truth ; and though we may not have been able to satisfy even ourselves as to "*what is truth ;*" yet we think the candid and generous will not fail to accord to us the privilege of giving expression to the difficulties that have obstructed our path, while we have endeavored to follow in the footsteps of one of the great masters in philosophy. But

from those bigoted souls, whose every thought revolves within the circumference of some theory, the basis of which they little understand, and about whose fundamental principles they have no mental misgivings, we have nothing to ask, nothing to expect.

We have endeavored to "define our position" with clearness and precision; and also in the statement of our difficulties to exercise the frankness and candor of lovers of truth. If these difficulties can be removed, and the system remain unimpaired, the person who shall successfully accomplish such a work will do great service to the cause of a sound and rational philosophy. No one will more sincerely rejoice at its accomplishment than ourselves; for we frankly confess that we find but an unsatisfactory remedy for our mental misgivings, either in the refined spiritualism of the present day, or in that mockery of common sense, transcendentalism.

This is an interesting era in the history of metaphysical science. That science is in a state of transition. The authority which, for a long time, has been held by the system of Locke, has, in a measure, become impaired; the spell which seemed to environ it as the *sanctum sanctorum* of philosophy has been broken, and even the name of its author has not a charm sufficiently potent to protect it from the closest scrutiny and the most rigid requisitions of reason. The philosophical spirit awakened by the labors of Reid and Stewart has met with a response from the kindred spirits of Royer Collard, Cousin, and Jouffrey in France, and not only a stronger impulse, but, in some sense, a new direction, has been given to philosophy. Of the strength and power of this movement, and of the kindred sympathy it has awakened in almost every part of the philosophic world, no one can doubt; but what shall be its result? Will philosophy rise to a higher eminence, and shine forth with clearer light, or shall it be a mere *revolution*, unmarked by *progression*? This is not a question of slight importance. Not merely the speculative notions of men, but also religion, morals, and the general improvement of society are interested in the solution which time, and future, as well as passing events, shall give to it. If philosophy may not be entitled the "twin-sister" of religion, yet may it be its handmaid and coworker in working out the great interests of humanity. A sound philosophy and a pure theology never disagree. It is not, however, our object at present to discuss the nature, the tendency, and probable results of this philosophic movement. We can only say that it is but a feeble heart that quails when the elements are in motion;

and but a feeble faith that distrusts the power of *truth*, or the capabilities of mind to work out its own emancipation.

We had thought, at first, to offer, by permission of the editor, only a brief notice of the "Communication from the Rev. Dr. Beasley," to correct some of the erroneous impressions it was calculated to make; but we found the question involving some of the fundamental principles of the "Essay on Human Understanding;" and we have, consequently, been led into a critical examination of them. With those who never question the correctness of a principle which has the sanction of Locke, we can hope to avail nothing. We cannot, however, withhold the conviction that Locke is more praised than *studied* in the present day: but if we should not succeed in putting our arguments in a clear and convincing form, we hope to be able to show that our objections are not groundless. Let us, however, premise that we claim for ourselves a place among those who venerate the name of Locke. His independence of spirit, the straightforwardness of his course, and the value of his contributions to the science of mind, command our homage; while the candor and ingenuousness of his acknowledgments, the modesty of his deportment, and the unassuming simplicity of his style, secure to him our highest commendation. When forced to question some of the principles of his philosophy, our reverence for him may in some measure be abated; but we can never call into question the great service he has done to the cause of truth and science.

Rev. Dr. Beasley's Communication.

The article which called forth this "Communication" was a review of Cousin's philosophy, which appeared in the April number of the Quarterly for 1842.

The author of that article was not, nor did he profess to be, a disciple of the "new school in philosophy," as it is called; nor did he design, in detail, to approbate the philosophical writings of Cousin, for on many points he expressed his strong and decided dissent from his views. But believing that the general scope and tendency of his philosophy were greatly misunderstood in this country, he attempted to vindicate it from some of the unfounded aspersions cast upon it, especially that of pantheism and atheism. This, indeed, was the main object of that article, and it was no small gratification to the author that the voice of the press, so far as we observed, united in pronouncing it a successful vindication. Dr. Beasley is also explicit on this point: he says, "I entirely agree with you that he is in heart opposed to the pantheism of

Germany, as well as to all materialism, atheism, and fatalism of the French school." So far, then, we agree; nor have we any right to complain if others think that to be "absolute jargon," out of which we flatter ourselves we are able to make tolerable sense. There is, indeed, much that is objectionable in the style of Cousin; but we sometimes feel constrained to smile at the professions which some make of inability to understand him; nor indeed do we profess much sympathy with those who are ever and anon deprecating the departure from the style observed in what they are pleased to call the "golden days of philosophy"—the days of Clarke, Cudworth, Butler, and Locke.

But the primary object of the doctor seems to be the vindication of Locke from what he considers to be an unjust reflection cast upon his philosophy in an incidental allusion we made to it. While referring to the state of metaphysical science in France, prior to the recent revival of philosophy there, we spoke of sensualism, using the term in its philosophical sense, as tending to materialism, and thence to atheism. That such was the tendency of the sensualist philosophy in France, we believe is not questioned; therefore it will be unnecessary to waste time in argument on this point. In the subsequent part of the article, designing to convey the idea that Locke's philosophy *tended* to sensualism, and thence to materialism, we used the following language:—"To accuse Locke of being a sensualist or materialist, because his system led to this, would be doing him injustice; for perhaps he never discovered the tendency of his doctrine of the origin of knowledge."

This, then, is the sum of our sinning against Locke. We have asserted that "his doctrine of the origin of knowledge" tends to sensualism, and also to materialism, as this is but the last result or final consequence of sensualism. This is the plain construction which a careful observer of all we said with reference to this subject would not fail to put upon it. The doctor intimates that "Locke is accused of maintaining this doctrine," [sensualism.] But do we not expressly say that to accuse him of it "would be doing him injustice?" The sum and substance of our charge was, that *such is the tendency of Locke's doctrine of the origin of knowledge*. Before undertaking to prove that this inference is not unwarranted, it may not be amiss to bestow a passing notice upon the doctor's defense of Locke. With regard to materialism he says,—

"We may be assured, that if any one of his doctrines led to materialism, it would not have escaped his discernment, more especially when it is recollected, that by this means it would be brought into

direct conflict with another part of his works, in which he asserts the immateriality of God and the human soul."

Let us analyze this argument, and see how much it weighs, and what it is worth. It rests upon two points:—1. His doctrines could not have led to materialism, because, if they did, "it would not have escaped his discernment." On this we can only remark, that much as we reverence Locke as a great philosopher and a conscientious Christian,* we have never felt it within us to subscribe to his infallibility, or to ascribe all knowledge to him. We think it *possible*, at least, that there might have been *tendencies* of his system which he did not discover. Dr. Beasley says that not one of his doctrines could have led to materialism without his discernment; Dr. Reid, the distinguished Scottish philosopher, says, "Des Cartes and Locke take the road that leads to skepticism without knowing the end of it."† Which of the doctors is "in the right" we shall not undertake to say; but we must certainly dissent from the opinion of one who was a better historian than philosopher, that the system of Locke "has served to introduce a universal system of skepticism, which has shaken every principle of religion and morals."‡ But we are not alone in the opinion that the tendencies of Locke's system are such, that not only the French sensualists, but even David Hume has strong claims to call him *master*. Indeed, we think it is admitted that Locke did not perceive all the tendencies of every feature of his system. Did he perceive the tendency of that very "slight error" which Bishop Butler "detected in his philosophy, when he maintained that personal identity consists in consciousness?"§ 2. The second argument is, that such could not be the tendency of any one of his doctrines, for in that case it would conflict with doctrines clearly and explicitly avowed, viz., "the immateriality of God and the soul of man." This objection also presumes that Locke had observed all the tendencies of his system; and that contradiction in him was impossible. We cannot see the force of the argument; and if Locke is on several points clearly convicted of error, even

* "In his religious belief Locke belonged to the Socinians."—*Henry's Hist. Phil.*, vol. ii, p. 39.

† Reid's *Inquiry*, p. 257. ‡ Russell's *Hist. Mod. Europe*, vol. ii, p. 297.

§ Bishop Butler remarks that this doctrine, viz., the doctrine that *consciousness constitutes personal identity*,—"involves as an obvious consequence, that a person has not existed a single moment, nor done one action, but that he can remember; indeed, none but what he reflects upon"—"consciousness presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity."—See the *Dissertation on Personal Identity*, subjoined to Butler's *Analogy*.

by the admission of his most profound admirers; and if, on other points, his philosophy is contradictory in itself,* we cannot see any impossibility in the case, *per se*, why his doctrine of the origin of knowledge, when followed out into its legitimate consequences, may not lead to that which would be contradictory to his doctrine concerning the "immateriality of God and the soul of man."†

Dr. Beasley may be correct in his view, but we think him unfortunate in his arguments. They are indeed such as we might have expected from a disciple of Pythagoras in defense of his master; but not such as we should expect from a disciple of Locke, in an age when every one claims it as an inborn right to think and reason for himself—instead of resting upon the *ipse dixit*, or presuming upon the infallibility of any man.

We will now turn to the other part of the vindication, that which relates to sensualism. This was our starting point. We believed Locke's "doctrine of the origin of knowledge" tended to sensualism, if it do not in its very idea constitute sensualism itself. If sensualism, as a system in philosophy, does not tend to materialism, then we have mistaken its tendency, and need only to be convinced of the fact that we may abate so much from the obnoxious passage we have penned concerning Locke's philosophy.

Let us, then, for a moment notice the doctor's argument upon this point. The following, though not in his precise language, we believe to be a clear and candid statement of it:—"Sensualism makes sensation the only source of knowledge. Locke traces two sources or inlets of human knowledge, sensation and reflection. Therefore Locke is not a sensualist." We believe the doctor's argument has lost nothing of its force by being placed in this form. But how does the conclusion quadrate with our own? We said distinctly, that to accuse Locke of "being a sensualist would be doing him injustice;" the doctor says he is not a sensualist.

* We would very respectfully ask the doctor if Mr. Locke is consistent or correct in his doctrine—"that the *ideas* of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them."—B. ii, ch. 8, § 15. Or, again, whether there is any inconsistency in stating that objects set before mirrors produce "images or *ideas*" therein.—B. ii, ch. 1, § 25.

† "You say," says the bishop of Worcester, "in that chapter about the existence of God, you thought it most proper to express yourself in the most usual and familiar way, by common words and expressions. I would you had done so quite through your book; for then you had never given that occasion to the enemies of our faith to take up your new way of ideas, as an effectual battery (as they imagined) against the mysteries of the Christian faith."—*Second Letter to the Author of the Essay on Human Understanding.*

On this point, then, we shall not differ; we grant him all he asks: "Locke was not a sensualist." But whether Locke's doctrine led or *tended* to sensualism we shall consider by and by.

The doctor having delivered himself of his formidable argument, immediately launches out into a metaphysical rhapsody, whose application to the topic under discussion we find it as difficult to understand as it is for him to decipher the "splendid paradoxes" and "absolute jargon" of Cousin. Take, for instance, the following passages:—

"There can scarcely be a doubt in the mind of any intelligent man, that through the operation of our [its] external senses the child derives its earliest notices of light, colors, sounds, and odors. If Locke be a sensualist, then, so is the great Contriver of nature; for he most indubitably communicates a knowledge of the external world solely through the instrumentality of our corporeal organs."—*Quarterly Review for October, 1842, p. 625.*

The doctor, we presume, does not mean to convey the idea that the whole cyclopedia of human knowledge is circumscribed to the notions which we form of the external world; and yet he here entirely overlooks that large portion of our ideas which are not immediately connected with the external world. It is not for referring the former class of ideas to the senses as their origin, that we think Locke's views tended to sensualism; but for, indirectly at least, referring the latter class to the same source, and thus virtually making but one origin or inlet of ideas, namely, sensation. The doctor will now perceive that we have, in our objections, but little to do with "the fanciful theory of Malebranche, that we perceive all things in God," or with "the pre-established harmony of Leibnitz." And, indeed, we are determined to contest stoutly our claims to some little share of "common sense;" for with us, in philosophical speculations, it is regarded as a prime commodity. But let us look at one passage more:—

"We have now proved, by incontestible evidence, that Locke was not the broacher of sensualism, as it is lately called; and until philosophers shall discover some method by which mankind can obtain ideas of sound without ears, of light and colors without eyes, and of odors without noses, his system upon this point ought to be considered as irrefragable."—*Meth. Quar. Rev., Oct., 1842, p. 625.*

Here, again, we can only compare the doctor's metaphysical engine to a car "off the track." He has mistaken wholly the

grounds of our charge.* We never had the least doubt but that our first knowledge of the *material world* was derived through the external senses, that of colors through the sense of sight, of odors through the sense of smell, of sounds through the sense of hearing, &c. But does this comprise all our knowledge? Are they, indeed, the *first* ideas that originate in the mind? These questions have an important bearing not only upon our present discussion, but also upon the fundamental characteristics of philosophy itself.

We have now cleared away enough of the rubbish, perhaps, to bring us directly to the main question, as to the tendency of Locke's doctrine of the origin of knowledge. But lest we should again be misunderstood, as Dr. Beasley has evidently mistaken us on that point, we would reiterate, that we think it tends to sensualism, not because he attributes our knowledge of the external world to the senses, (for who that has common sense would not do this?) but because, according to his theory, reflection, though an accredited source of ideas, becomes such only by virtue and in consequence of sensation, which thus becomes not only the first, but the fundamental source of all our knowledge. The soul, indeed, thinks or reflects, but it thinks only after "the senses have furnished it ideas to think on;"† and, moreover, its reflection is limited to the ideas derived from sensation, for even our most "abstruse ideas are only such as the understanding frames to itself by repeating and joining together ideas that it had either from objects of sense or from its own operations about them."‡ Hence, in the last analysis, all our ideas are traced up to sensation. This we believe to be an inevitable conclusion from the above data.

Let it now be premised that we are not inquiring into the validity of sensualism, or even of Locke's view "of the original of knowledge." Those points we propose to consider before we close the discussion. We now propose to discuss simply,

The tendency of Locke's theory concerning the origin of knowledge.

Perhaps we cannot introduce the subject better than by presenting the following question for consideration: Does Locke

* The doctor, we presume, had not seen the article on Cousin's Psychology in the April number of the Review for 1841, in which the subject was stated more explicitly; hence this misapprehension of the question was quite natural.

† Locke's Essay, b. ii, ch. 1, § 20.

‡ Locke's Essay, b. ii, ch. 12, § 8.

consider "reflection" an *independent* and *primary* source of ideas? or does he not, while he nominally recognizes it as a source of ideas, virtually resolve it into, or make it dependent upon, sensation, so as to render the latter, *de facto*, the only primary source of ideas?

1. *Locke's theory concerning the origin of ideas.*—In order to discuss understandingly the above question, it will be necessary for us to take a cursory view of the doctrine of Locke concerning the "original of ideas." On this point he is very explicit:—

"All ideas come from sensation or reflection.—Our observation, employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are the only fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring."—*Locke's Essay*, b. ii, ch. 1, § 2.

Again, he says,—

"The understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmering of any ideas, which it doth not receive from one of these two."—*Ib.*, § 5.

This is, perhaps, sufficient as a mere statement of Locke's theory on this point. The correctness of the theory we do not propose now either to question or discuss.

2. *Office and nature of reflection according to Locke's theory.*—Perception, according to Locke's theory, is a generic term, including two species under it, sensation and reflection; sensation, by which we become acquainted with the qualities and operations of the exterior world; and reflection, by which we become acquainted with the properties and operations of our own minds.* A new question here necessarily arises, namely, What are the conditions under which these two sources are developed? Are they developed simultaneously and independently; or is there an order of succession, and a dependence one upon the other? If so, what is that order? or, in other words, which is subsequent and dependent?† For it must be evident, that just so far as one is dependent upon the other, or takes a subordinate place to the other, just so far it ceases to be an independent or primary source of ideas. Perhaps we may illustrate this statement by referring to memory as a source of ideas. Concerning this, Professor Upham very clearly remarks:—"In reference to the great question

* Search of Truth, ch. iii, p. 123.

† Meth. Quar. Rev., July, 1841, p. 346

of the origin of human knowledge, the memory is to be considered a source of knowledge, rather in its connection with other mental susceptibilities, than *in itself*.* Memory, then, cannot be considered a primary source of knowledge. The same may be said of the reasoning, or comparing and deducing faculties of the mind. They are occupied about ideas that the mind *already possesses*. Up to the absolute origin, the fountain head of knowledge, they cannot go; for "reasoning implies the existence of antecedent or assumed propositions," [ideas.†]

The order of sequence and dependence, which Locke would institute between sensation and reflection, or the relation he supposes them to hold, may be readily gathered from the following passages. After having spoken of sensation as the first source of ideas, he remarks,—

"The other fountain from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas, is the perception of the operations of our own mind within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got."—*Locke's Essay*, b. ii, ch. 1, § 4.

It will be observed that "reflection" is here limited to "the perception of the operations of our own mind, as it is employed about the ideas it has got" through sensation. Hence reflection is limited to a mere cognizance and contemplation of the mental activity produced by sensation. Beyond this it cannot go, and upon this it is wholly dependent. Therefore it would be as absurd to consider *reflection* a primary source of knowledge, or a source of knowledge "*in itself considered*," as it would memory or any other relative and dependent power. The same order of sequence and the same relation of dependence are repeatedly insisted on by Locke:—

"I see no reason, therefore, to believe that the soul thinks before the senses have furnished it with ideas to think on; and as those are increased and retained, so it comes by exercise to improve its faculty of thinking, in the several parts of it, as well as afterward by compounding those ideas, and reflecting on its own operations; it increases its stock, as well as its facility in remembering, imagining, reasoning, and the other modes of thinking."—*Ib.*, § 20.

And again,—

"If it shall be demanded, then, when a man begins to have any ideas, I think the true answer is, when he first has any sensation. For since there appear not to be any ideas in the mind, before the senses have conveyed any in, I conceive that ideas in the understand-

* *Ment. Phil.*, vol. i, § 244, p. 309.

† *Ib.*, § 274, p. 347.

ing are coeval with sensation ; which is such an impression or motion made in some part of the body, as produces some perception in the understanding. It is about these impressions made on our senses by outward objects, that the mind seems first to employ itself," &c.—*Locke's Essay*, b. ii, ch. 1, § 23.

Again, he says,—

"In time the mind comes to reflect on its own operations, about the ideas got by sensation, and thereby stores itself with a new set of ideas, which I call ideas of reflection.—All those sublime thoughts which tower above the clouds, and reach as high as heaven itself, take their rise and footing here ; in all that good extent wherein the mind wanders, in those remote speculations it may seem to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond those ideas which sense or reflection have offered for its contemplation."—*Ib.*, § 24.

We think it will be unnecessary to quote further. The above passages clearly evolve two of the leading principles in Locke's theory of the origin of ideas. 1. That our first ideas are conveyed into the mind by the senses. 2. That all mental activity is dependent upon sensation,—first, as its original excitant ; second, as furnishing the materials about which it is employed. The mind is indeed a fruitful soil ; but it only nourishes and brings to maturity the seed which the senses have sown.

3. *Reflection not a source of ideas in itself considered.*—The truth of the above proposition might indeed be inferred from the very term employed by Locke, *reflection*. Thus, to reflect, it is evident that the mind must possess some ideas upon which it reflects ; nor can its sphere of action extend beyond that stock of ideas and their mutual relations and dependences ; for upon these it is dependent, and by these it is limited. Locke, it is true, admits two distinct sources of ideas ; he does not confound the operations of the soul with sensations ; but he limits the sphere of reflection to the "operations" of the soul ; and these operations do not take place until after sensations, upon which they are dependent.* It remains to see what these operations are, and what are their proper functions ; upon what, and in what sphere, they are carried on ; what is their extent, and whether, supposing them not to enter into exercise till after sensation, they are, or are not, condemned to act solely upon the primitive data furnished to them by the senses.† The answer to these queries may be seen in the office which Locke assigns to reflection, that is, to observe the operations of the mind excited by the senses. Hence reflection is only a natural consequence of sensation ; and the understanding only an instru-

* *Locke's Essay*, b. ii, ch. 1, § 20.

† *Cousin's Psychology*, ch. iii, p. 73.

ment, whose whole power is exhausted upon sensation. This is the view of Locke. It is the view of his school even to the present day; for though it has been somewhat modified, especially by Dr. Brown, whose classification of external and internal intellect has been adopted by Professor Upham, yet the same order of sequence and relation of dependence forms a prominent feature. He distinctly declares, "The process which is implied in the perception of external things, or what is commonly termed by Mr. Locke *sensation*, may be justly considered the *occasion*, or the introductory step to all our knowledge."*

4. Hence, *Locke's theory leaves us, in fact, but one primary source of ideas.*—Sensation is made the condition of all knowledge, the main-spring of mental action. Locke, to be sure, has not confounded sensation and the faculties of the mind; he has most explicitly distinguished them; but he makes our faculties sustain a secondary and insignificant part, and concentrates their action upon the data furnished by the senses. From this to the point of confounding them with the sensibility itself, is but a step. Take this step, and you are encircled in the folds of *materialism*. Here is the germ of Condillac's theory of *sensation transformed*, of sensation as the sole and single principle of all operations of the mind.† We have to pass only a little beyond the "theory of transformed sensations" to reach the ulterior point of *sensualism*. Thus do we find both sensualism and materialism interweaving their fibres with the doctrines of the Essay. And let it be remarked, that this is no forced construction of those doctrines. It may be justly called their terminating point. The following extract is not inappropriate to the subject, inasmuch as it exhibits not only the tendency of Locke's system to sensualism, but also the agency Condillac had in developing that tendency in France:—

"The theory of Locke was developed in France by Condillac, according to whose principle ideas are nothing but sensations transformed.

"Locke had admitted two sources of ideas, sensation and reflection, or the consciousness which the soul has of its own operations. Condillac maintained, in the first place, that all operations of the soul are reducible to a single one, namely, attention, which exists in various degrees, and under various relations, and that reflection is itself only a mode of attention. But what is attention? According to Condillac, it is nothing but the effect of a predominant sensation. Every thing, therefore, becomes resolved into a

* Ment. Phil., vol. i, p. 228, § 174.

† Cousin's Psychology, p. 76.

single element, sensation."*—*Henry's History of Philosophy*, vol. ii, pp. 42, 43.

We think we have now established conclusively the fact, that while Locke nominally recognizes reflection as a source of ideas, he virtually resolves it into, or makes it dependent upon, sensation, so as to render the latter, *de facto*, the only primary source of knowledge. And having established thus much we are warranted in saying that his doctrine of the origin of knowledge *tends* to sensualism.

Dr. Beasley accuses the sensualists of abusing Locke's theory, and perhaps the same charge may be applied to ourselves; but we think all we have said, and all our inferences concerning his philosophy, have been amply sustained by the quotations we have made from the "Essay" itself. We neither revive nor indorse the objections of Bishop Stillingfleet; nor do we care now to summon to our aid those urged with such force and power by Reid and Stewart, or still later by M. Cousin, against the pernicious tendencies of some of the doctrines of the Essay on Human Understanding. It should, however, be remarked, that the high estimation in which Locke's philosophy was ever held by the sensualists of France, is at least a pretty strong indication that there was some affinity between their respective systems, or that one would readily run into the other. O, but they were "not masters of Locke's whole system!"† This, to us, is not a satisfactory solution. We think they gave good evidence of having mastered some portion of it at least; and had they not found in it some kindredship with their own doctrines, it would soon have met with a rejection. We dislike the solution on another ground: we think it hardly comports with modesty in pretension, especially when we take into account the great number and the high respectability, both as to scholarship and metaphysical acumen, of those who have ever objected to some of the fundamental doctrines of Locke. If, indeed, we are, *a priori*, to take it for granted that there can be no vicious tendency of Locke's system because "it could not have escaped his discernment;"‡ and, furthermore, that every objector to it is "by no means master of his whole system;" we may as well cut short all controversy at once, by pronouncing father Locke infallible.

Let us not be accused of a bigoted opposition to Locke. Our views of some portions of his system do not diminish our respect

* Harper's Family Library, vols. 143, 144.

† Dr. Beasley's Communication, *Meth. Quar. Rev.*, Oct., 1842.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 624.

for him as a man and a philosopher; we most sincerely believe and most frankly avow that, in our estimation, no other philosopher has done more to place metaphysical science upon a firm and rational basis than John Locke. But that philosophy has made no progress since his day, that the master minds that have since appeared upon the stage have been able to contribute nothing to the transcendent brightness of his light, and so far as they have departed from him, have only wandered into the labyrinths of error, or plunged into the quagmires of skepticism, we cannot, we will not believe. The science of astronomy owes much to Copernicus and Galileo, but it was not perfected by them. Mathematics and its kindred sciences owe much to Newton; but who believes that they were carried to their complete acme of perfection by him? Indeed, who now would advocate the use of Newton's Works in our schools of learning? But because Newton has been laid aside, in this respect, are we therefore to infer that philosophy is on the retrograde? We should suspect that the person who could make such an inference had but few claims to philosophy, except a bigoted discipleship of Newton. Disciples, indeed, but such as he, were he now brought back to life, would be ashamed to own. Locke, however, has been superseded in a more striking manner. Not only has the general style and manner of treating metaphysical subjects been improved since his day, and many of his principles been more fully developed, but new and fundamental principles in philosophy have also been brought to the light of reason. Locke is indeed one of those fortunate authors whose works all praise, few read, and still fewer understand.

Of the nature of ideas.

The nature of ideas, or the *thing* designated by the term *idea*, is an important consideration in the study of Locke's philosophy. It is the key that unlocks the passage-way to its penetralia.

The author introduces the term into his work by the following modest, apologetic definition:—

"I must here, in the entrance, beg pardon of my reader for the frequent use of the word 'idea,' which he will find in the following treatise. It being that term, which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks; I have used it to express whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking; and I could not avoid frequently using it."—*Locke's Essay*, b. i, ch. 1, § 8.

Again he says,—“Idea is the object of thinking;”^{*} and this is frequently repeated in the subsequent part of his Essay. And if we take the definition in itself, it is perhaps unexceptionable; only that terms are used which are themselves susceptible of various and diverse meanings. The word *phantasm* may denote something widely different from *notion*; and *species* something widely different from either. The question then arises, whether Locke always uses the word *idea* in the same sense; or whether it is used merely to denote a *genus*, whose individual subjects differ widely, not only in the manner of their origin, but also in their nature. Any one who reads with care his book† upon the genealogy of ideas, will not fail to discover that sensation is the author of not only a numerous, but widely diversified progeny.

It would be a Herculean task to point out all the characteristics of all this progeny. This, however, it would be necessary to do if we would obtain a clear understanding of the import or meaning of the word “*idea*,” as it is used by Mr. Locke, since the definition he employs conveys no definite knowledge of it.

If, however, Locke is to be understood to maintain that our ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of those qualities, then, we think, we have foot-hold within the precincts of his system, and that too in a place which holds close proximity to *materialism*. For if ideas which are in the *mind* resemble the qualities of bodies which they represent, it is but a plain and obvious inference that the mind which receives and holds those ideas, is, in itself, a material substance. But let us appeal to the Essay for Locke's decision upon this point:—

“Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call idea.”—*Locke's Essay*, b. ii, ch. 8, § 8.

Here it will be observed that the *idea* is something independent of and distinct from thought, something which “the mind perceives in itself.” It seems to be a something, in whose manufacture the mind had no agency, nor does the mind appear to have any control over it, any further than to perceive it, after the mechanical agencies of the system have introduced it within the mind's inclosure.

But, again,—

“To discover the nature of our ideas the better, and to discourse of them intelligibly, it will be convenient to distinguish them as they are ideas or perceptions in our minds, and as they are modifications

^{*} Locke's Essay, b. ii, ch. 1, § 1.

† *Ib.*, b. ii.

of matter in those bodies that cause such perceptions in us; that so we may not think (as perhaps usually is done) that they are exactly the images and resemblances of something inherent in the subject; most of those of sensation being in the mind no more the likeness of something existing without us, than the names that stand for them are the likeness of our ideas, which yet, upon hearing, they are apt to excite in us."—*Locke's Essay*, b. ii, ch. 8, § 7.

It seems not a little strange to me, that this very passage has been quoted as a triumphant vindication of Locke, as proof "demonstrative" that he held to no such doctrine as "that ideas are images in the mind."* The very fact that he claims this to be the case only with regard to *most* of our ideas, is a presumptive evidence, at least, that he believed it to be the case with regard to some. But let us come to his own language, in which he speaks explicitly on this point:—

"Ideas of primary qualities are resemblances; of secondary, not.—From whence [that is, from what he had said concerning secondary qualities being nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce sensations in us, and depending on the primary qualities] I think it easy to draw this conclusion, that the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves; but the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities have no resemblance of them at all."—*Ib.*, § 15.

Primary qualities of bodies had been defined in a previous section. They are "such as are utterly inseparable from the body," viz., "solidity, extension, figure, motion, or rest, and number."† Locke denominates secondary qualities those "which in truth are nothing in the objects, but powers to produce various sensation in us by their primary qualities, that is, by the bulk, figure, texture and motion of their insensible parts, as sounds, colors, tastes,"‡ &c. I am aware that many a special plea has been made in behalf of Locke on this point; and arguments "presumptive" and "demonstrative" have been laboriously formed and aptly fitted to prove that Locke meant something different from what he is supposed to express with regard to our ideas of the primary qualities of bodies being resemblances of them. Dr. Beasley, too, has entered this Augean stable;§ but though he "laid on" lustily, and that too in full confidence of being fully able to convince the philosophic world,|| the result proves him to have been neither a Hercules nor a prophet.

* Beasley's *Search of Truth*, p. 160, *et seq.*; also Blakeley's *History of Moral Science*, vol. i, p. 135, *et seq.*

† Locke's *Essay*, b. ii, ch. 8, § 9.

§ *Search of Truth*, p. 142, *et seq.*

‡ *Ibid.*, § 10.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 120.

We will not undertake to vindicate Dr. Reid from doing injustice to Locke; but with regard to our ideas of the *primary* qualities of bodies, there can be no dispute about the language, if there can about the meaning of Locke. He expressly affirms them to be *resemblances of these qualities*; and if there is one passage in the whole Essay in which his statement of a doctrine is explicit, considering the immediate language employed, and also the context, it is this.

We will not undertake, at this late day, to enter into a refutation of this gross absurdity. We might indeed speak of forming images within the *dark* cavern of the skull; but we choose rather to leave the subject till the science of anatomy shall be carried to such a degree of perfection, as, in its dissections of the human brain, to unhouse these little filmy creatures (*ideâs*) and expose them to observation. Then will they doubtless come forth to the complete vindication of Locke's theory, and also assert their genuine phrenological paternity. When this shall have transpired, we shall be prepared, per force, to bow our necks to the yoke of materialism.

We have now taken up the great question which called forth the doctor's Communication, and if we have not said all that might be said upon it; and if what we have said is not put in its most convincing form, still we hope our remarks may call attention to a theme which is of far greater importance than any mere question of individual skill and accuracy. It is due to ourselves, before passing to consider the validity of Locke's theory, to notice one or two of the minor criticisms which the doctor bestowed upon our article; we will not, however, tire our readers with a useless detail of them. We have no recollection of introducing Condillac as an atheist, or even a materialist; we only spoke of him as an expounder of Locke in France; and one whose exegesis of his system tended to the development of sensualism.* Such we believe to be the fact; and that we have not misjudged him, may be seen from the following extract, translated from his Treatise on Sensations:†—"If we consider," says he, "that to remember, to compare, to judge, to distinguish, to imagine, to be astonished, to have abstract ideas of number and duration, to know truths, whether general or particular, are but so many *modes of being attentive*; that to have passions, to love, to hate, to hope, to fear, to will, are but so many different *modes of desire*; and that attention in the one case, and desire in the other case, of which all these feelings are modes, are themselves, in their origin, nothing more than modes of sensation; we cannot but conclude that SEN-

* See Upham's Ment. Phil., vol. i, p. 227. † Ibid.

SATION involves in itself ALL the faculties of the soul."* Can it be possible that one who has read Condillac's *Treatise on Sensations* can doubt whether Condillac belonged to the sensual school in philosophy?

As to the bug-bears, "me" and "not-me," over which the doctor, in his "surprise that so sensible a writer as this reviewer could commend or justify" the use of them, stumbles, we would modestly hint to the doctor, that reviewers, even more "sensible" than the one he criticises, are very much in the habit of using the same offensive terms. We, however, used them quite innocently, not as terms of our own choice, but as terms very extensively used by philosophical writers of the present day, and indeed we could hardly avoid their use, from the fact that they were technical phrases, and also of very frequent application in the work we reviewed. We did not then, nor do we now, see any particular reason, notwithstanding the doctor's homily, for entering our protest against them.

We will next proceed to consider another question concerning Locke's theory of the origin of knowledge, a question which cannot be considered unimportant by the lover of truth, nor indeed by any one when we consider the extensive authority and influence that are attached to the very name of Locke. Indeed, such is the great authority of a name, that he who questions Locke must subject himself to the suspicion of heresy in philosophy, if not to skepticism in theology.

Validity of Locke's theory of the origin of knowledge.

The theory of Locke has perhaps been sufficiently indicated in the quotations we have made from his Works. That theory is,—
1. There are no innate ideas; 2. Our first ideas are of external origin, that is, are derived through the medium of sensation and perception; 3. That portion of our ideas which is of internal origin, or is derived through reflection, is subsequent; 4. All our ideas come through either sensation or reflection.

1. *There are no innate ideas.*—There are certain intuitive perceptions of the human mind, so simple in their nature, so early in their origin, and so universal in their prevalence, that many philosophers, as well as the bulk of mankind, had, without further evidence, consented to consider them innate. That is, they endowed the mind not only with a susceptibility of perceiving, and of acquiring ideas, but also supposed that there were stored up in it, antecedent to any action of its own, certain fundamental ideas and

* *Traité des Sensations*, part i, ch. 7, § 2.

principles. This notion Locke very justly explodes; and by arguments, in the main sound and incontestible, shows that we may claim no more for the mind than an original susceptibility of acquiring knowledge.

This notion we said Locke explodes. We are not, however, so confident with regard to the qualities of his explosive mixture. That the doctrine of "innate ideas" received its quietus with Locke is clearly evident, as it has been scarcely agitated in the philosophical world since his day. Locke undoubtedly urged strong objections to the doctrine; and, at the same time, ingeniously drew the public mind away from it to another, viz., the theory of the origin of knowledge, which he makes the fundamental principle, the starting point in philosophy.

Setting aside the doctrine of innate ideas, the student will here find a radical error of method in the order in which Locke proposes to consider the questions which compose a complete system of psychology, or (to retain his favorite term, *idea*) of *idealogy*. He proposes to treat of the *origin* of ideas before investigating what they are; he goes directly to the question of their origin, while yet their nature is unexplored, and their character and limits undefined. This fundamental error of method, and the chances of error in theory it involves, are clearly pointed out and urged with great force by M. Cousin.* The reader will also find a few suggestions on the same subject in an article on Cousin's Psychology in a former number of the Methodist Quarterly Review.†

2, 3. *Ideas of sensation first, those of reflection subsequent.*—We have already quoted enough from the "Essay" to show that this is a correct statement of Locke's theory, and also to show the specific meaning which he attaches to the terms, sensation and reflection.‡

The true idea of this theory is, that the mind at first possesses no ideas, is like a piece of white paper;§ but is endowed with organs of sense and susceptibilities of mental activity—these organs of sense are first acted upon or excited by their proper objects, as the organ of sight by the light that breaks in from the window—

* History of Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century, vol. ii, Lec. 16.

† Vol. i, July, 1841.

‡ M. Cousin is evidently in error in asserting that Locke "confounds reflection with consciousness;" (see Lec. 17, vol. ii, or Psychology, p. 72;) since reflection is occupied about not only those ideas that are present in the mind, but indeed seems to cover our whole mental activity, past as well as present operations of the mind.

§ Locke's Essay, b. i, ch. 2.

the mind at this moment is roused from its dormant state to a state of activity, an *idea* has found lodgment in its domains, it has now the notion of some sensible object, or an "*idea of sensation*"*—its next essay is to "reflect" upon the mental activity excited by the "*ideas of sensation*" it has received, and hence results a new class of ideas, ideas not of sensation, but of reflection.†

It is undoubtedly true that our senses form one of the great inlets of human knowledge; and that we are much dependent upon them, especially in the early period of our lives, for our ideas. It is also true that they not only furnish the understanding with ideas, but also that the understanding, by reflecting upon these ideas, gains other ideas. Thus: I gaze upon a beautiful landscape, and that mental activity which we denominate emotion of beauty is excited. Here I evidently have a perception, an *idea*, if you please, of colors, in gazing upon the landscape; but in reflecting upon the mental activity thus excited, I gain an additional idea, viz., that which comprehends the mental activity, as simple perception evidently does not, an idea of beauty, or of an emotion of beauty. This much we admit, because it accords with experience and common sense. But when we would go on to make the broad, the comprehensive inference, that this is the natural or logical order of ideas, we are restrained by the fact that there is not enough contained in the premises to warrant the conclusion.

The fact that this is the order in which knowledge seems generally to be acquired, is no proof that sensation furnishes the primary data of mental activity, or even that our first ideas are those of sensation.

Our objections to this doctrine are,—

1. *That it wants proof.*—To say that this accords with human experience, and therefore needs no further proof, is not satisfactory. How shall we know it accords with human experience? Shall we turn our thoughts within, and test it by our inward consciousness? Consciousness reveals no such fact. It apprises us only of our present mental operations, without giving any indication of their moving cause, unless, indeed, it reveals the *me*, the *soul*, as their cause. Shall we then call in memory to our aid, and interrogate it concerning the past?‡ We may, it is true, discover, or think we discover, that our ideas in the early period of our lives were few, and, for the most part, had reference to external objects, and, consequently, were received through the senses. But memory teaches nothing more; it determines not whether our first mental

* Locke's Essay, b. ii, ch. 1, § 3, 9, &c.

† Ibid, § 4, 8, &c.

‡ Upham's Ment. Phil., vol. i, p. 62.

activity resulted from sensation, or whether it was the spontaneous offspring of the soul itself. Who, indeed, can follow up the mighty stream of his thoughts till he reaches their fountain head, and there define the circumstances under which they began to flow, and the agency by which they were called forth? Equally absurd is it to appeal to the infant mind, till some mode of communication, aside from sense, be discovered. Who, indeed, can lift the veil that envelops the infant mind, and discover to us its operations from their very first origin? And yet all this must be done before we can with certainty assert that our "ideas of sensation are first, those of reflection subsequent."

Again: perhaps it will be urged that there is a logical necessity for this consecution and dependence of our mental states, inasmuch as *reflection* implies the subsequent possession of ideas; for there can be no reflection without ideas to reflect upon.* Now, if we go one step further, and admit that all our ideas come through either sensation or reflection,† the logical necessity will be fully established. Without this it will not. But it so turns out, that this is a feature in Locke's theory that we stoutly deny, and our reasons for that denial will be assigned under their appropriate head.

2. *That it involves the absurdity of supposing the mind to be the recipient of an idea, or of ideas, before it possesses any knowledge of itself or consciousness of its own existence.*—This theory contemplates the mind as a kind of reservoir, perfectly passive in the reception of ideas of sense, which are unceremoniously thrown into it; and it is only after these ideas have been received that the mind is aroused to conscious action and life. We are not even allowed to suppose that our ideas of internal origin are simultaneous in their origin with those of sense, for our theory distinctly declares them to be "subsequent." That the mind can thus receive an idea, as of color, or of solidity, for instance, while yet it possesses no consciousness of *self*, seems to border more upon the chimeras of the imagination than upon the deductions of philosophy. We can readily conceive of an article of merchandise deposited in an unconscious ware-room; but to suppose the mind, while yet it has no knowledge of its own existence, to entertain ideas of sense, obtruding themselves as unbidden guests, and receiving the mind's notice ere yet it had ever bestowed notice upon itself, is a little too paradoxical. Yet such are the requisitions which this theory makes upon our credulity.

3. *That other ideas, especially that of existence, are received by the mind simultaneously with, if not prior to, ideas of sensa-*

* Locke's Essay, b. ii, ch. 1, § 20.

† Ibid, § 5.

tion.—Admitting that all sensation is in the mind*—a doctrine which the followers of Locke particularly insist upon, but one which, to say the least of it, has rather been assumed than proved to be true†—we say, admitting this to be the fact, then we shall have the mind passive in sensation, but active in perception. Now it is evident that the mind can have no idea of sense till it perceives, or, in other words, puts forth the act of perception. For instance, we have no idea of color till perception is exercised; for this exercise of perception is the receiving, or, rather, the forming of the idea of color. Now we apprehend that we are so constituted that whatever mental activity is called forth, we are directly conscious of that activity, and also that it is the *I*, *self*, or the *me*, if you please, who is active. This idea of *self*, of existence, we believe to be inseparable from mental activity; it is indispensable to every act of consciousness. Hence the idea of *existence*, which is not an idea of sensation, must have been originated in the mind simultaneously, at least, with the first beginnings of mental activity, since the mind does not act without a consciousness of the *me* that acts. Thus it is that we are led from *activity* to *being*, from psychology to ontology.

That we have not misconstrued the facts and nature of consciousness as it really exists in the human mind, must be evident to all who will take the trouble to "look within" and interrogate *themselves* upon the subject. That we have not misconstrued it as it is exhibited in the speculations of philosophers, we will present a few quotations to show. Professor Upham says, "Every instance of consciousness may be regarded as embracing in itself the three following distinct notions at least: (1.) The idea of *self* or *personal existence*; (2.) Some quality, state, or operation of the mind; (3.) A relative perception of possession, appropriation, or belonging to."‡ Dr. Rauch says, "Self-consciousness is the root of all our knowledge; it must accompany our mental activities,

* Schmucker's Philosophy, p. 111.

† This doctrine, too, involves some rather curious consequences. If, as Professor Upham says, sensation is wholly in the mind, (*Ment. Phil.*, vol. i, p. 77,) then we naturally infer that whatever experiences sensation possesses *mind*. Have we not clear and indubitable evidence that the brute creation, in all its varieties and orders, are capable of sensation? The veriest reptile we crush beneath our feet, the insect so minute that microscopic power only can reveal its existence, and the oyster luxuriating in its native element—all are endowed with sentient life, are capable of sensation. Have they, therefore, minds?

‡ *Ment. Phil.*, vol. i, p. 256.

and, without it, it would be in vain to investigate the nature of the soul.* Cousin says, "Consciousness is a witness which gives us information of every thing which takes place in the interior of our minds."† Dugald Stewart says, "The moment that a sensation is excited, we learn two facts at once:—the existence of the sensation and our own existence as sentient beings;—in other words, the very first exercise of my consciousness necessarily implies a belief, not only of the present existence of what is felt, but of the present existence of that which thinks and feels; or (to employ plainer language) the present existence of that being which I denote by the words *I* and *myself*."‡

Again, admitting that the mind is passive in sensation, or, as M'Cormac says, is provoked to activity by it;§ and also that it is involuntary in its first perceptions, or in the reception of its first ideas of external entities, still we cannot but suppose that it receives them knowingly, it must know itself, the receiver, as well as the idea that is received.

4. *That it is incompatible with a correct interpretation of our mental phenomena.*—It represents the mind as first embracing an idea, then reflecting upon, or taking cognizance of, its own operations. Whereas both operations are simultaneous. The soul feels and thinks at once. Sensation cannot precede our cognizance of sensation; for the cognizance comes along with the sensation, and is inseparably connected with it. We are not to look upon man as exercising first one of his faculties, then another, and another. This would be a factitious, not a real man. "The intellectual life implies the simultaneous working of several faculties, very much as the organic life is conditioned by the simultaneous working of many organs. There is in both an intimate unity which cannot be constructed piecemeal."||

Our limits do not admit of our pursuing this subject further. But we have already said enough to, at least, lay the foundation of an important philosophical principle. For, admitting that the internal intellect is developed simultaneously with the external, we infer that it is a primitive and independent source of knowledge. It is primitive, because nothing precedes it. It is independent of sensation, because originating simultaneously with sensation, it cannot be dependent upon it.

5. *That it contemplates our material organization as the prin-*

* Rauch's Psychology, p. 46.

† Cousin's Psychology, p. 163.

‡ Philosophical Essays, Works, vol. iv, p. 54.

§ The Philosophy of Human Nature, p. 10.

|| Henry's Hist. Phil., vol. ii, p. 44.

ciple or cause of our mental activity, thereby making the soul the instrument used by the senses, instead of considering the material organization, the brain and nervous system, the instruments used by the soul.

We are, by this theory, taught to look upon the soul as in a dormant state, safely housed in its material home, and excited to activity only by some impression made upon the organs of sense.

"In this part (the reception of simple ideas, either of sensation or reflection) the understanding is merely passive; and whether or no it will have these beginnings, and, as it were, materials of knowledge, is not in its own power. For the objects of our senses do, many of them, obtrude their particular ideas upon our minds, whether we will or no; and the operations of our minds will not let us be without, at least, some obscure notions of them. No man can be wholly ignorant of what he does when he thinks. These simple ideas, when offered to the mind, the understanding can no more refuse to have, nor alter, when they are imprinted, nor blot them out, and make new ones itself, than a mirror can refuse, alter, or obliterate the images or ideas which the objects set before it do therein produce, [objects producing *ideas* in mirrors!] As the bodies that surround us do diversely affect our organs, the mind is *forced* to receive the impressions, and cannot avoid the perception of those ideas that are annexed to them."—*Locke's Essay*, b. ii, ch. 1, § 25.

"The soul, considered in its relationship to external nature," says Professor Upham, "may be compared to a stringed instrument. Regarded in itself, it is an invisible existence, having the capacity and elements of harmony. The nerves, the eye, and the senses generally are the chords and artificial framework which God has woven round its unseen and unsearchable essence. This living and curious instrument, which was before voiceless and silent, sends forth its sounds of harmony as soon as it is swept by outward influences."* Mr. Locke says, "In bare naked perception, the mind is, for the most part, only passive; and what it perceives, it cannot avoid perceiving."† Now, we apprehend it to be a very important question, and one that has a very important bearing upon the freedom of the will, whether the mind be active or passive in perception; or, rather, whether the organs are the principle or the instruments in the production of the phenomena of sensation. But, says one, would you urge that a man can see without eyes? By no means, any more than we would assert that a man could walk without feet, or chop without hands. But does a man walk because he *has* feet, or because he voluntarily determines to *use* his feet for that purpose? The principle involved

* *Ment. Phil.*, vol. i, p. 60.

† *Locke's Essay*, b. ii, ch. 9, § 1.

here is not of slight importance. It is none other than the question of *free activity*. It is the question whether the activity of the mind in sensation and perception is *forced* or *free*. And, indeed, if we do not find free activity here, where shall we find it? Follow the theory out into its details. Allow to the mind only a forced activity in sensation and perception; direct the order, the consecution of our mental states, or the trains of our ideas by the controlling influence of the laws of mental association; let these two principles be premised, and though we may still claim for a man that he acts *freely*, yet it is in the same sense that the watch acts freely when its parts are aptly fitted and well greased; we shall be on the high road to the conclusion that "*liberty belongs not to the will.*"*

But what are the facts in the case? Let us appeal to the consciousness. Are we not as fully conscious that it is the free act of *self* when we see or hear as when we think or reason? Interrogate the soul on this point. Does it, or indeed can it, give any other solution to the phenomena of perception than that which renders itself the principle rather than the instrument?† Consciousness must be belied, and its authority set aside, before any other solution can be received. But perhaps it will be objected, that if free activity be essential to perception, a man might choose only those sensations and perceptions which were agreeable; and, again, than the organ of sense may be so powerfully affected by its proper excitant as to render it impossible for us not to notice the impression, just as violent bodily suffering necessarily produces a perception of pain. We will not undertake to enter into the minutiae of the subject, and trace it out into all its details. Our limits will not admit of it. Nor indeed is it necessary, if we admit the primitive data of consciousness, and also that we have reported that data correctly. We can readily enough conceive of a palace, whose outer courts being accessible to all, are thronged with innumerable guests, none of whom can gain access to the palace without a notice and reception from its owner and master. Just so the outer courts (if we may so speak) of the mind are thronged with guests, not in the form of *ideas*, but of organic impressions. Some of these guests may be good, others bad; some pleasant, others disagreeable; this, however, is to be determined by information concerning the guests themselves. Some may be clamorous for admittance, and seem almost to force from the master the

* Locke's Essay, b. ii, ch. 21, § 20.

† "The native activity of the soul prompts us to action."—*Schmucker's Psychology*.

prompt attention they receive ; others wait quietly till he attends to their claims ; or, perhaps, if long neglected, pass away unnoticed.

Now let us attend well to this fact as it is exhibited in the following passage, in which Locke seems to have leaped quite out of the traces of his theory :—

“ How often may a man observe in himself, that while his mind is intently employed in the contemplation of some objects, and curiously surveying some ideas that are there, it takes no notice of impressions of sounding bodies made upon the organ of hearing with the same alteration that uses to be for the producing the idea of sound ! A sufficient impulse there may be on the organ ; but if not reaching the observation of the mind, there follows no perception ; and though the motion that uses to produce the idea of sound be made in the ear, yet no sound is heard. Want of sensation, in this case, is not through any defect in the organ, or that the man's ears are less affected than at other times when he does hear ; but that which uses to produce the idea, though conveyed in by the usual organ, *not being taken notice of in the understanding*, and so imprinting no idea in the mind, there follows no sensation.”—*Locke's Essay*, b. ii, ch. 9, § 4.

So, then, *attention*, (“ *taking notice of*,”) according to Locke's admission, is essential to sensation. But what is attention ? Does it not imply a volition ? an exercise of the will, directing, condensing, and confining the mental powers ?* This, we presume, will hardly be questioned. The inevitable conclusion, then, to which we are led is, that without attention, without the free activity of the mind, there can be no sensation. Without this indispensable prerequisite all impressions made upon the senses go no further, at their utmost limit, than the brain. Without the mind's notice, they acquire no higher character than mere organic impressions.

This part of the subject we can pursue no further ; we will now bestow a passing notice (for it is all our limits will admit) upon the fourth leading feature of Locke's theory of the origin of ideas.

4. *All ideas either from sensation or reflection.*†—We need not delay to point out again the technical meaning of the words sensation and reflection ; but will proceed at once to weigh the theory in the balance of *ideas*.

Let us instance the idea of *self-existence*. That such an idea finds place in the human mind, it is unnecessary to argue. How, then, does it get there ? by sensation or reflection ? Not by sensation, evidently, since we neither see, hear, feel, smell, nor taste it. Again, the mind receives it not through reflection ; for, “ the

* See Upham, vol. i, p. 198, *et seq.*

† Locke's *Essay*, b. ii, ch. 1, § 2.

ideas it (that is, reflection) affords are such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself.* Reflection, then, implies the antecedent idea of *self*, for how can the mind "reflect on its own operations within itself," while yet it had no knowledge of its "own" self! Just imagine yourself reflecting upon the operations of a steam-engine, without a knowledge of the existence of such an engine! But, again, Mr. Locke says, "By reflection, then, in the following part of this discourse, I would be understood to mean that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them; by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding."† Reflection, then, gives us a knowledge of the *operations* of the me, or of self, and not of its *existence*.

It comes, then, to this, the idea of self is not innate, is not derived through the senses, nor yet through reflection; and to completely bar the ingress of such an idea, we have only to admit that "all ideas are either from sensation or reflection,"‡ and the work is done; every avenue is barricaded by the bars and bolts of theory. But then is not the idea of *self* in the human mind? Most certainly; it got in before Locke's theory closed the doors against it. The true solution of this is, that the ideas of *existence*, *self-existence*, and *personal identity* are spontaneously suggested in the mind and are inseparably connected with the *fact* of existence. "At the very earliest period they flow out, as it were, from the mind itself; not resulting from any long and laborious process, but freely and spontaneously suggested by it."§ "Such is our nature that we cannot exist without having the notion of existence."|| "Nature has implanted within us this spontaneity of thought, this intuitive directness of perception, and thus taken care to furnish important elements of knowledge, which could be possessed by no other."¶

We will not now pursue this subject further. We will only ask the reader to bring this theory to the test of our ideas of SPACE, of INFINITY, of RIGHT AND WRONG, of GOD, and also of various other ideas, of which we are the undoubted possessors.** C.

Amenia Seminary, Dec., 1842.

* Locke's Essay, b. ii, ch. 1, § 4.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid, § 2.

§ Upham's Ment. Phil., vol. i, p. 235.

|| Ibid, p. 234.

¶ Ibid, p. 237.

** On this subject see also Cousin's Psychology, ch. 2, *et seq.*

ART. VIII.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. *Memoirs of Mr. Wesley's Missionaries to America. Compiled from Authentic Sources.* By Rev. P. P. SANDFORD. 12mo., pp. 390. New-York: G. Lane & P. P. Sandford. 1843.

THE history of the labors and sacrifices of the holy men employed by Mr. Wesley in the great work of spreading the gospel in this country must increase in importance and interest with the lapse of time. In this history we see the great work of God, which has brought such vast multitudes to the knowledge of the truth, in its incipient stages. And when we look back from our present position to the infancy of American Methodism, we are led, with devout admiration, to exclaim, "What hath God wrought?"

The present work is compiled from authentic documents, by Rev. P. P. Sandford, who has spared no pains to make it acceptable and useful. The matter in general is left, as it is fit that it should be, in its original state; and having been composed by plain, practical men, who were more concerned to relate such facts as would magnify the grace of God, than to gratify the taste of mere scholars, they did not, in their narratives, affect the graces of composition. The style of these Memoirs, consequently, will not always bear the test of a comparison with the models of modern taste. All this, notwithstanding, it may be presumed that the work will be joyfully greeted by the members and friends of our church as a fine illustration of primitive Methodism, and will remain, to the end of time, among the permanent records of the rise and progress of that great revival of Scriptural holiness, which we devoutly pray may never decline, until the knowledge of the Lord shall fill the earth as the waters fill the great deep.

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2. *Methodism in its Origin, Economy, and Present Position.* By Rev. JAMES DIXON, D. D., ex-president of the Wesleyan Conference. 18mo., pp. 360. New-York: G. Lane & P. P. Sandford. 1843.

THE basis of the present work was a sermon delivered before the British Conference of 1842. Being requested by the conference to publish his discourse, the author has wisely expanded it into a volume. The origin and character of Wesleyan Methodism are subjects of deep interest and animated discussion at the present time. Though the Wesleyan Connection in Great Britain have, ever since the organization of the conference, developed all the attributes of a *church*, in the true Scriptural sense of that term, yet such has been their regard for the national Establishment, that they have refrained from assuming that title, and contented themselves with the modest appellation of a "connection." The recent movement in the Establishment, and the aggressive measures against the Methodists, which have been some of its legitimate fruits, have finally compelled them to take different, and, as we conceive, more legitimate ground. Dr. Dixon openly and conclusively maintains the true *church* character of the *connection* from

the indubitable testimony of Holy Scripture; and in prosecuting his argument, meets high-Church claims with a most triumphant refutation and withering rebuke. The work is timely, and, as a whole, for scope of thought, conclusiveness of reasoning, and purity of style, will scarcely find a rival in the mass of excellent productions which have emanated from the Methodist press in England since the days of Mr. Wesley. We can have no doubt but this most excellent and timely production will be eagerly sought for and read.

3. *Annals of the Christian Church. In Familiar Conversations. For Young People.* By Mrs. PARKER, author of "Decision and Indecision," "Features of Social Life," &c. 18mo., pp. 347. New-York: G. Lane & P. P. Sandford. 1843.

THE history of the church is daily assuming additional interest. All classes of people must enter more or less into the study of the various changes which the church has passed through, and the various heresies with which she has been afflicted, in order to form a rational judgment of many questions which are constantly pressed upon their attention. The young, as well as the old, should, as far as circumstances will admit, participate in this study. To supply such portions of this history as are of primary importance, in a dress which will entertain and please youth, is the object of the present manual. And we most cheerfully award to the fair writer the credit of complete success in her undertaking. We hope this beautiful and interesting little volume will be extensively circulated and read among our people. As an introduction to the study of ecclesiastical matters it will be found admirably adapted.

4. *Practical Considerations on the Christian Sabbath.* By Rev. PETER M'OWAN. 18mo., pp. 200. New-York: G. Lane & P. P. Sandford. 1843.

RIGHT views of the nature and obligations of the sabbath are eminently important at the present moment. The desecration of this holy day is so common, and the ruinous consequences of this evil so rife in our country, that no effort should be spared which gives promise of bringing about a better state of things. We welcome this manual as timely, and we most heartily recommend it as an able and thorough exposition of the subject. We hope it will speedily find its way into every family in the connection, and would not object to its going much further.

5. *History of the Westminster Assembly of Divines.* By the Rev. W. M. HETHERINGTON, author of the "History of the Church of Scotland," "Minister's Family," &c. 12mo., pp. 311. New-York: Mark H. Newman. 1843.

THIS is a work of no ordinary interest. After a bold sketch of the English Reformation, the author proceeds to an account of the cir-

cumstances which called into being the famous Westminster Assembly. He enters into a detailed account of the controversies upon church polity which so long and painfully agitated the body, and the results and bearings of all their labors. The work contains much valuable historical matter. Though we except to some of the author's views, yet we have been amply compensated for our labor in perusing his book; and we doubt not but all who feel an interest in the stirring events of the eventful times, and the momentous matters of which he treats, after a thorough reading, will say the same.

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6. *Manual of Classical Literature.*—From the German of J. J. Eischenburg, Professor in the Carolinum at Brunswick. With Additions, embracing Treatises on the following Subjects: Classical Geography and Topography, Classical Chronology, Greek and Roman Mythology, Greek Antiquities, Roman Antiquities, Archæology of Greek Literature, Archæology of Roman Literature, Archæology of Art, History of Greek Literature, History of Roman Literature. By N. W. FISKE, Professor in Amherst College. Fourth edition—six thousand. 8vo., pp. 690.

7. *Supplemental Plates to the Manual of Classical Literature.* 8vo.,—52 in number. Philadelphia: Edward C. Biddle. 1843.

THE extensive use which has been made of the "Manual of Classical Literature" in our academies and colleges, is, of itself, a sufficient recommendation of the work, and a sufficient guaranty to the publisher for the sale of another large edition. The American public owe a debt of gratitude to the learned translator, and the publisher, for so truly valuable an assistant in the department of ancient literature, which we have no doubt will be repaid by liberal and continued patronage. The volume of "Supplemental Plates" should, by all means, be obtained with the original work. The mechanical execution of the work is highly creditable to the publisher.

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8. *Lectures on the Epistle of Paul to the Romans.* By THOMAS CHALMERS, D. D., LL.D., Professor of Theology in the University of Edinburgh, and Corresponding Member of the Royal Institute of France. Second edition. 8vo., double columns, pp. 521. New-York: Robert Carter. Pittsburg: Thomas Carter. 1843.

THIS is a *great* book, upon a *great* subject, from a *great* man. Though, considering the author's theological views, it cannot be expected that we would agree with all his expositions; yet we are perfectly free to recommend his work, with some exceptions and abatements, which will easily be detected by the reader. As we have not space to give it an adequate notice in the present number, we must waive our impressions in relation to the work to a future occasion, when we hope to bestow upon it all due attention.

9. *Classical Studies: Essays on Ancient Literature and Art. With the Biographies and Correspondence of Eminent Philologists.* By BARNAS SEARS, President of Newton Theological Institution; B. B. EDWARDS, Professor in Andover Theological Seminary; and C. C. FELTON, Professor in Harvard University. 12mo., pp. 413. Boston: Gould, Kendall, & Lincoln. 1843.

THIS volume is a high tribute to classical learning and philological research. It contains some of the best efforts of the age upon the character and value of the classics, with correspondences and biographical notices of several of the leading German philologists. A rare treat to a classical student.

10. "*The Episcopal Church Defended*." *Reviewed: being a Vindication of Methodist Episcopacy.* By ALLEN STEELE, of the Genesee Conference. 12mo., pp. 264. Batavia: Frederick Follett. 1843.

THIS is an answer to a weak, puerile attack upon the government of the Methodist Episcopal Church, by the Rev. J. A. Bolles, of the Protestant Episcopal Church. We have not space to give our impressions with regard to this controversy. We are always sorry to see matters merely personal mingled in the discussion of topics of general interest. In this case, however, the responsibility seems clearly devolved upon Mr. Bolles. His impertinence and effrontery, which are quite unbounded, are well chastised by our brother, and his errors ably refuted.

11. *Essays on the Church of God.* By JOHN MASON, D. D. Edited by the Rev. EBENEZER MASON. 12mo., pp. 258. New-York: Robert Carter. 1843.

THIS book contains a sketch of the nature, organization, &c., of the church, drawn out, as every thing from Dr. Mason was, with a bold hand. Many points of the important subject are clearly, and, as we conceive, truly stated; but, as a whole, it cannot claim to be a perfect treatise on the church. Indeed, the man who will execute such a work upon the proper basis will do what has not yet been done.

12. *Geological Cosmogony; or, an Explanation of the Geological Theory of the Origin and Antiquity of the Earth, and of the Causes and Objects of the Changes it has undergone.* By a Layman. 18mo., pp. 167. New-York: Robert Carter. 1843.

THIS is an effort to show that the geological theory, which gives a higher antiquity to the earth than that which is given in the Mosaic account, is "not well founded." It is a clever little book, but will not convince "the philosophers."

13. *Prayers for the Use of Families; or, the Domestic Minister's Assistant.* By WILLIAM JAY, author of Sermons, Discourses, &c., &c. With an Appendix. 12mo., pp. 311. New-York: M. W. Dodd. 1843.

THESE prayers are beautifully appropriate, and breathe a holy, heavenly spirit. We cannot recommend any set forms of prayer, however excellent, as superseding extempore prayer, coming from the deep feelings of the heart. But, in addition to this, we doubt not but such prayers as these may be read in the family circle with great profit. They will supply the young and inexperienced with appropriate language, and expand their views as to the proper matter of prayer.

14. *Memoir of Mrs. Mary Howe, of the City of New-York. Containing Selections from her Letters and Diary.* By her Husband. 18mo., pp. 282. New-York: G. Lane & P. P. Sandford. 1843.

THE author of this little work has executed his delicate task with no mean skill. The work abounds with pious reflections, and will no doubt be read with great interest and profit.

15. *Missionary Labors and Scenes in Southern Africa.* By ROBERT MOFFATT, twenty-three Years an Agent of the London Missionary Society in that Continent. Fourth edition. 12mo., pp. 406. New-York: Robert Carter. 1843.

THE present work is both instructive and highly entertaining. It presents an account of the most glorious successes of the missionary enterprise among the most deeply degraded of our race. He who has any doubts remaining with regard to the suitableness and efficacy of the gospel to restore fallen human nature from the lowest depths of ignorance and sensual abasement, will do well to read the work of Mr. Moffatt. Here are also many strong exhibitions of the true missionary spirit. What self-denial! what Christian heroism! what bowels of mercy are here displayed! If the curious are not to be influenced by higher motives to peruse this work, the descriptions of savage life—the miraculous escapes—the romantic adventures, will, we doubt not, invite their attention.

16. *Memoirs of the Life of the Rev. John Williams, Missionary to Polynesia.* By EBENEZER PROUT, of Halstead. First American edition. 12mo., pp. 416. New-York: M. W. Dodd. 1842.

THIS work is a history of the labors, sacrifices, and successes of one of the most devoted missionaries of modern times. The subject of this Memoir was for twenty-three years identified with the South Sea Missions. The book is full of incident, and records the glorious triumphs of the cross among the poor islanders, the intelligence of which has so often gladdened the churches in every part of the Christian world. The fall of Williams was tragical, but glorious. Murdered, and probably devoured by cannibals, some might be disposed to say, "Died thou as a fool diest." But he fell at his post—in the field of conflict—and that God who made "the blood of the martyrs the seed of the church" in the early ages of Christianity, can make the mysterious death of this devoted missionary upon the shore of an island, inhabited by the rudest savages, the means of the moral regeneration of thousands of these poor besotted heathen.

17. *The History of the Puritans, or Protestant Nonconformists; from the Reformation in 1517 to the Revolution in 1688. Comprising an Account of their Principles; their Attempts for a further Reformation in the Church; their Sufferings; and the Lives and Characters of their most considerable Divines.* By DANIEL NEAL. Reprinted from the Text of Dr. Foulmin's edition. Revised, corrected, and enlarged with Additional Notes. By JOHN O. CHOULES. With nine portraits on steel. New-York: Harper & Brothers.

THIS is a timely publication. The work of Neal is now scarce and costly, and the times now loudly call for all the light that can be shed upon the history of the English Reformation. The history of the Puritans is an essential portion of the history of Christianity in Great Britain from the days of Elizabeth, and is connected with the history of the settlement of this country and of our religious institutions. We have no fears that any new elements of sectarianism have been infused into the work by the editor; but confidently expect from his well-stored mind much valuable additional matter. The work is not yet published, but will be forthcoming soon. A formal review of it may be expected on a future occasion.

18. *Notes, Explanatory and Practical, on the Epistle to the Hebrews.* By ALBERT BARNES. 12mo., pp. 335. New-York: Harper & Brothers.

WE have not been able to examine this volume very extensively. As far as we are able to judge, we should think the industrious author in this volume fully sustains his high reputation as a practical commentator. It is upon an important portion of Scripture, and we hope may do much good. We presume he succeeds better upon most parts of the Hebrews than upon the sixth chapter. Here we see he stumbles; but we expected nothing else,

